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S A M U E L  B E S W I C K  
Retroactive Adjudication 
abstract.  This Article defends the retroactive nature of judicial lawmaking. Recent Supreme 
Court judgments have reignited debate on the retroactivity of novel precedent. When a court an-
nounces a new rule, does it apply only to future cases or also to disputes arising in the past? This 
Article shows that the doctrine of non-retroactive adjudication offers no adequate answer. In at-
tempting to articulate a law of non-retroactivity, the Supreme Court has cycled through five flawed 
frameworks. It has variously characterized adjudicative non-retroactivity as (1) a problem of legal 
philosophy; (2) a discretionary exercise for balancing competing right and reliance interests; (3) a 
matter of choice of law; (4) a remedial issue; and (5) a contingency of last resort. This Article 
rejects these paradigms and instead offers an alternative framework grounded in conventional 
common-law reasoning: that judicial precedent is inherently retroactive. The “equitable consider-
ations” animating this body of law can best be fulfilled by judicial abandonment of non-retroac-
tivity doctrine. Instead, courts should respond to “new” law by turning to a long-held value in our 
legal system: that equity aids the vigilant, not those who sleep on their rights. 
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The temporal scope of judicial decisions has long been “among the most dif-
ficult of those [issues] which have engaged the attention of courts.”1 When a 
court announces a new rule, does the new rule apply only to future cases or also 
to disputes arising in the past? 
Over the past half century, the Supreme Court has addressed this temporal 
puzzle primarily through the lens of non-retroactivity doctrine. This doctrine, 
also known as “prospective overruling” of the law, defies the conventional con-
ception of common-law adjudication whereby judicial decisions both bear upon 
past events and lay down the law for future cases. Non-retroactive adjudication 
constrains the effects of judicial changes in the law from applying to the past. 
Only events postdating a new precedent are treated as governed by it. Litigants’ 
rights to legal recourse under this doctrine are thus determined according to the 
timing and outcome of any relevant leading case. 
Federal non-retroactivity doctrine peaked during the Warren Court era. It 
now seems destined for demise before the Roberts Court. While scholars con-
tinue to argue that non-retroactivity is a useful paradigm, this Article contends 
that it is not. To the contrary, non-retroactive adjudication is a defective and su-
perfluous doctrine. It lacks a coherent and generally accepted rationale. There is 
no agreement within the judiciary or academe as to how the doctrine should be 
conceived. Non-retroactivity cannot even perform its basic job: to rationalize 
and contain the temporal scope of novel precedent. 
This Article advances an alternative framework for understanding novel 
precedent, one that returns to conventional common-law reasoning. This frame-
work orients judges’ focus toward the claims that come immediately before their 
courts—those over which they have direct jurisdiction. It embraces the retroac-
tivity of judicial precedent. Disputes over rights, adjudicated by courts, can only 
be resolved from the perspective of hindsight, and they cannot feasibly be insu-
lated from developments in precedent. Precedent today necessarily informs our 
understanding of past rights. That does not mean, however, that new rights of 
action are unlimited in temporal scope. Rather, interests of justice and fairness 
are embodied in long-recognized temporal limits on plaintiffs’ rights to obtain 
relief from a court. 
Supreme Court jurisprudence on the temporal scope of novel precedent has 
effectively been dormant since the mid-1990s.2 But recent judgments have reig-
nited the retroactivity debate. A�er the Supreme Court in Obergefell v. Hodges 
declared that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees same-sex couples a right 
 
1. Chicot Cty. Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 374 (1940). 
2. See infra Section I.D. 
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to marry, 3  attention turned to the judgment’s remedial implications. Many 
scholars encourage “backdating” same-sex marriage to vindicate the rights of 
those previously denied the constitutional protection.4 They argue, for example, 
that where a same-sex spouse passed away before Obergefell was handed down, 
courts should uphold the partner’s claims to surviving-spouse pension benefits 
or to the primary share of the deceased’s estate by treating the couple as retroac-
tively married in law.5 Others counsel restraining the judgment’s retroactive ef-
fects to protect prior reliance interests and the finality of past transactions.6 
These scholars are concerned that, among other things, retroactive expansion of 
spousal property rights and liabilities under Obergefell would likely not have been 
anticipated and accounted for by same-sex couples—nor, indeed, by their credi-
tors (who may gain access to newly deemed community property) or by those 
with whom they entered (now potentially voidable) transactions. Both of the 
competing “right” and “reliance” arguments are compelling. 
A similar dynamic has followed the Court’s decision in Janus v. AFSCME, 
which held that the deduction of union agency fees from nonconsenting public-
sector employees violated the First Amendment. 7 Immediately following the 
judgment, plaintiffs sought to vindicate their newly announced rights through 
lawsuits filed across the country demanding recovery of fees paid before Janus 
was decided. Some scholars believe such plaintiffs have good constitutional and 
private-law grounds, given that Janus held that these fees were unconstitu-
tional. 8  Others do not, on the grounds that agency fees “were indisputably 
 
3. 576 U.S. 644, 675 (2015). 
4. See, e.g., Peter Nicolas, Backdating Marriage, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 395, 395-96, 425-41 (2017); 
Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, Loving Retroactivity, 45 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 383 passim (2018); 
Kate Shoemaker, Post-Deportation Remedy and Windsor’s Promise, 63 UCLA L. REV. 168 passim 
(2016); Lee-ford Tritt, Moving Forward by Looking Back: The Retroactive Application of Ober-
gefell, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 873 passim; see also Michael J. Higdon, While They Waited: Pre-Ober-
gefell Lives and the Law of Nonmarriage, 129 YALE L.J.F. 1, 1 (2019) (discussing how the courts 
must “wrestle with the question whether any portion of a pre-Obergefell relationship should 
count toward the length of the ensuing marriage”). 
5. See, e.g., Nicolas, supra note 4, at 398, 402; Tritt, supra note 4, at 922. 
6. See, e.g., Andrea B. Carroll & Christopher K. Odinet, Gay Marriage and the Problem of Property, 
93 WASH. U. L. REV. 847, 851-54 (2016); see also Huiyi Chen, Balancing Implied Fundamental 
Rights and Reliance Interests: A Framework for Limiting the Retroactive Effects of Obergefell in 
Property Cases, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1417, 1420, 1435-49 (2016) (describing the potential for “sig-
nificant disruption of settled property interests due to the retroactive application” of Oberge-
fell). 
7. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018), overruling Abood v. 
Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977). 
8. E.g., William Baude & Eugene Volokh, Compelled Subsidies and the First Amendment, 132 HARV. 
L. REV. 171, 172, 203 (2018). 
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lawful” at the time of collection.9 Since fee refunds could bankrupt unions, these 
scholars would limit the retroactive effect of Janus to protect union coffers based 
on the unions’ reasonable reliance on the state of the law at the time agency fees 
were collected.10 
This tension between newly declared rights and reliance on prior established 
rights arises whenever a court “changes” the law as previously understood. 
Claims for restitution of unlawful taxes are another prominent example. When 
a court strikes down a taxing statute or overrules prior precedent, its new prece-
dent presents plaintiffs with a compelling claim to a remedy for their unlawfully 
impinged rights.11 Prima facie, plaintiffs are entitled to restitution of taxes im-
properly paid.12 There should, a�er all, be no taxation without (valid) legisla-
tion. But defendant states and municipalities have a compelling counterargu-
ment: that their treasuries should not be vulnerable to extensive money claims 
based on interpretations of law that were not known at the time of collection.13 
The stakes are high. In the leading Supreme Court case on recovery of unconsti-
tutional taxes, $1.8 billion of tax revenue hinged on the retroactivity of the Su-
preme Court’s new precedent.14 In the United Kingdom, £55 billion of tax reve-
nue was thought to be at stake a�er tax provisions were retrospectively found to 
be incompatible with European Union law.15 
Similar concerns arise when the public- and private-party interests are in-
verted. Where private entities have benefited from a precedent that is later over-
ruled, states may be able to seek backward-looking remedies under the new prec-
edent. For example, for half a century, federal doctrine exempted businesses that 
 
9. Aaron Tang & Fred O. Smith Jr., Can Unions Be Sued for Following the Law?, 132 HARV. L. REV. 
F. 24, 24 (2018); see also Erwin Chemerinsky & Catherine L. Fisk, Exaggerating the Effects of 
Janus: A Reply to Professors Baude and Volokh, 132 HARV. L. REV. F. 42, 43-54 (2018) (arguing 
that unions are not retroactively liable under Janus). 
10. See Chemerinsky & Fisk, supra note 9, at 53-54; Tang & Smith, supra note 9, at 30-37. 
11. See, e.g., McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 31-33 (1990). 
12. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 19(1) (AM. LAW INST. 
2011). 
13. See Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 183 (1990) (plurality opinion) (“[W]e think 
it unjust to impose this burden [of retroactive tax refunds] when the State relied on valid, 
existing precedent in enacting and implementing its tax.”). 
14. See Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 130 (1993) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“The 
States estimate that their total liability will exceed $1.8 billion.”). 
15. Charles Mitchell, End of the Road for the Overpaid Tax Litigation?, 9 U.K. SUP. CT. Y.B. 1, 1 
(2018). 
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had no “physical presence” in a state from state sales tax.16 When the Supreme 
Court was invited in South Dakota v. Wayfair to overrule the physical-presence 
rule,17 the respondent businesses implored judicial restraint, warning that over-
ruling the long-standing precedent would “expose all remote sellers that have 
relied on the rule to retroactive liability in dozens, if not hundreds, or even thou-
sands of jurisdictions.”18 The temporal repercussions of adjudication are perva-
sive, and managing them may seem irresoluble. 
The solution to this puzzle does not lie in denying the retroactive effects of 
novel precedent. A familiar flaw in theories of non-retroactivity is failure to ap-
preciate adjudication as a dynamic experience.19 Part I of this Article shows that 
novel judgments do not simply replace “old” law with “new” law. Rules and prin-
ciples are constantly subject to elaboration, challenge, and revision. Judgments 
do not apparate. They proceed from a background of complaint and litigation. 
The stakes are set long before issues reach a courtroom. In this context, novel 
judgments may be considered surprising, but they are never wholly a surprise. 
The protest that novel precedent unpredictably “changes” past law on which par-
ties may have “relied” is thus overwrought. Since interpretation of law is not 
divisible into static points in time, adjudicating courts can only coherently un-
derstand past rights in light of prevailing law. Judicial precedent is by nature 
retroactive: there is no prospectivity puzzle at all. 
This Article advances two core contributions to non-retroactivity scholar-
ship. First, Part II challenges the prevailing rationales for non-retroactivity 
 
16. See South Dakota v. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2091-92 (2018) (describing the physical-pres-
ence rule and tracing it to Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967)); 
see also Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 301-02 (1992) (declining to overrule Bellas 
Hess). 
17. 138 S. Ct. at 2087-88. 
18. Respondents’ Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 35, Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. 
2080 (No. 17-494); see Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2104 (Roberts, C.J., joined by Breyer, Sotomayor 
& Kagan, JJ., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for overruling the Court’s established prec-
edent when instead Congress could legislate and “provide a nuanced answer to the troubling 
question whether any change will have retroactive effect”); Michael T. Fatale, Wayfair, What’s 
Fair, and Undue Burden, 22 CHAP. L. REV. 19, 34-35, 42-43 (2019) (discussing the possible ret-
roactive effects of Wayfair); cf. Richard D. Pomp, Wayfair: Its Implications and Missed Oppor-
tunities, 58 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 1, 14 (2019) (noting that “the states seem not to be applying 
Wayfair retroactively”). 
19. Cf. HANOCH DAGAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM & RETHINKING PRIVATE 
LAW THEORY 63-65 (2013) [hereina�er DAGAN, RECONSTRUCTING] (discussing “the intrinsic 
dynamism of law”); Hanoch Dagan, The Real Legacy of American Legal Realism, 38 OXFORD J. 
LEGAL STUD. 123, 144 (2018) [hereina�er Dagan, American Legal Realism] (discussing how 
“law is a dynamic institution”). But see Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equi-
librium Approach, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1055 passim (1997) (considering how the dynamic nature 
of lawmaking implicates conceptions of retroactivity). 
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doctrine in federal law. It identifies in the case law and commentary several dis-
tinct frameworks. Each framework misconceives the essence of the temporal 
problem and relies on distinctions that are arbitrary and manipulable. Non-ret-
roactive adjudication simply has no principled foundation. 
Second, Part III offers an alternative framework grounded in conventional 
common-law reasoning: that judicial precedent is inherently retroactive. Since 
adjudication is dynamic, the essential question is not when it is that law is 
changed, but rather when it is that plaintiffs can “timely challenge” the validity 
of legal rules affecting them.20 This inquiry—the time at which “novel” rights of 
action become justiciable—asks when a plaintiff incurred the complained-of 
harm. As a general matter, when a court finds with hindsight that there has been 
a violation of a plaintiff ’s right, the violation should be remedied according to 
prevailing law at the time of judgment. In most cases, that will be the end of the 
matter. In exceptional cases, where the extent of such relief would be unduly 
prejudicial to defendants, courts can invoke the equitable doctrine of laches, 
among other possible tools, to constrain the scope of litigation. A�er Janus, for 
example, a court might well be justified in limiting those who sued in Janus’s 
wake to a recovery period much shorter than that provided by the statute of lim-
itations. Judges need not deny claims entirely by resorting to the sledgehammer 
of non-retroactivity doctrine. The response to “new” law advanced in this Article 
reflects a long-held value in our legal system: that equity aids the vigilant, not 
those who sleep on their rights.21 
i .  the puzzle of novel precedent 
Whenever a court delivers a novel precedent22—a judgment that determines 
a new rule of law or overrules a prior rule—the decision carries implications for 
 
20. Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2055 (2018); see Elizabeth Earle Beske, Backdoor Balancing and 
the Consequences of Legal Change, 94 WASH. L. REV. 645, 645 (2019) (describing Lucia as her-
alding the Court’s “next big retroactivity challenge”). 
21. JAMES W. EATON, HANDBOOK OF EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 52 (1901) (“Vigilantibus non dor-
mientibus æquitas subvenit.”). 
22. This Article addresses only adjudicative (non-)retroactivity, not legislative (non-)retroactivity, 
which involves quite different considerations. See BEN JURATOWITCH, RETROACTIVITY AND 
THE COMMON LAW 67-118 (2008); CHARLES SAMPFORD, RETROSPECTIVITY AND THE RULE OF 
LAW 103-64 (2006); Neil Duxbury, Ex Post Facto Law, 58 AM. J. JURIS. 135, 158-61 (2013); J. 
Lyn Entrikin, The Death of Common Law, 42 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 351, 424 (2019). But cf. 
Jonathan S. Masur & Adam K. Mortara, Patents, Property, and Prospectivity, 71 STAN. L. REV. 
963, 997 (2019) (“There is no reason to deprive patent policymakers of the tool of prospective 
lawmaking just because those policymakers happen to be judges, rather than legislators or 
executive officials.”). 
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similarly situated parties.23 Some will seem to gain and others to lose substantive 
rights in light of the newly determined rule. Without some mechanism to limit 
the repercussions of adjudicative change, people, institutions, and courts may 
face considerable challenges reconciling parties’ conflicting claims to rights. 
This Part introduces the problems with novel precedent that have caused 
courts to entertain the idea of limiting their retroactive reach. It begins by out-
lining the puzzle of adjudication’s temporal implications. It then addresses the 
retroactive nature of adjudication and sets the scope of this Article, before turn-
ing to summarize the development and decline of non-retroactivity doctrine over 
the past century.24 
A. The Temporal Puzzle 
The doctrine of stare decisis guides lower courts to follow precedent when 
issues reappear before them.25 This reinforces the rule-of-law principle that like 
cases should be treated alike.26 It is conceptually easy for a judge to apply prece-
dent to resolve a dispute that arose a�er that precedent was delivered because no 
temporal conflict arises. It is harder when parties have ordered their affairs and 
conducted transactions on the basis of the law as it stood (or was understood) 
prior to a new precedent being delivered. In these cases, to apply a new rule of 
law that the parties did not appreciate at the time of their transaction would seem 
to undercut the parties’ reliance interests. It is not clear that justice is served by 
applying new law to such antecedent claims.27 
Kermit Roosevelt poses the problem this way: consider two parties who 
transact at Time 1. A dispute arises that, under the settled law at the time of 
transacting, would be resolved in favor of Party A, so Party A files suit. At Time 
2, the Supreme Court delivers a novel precedent in another case that changes the 
relevant legal rule. It might do so by striking down a statute or overruling a 
 
23. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 216 (3d ed. 2000). 
24. This Article does not draw a sharp distinction between the quite problematic terms “retroac-
tive” and “retrospective,” although some scholars do. See SAMPFORD, supra note 22, at 21-23 
(noting that “this distinction is made by many” who write on the temporal implications of 
novel precedent, but claiming that “it is not as important as ordinarily assumed”). 
25. See William Baude, Precedent and Discretion, 2019 SUP. CT. REV. 313, 314-29 (2020) (contend-
ing that the Roberts Court has introduced elements of arbitrary discretion into modern stare 
decisis doctrine). 
26. GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 86 (1985); BENJAMIN N. 
CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 33-34 (1921); cf. Andrei Marmor, Should Like 
Cases Be Treated Alike?, 11 LEGAL THEORY 27, 27 (2005) (arguing that the principle “like cases 
should be treated alike” is o�en confused with two other ideas: “the rationale of analogical 
reasoning in adjudication” and “the value of coherence”). 
27. See infra Section II.B. 
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precedent that had supported the earlier rule. This new precedent favors Party 
B’s position. At Time 3, the parties’ dispute reaches a court. Should the court 
resolve the dispute by applying the rule prevailing at the time of the parties’ 
transaction (Time 1) or at the time the court delivers its decision (Time 3)?28 In 
other words, should the new rule influence the outcome of cases that arose be-
fore the rule was explicitly articulated? 
For clarity, we can designate the parties to the Supreme Court’s novel deci-
sion as the “principal” parties. Our concern is with the precedent’s impact on 
other, “successive” parties. Applying the transaction-time law (so that Party A 
prevails) would seem to vindicate successive parties’ reliance interests, whereas 
applying the decision-time law (so that Party B prevails) would seem to vindi-
cate the parties’ rights as understood in the law’s best light. This scenario illus-
trates the problem that drives judicial non-retroactivity jurisprudence. The 
problem is not simply that applying a novel precedent to antecedent disputes 
subordinates the expectations that parties may have had about their rights and 
duties at the time of their transaction. The problem is that handing down such 
a precedent itself changes parties’ expectations. The novel precedent gives Party 
B reason to expect to prevail where they otherwise might not have. And it does 
so for everyone in society who acted on the basis of the “old” law—the law as it 
was understood before the Supreme Court determined the principal parties’ 
case. Thus, the problem with novel precedent is its tendency to disrupt people’s 
expectations and beliefs about their rights and duties across society. People and 
institutions who planned, acted, or transacted at a time when the law was un-
derstood to be X come to be alerted that the law is ¬X. This creates potential for 
great disruption to future expectations and past transactions. 
Huiyi Chen shows that similar problems arise when, varying Roosevelt’s sce-
nario, the “events or facts giving rise to the [successive plaintiff ’s] legal claim 
occur” at Time 1, and only a�er the new rule is delivered in the principal case at 
Time 2 does the plaintiff file suit.29 This too is a hard case because the relevant 
legal rule changes between the time of the alleged wrong and the time the wrong 
is litigated. There are many reasons why people might not litigate until a�er a 
relevant rule changes in their favor, not the least of which is that while precedent 
stood against them, such parties would have thought they had a losing case. 
Much of the post-Obergefell and post-Janus litigation exemplifies this problem: 
that novel precedent can have cascading effects by inspiring other materially sim-
ilar parties to pursue their own rights of action. 
 
28. Kermit Roosevelt III, A Little Theory Is a Dangerous Thing: The Myth of Adjudicative Retroactiv-
ity, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1075, 1080-81 (1999). 
29. Chen, supra note 6, at 1422-23; see David Lehn, Adjudicative Retroactivity as a Preclusion Prob-
lem: Dow Chemical Co. v. Stephenson, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 563, 565 (2004). 
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Roosevelt’s scenario concerns the effects of novel precedent on pending cases 
before a court, and Chen’s scenario, the effects on subsequent cases filed in court. 
In both scenarios, unfairness seems inescapable regardless of whether the suc-
cessive court applies the new rule or the old rule to the dispute before it. Since in 
both scenarios, the underlying dispute arose at a time when the old rule appar-
ently governed, each side can stand on either right or reliance to argue that their 
preferred rule should determine their dispute.30 Each side can invoke notions of 
fairness31 and efficiency32 to support their argument. How should courts sort 
between applying old law and new? 
B. Adjudication’s Inherent Retroactivity 
This Article’s thesis is that this is the wrong question. That is because the 
“old”-law versus “new”-law framing rests on a false dichotomy. As Paul Mishkin 
recognized over half a century ago, this paradigm oversimplifies the adjudicatory 
role.33 Adjudication is an inherently backward-looking exercise: cases can only 
come to the courts via (past) disputes that judges must (now) resolve.34 In this 
 
30. See infra Section II.B. 
31. See Chen, supra note 6, at 1435; Fisch, supra note 19, at 1085-86; Pamela J. Stephens, The New 
Retroactivity Doctrine: Equality, Reliance and Stare Decisis, 48 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1515, 1560-61 
(1998). 
32. See SAMPFORD, supra note 22, at 221, 236-38; Fisch, supra note 19, at 1088-91; Louis Kaplow, 
An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509, 520-66, 598-602 (1986) (eval-
uating strategies for managing legal transitions and contending that non-retroactivity of new 
rules is inefficient because market actors already absorb risks of legal change); cf. Jonathan S. 
Masur & Jonathan Remy Nash, The Institutional Dynamics of Transition Relief, 85 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 391, 394 (2010) (“Recent commentary . . . questions the scope of Kaplow’s claim. Schol-
ars have pointed out that considerations of efficiency, incentives for socially desirable invest-
ments, governmental legitimacy, and fairness might justify legal transition relief.”); Anthony 
Niblett, Delaying Declarations of Constitutional Invalidity, in THE TIMING OF LAWMAKING 299, 
319 (Frank Fagan & Saul Levmore eds., 2017) (arguing that prospective constitutional reme-
dies can mitigate some of the costs of legal transitions, which “may be socially valuable in 
particular circumstances”). See generally Kyle D. Logue, Legal Transitions, Rational Expectations, 
and Legal Progress, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 211 passim (2003) (assessing the consequen-
tialist transition frameworks that can account for adjudicative retroactivity). 
33. See Paul J. Mishkin, Foreword: The High Court, the Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time and 
Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56, 56-60 (1965). 
34. See id. at 60-72 (1965) (discussing institutional, symbolic, and functional explanations for 
adjudicative retroactivity); see also Herman Schwartz, Retroactivity, Reliability, and Due Process: 
A Reply to Professor Mishkin, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 719, 720-23 (1966) (partially criticizing Mish-
kin for failing to embrace a fully retroactive conception of adjudication); Bradley Scott Shan-
non, The Retroactive and Prospective Application of Judicial Decisions, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
811, 838-62 (2003) (discussing the retroactive nature of the adjudicative function); Harry H. 
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context, there can be no clean separation between “old” law and “new.” Interpre-
tation of the law is not a static inquiry. It is informed by legal authorities that—
themselves a product of adjudication—build over time. Judges interpret “old” 
law with hindsight from their present-day perspective, and they determine 
“new” law by ruling today on past disputes. This process inevitably generates 
contests in interpretive perspectives. The same judgment can be seen both as a 
(mere) evolution from prior law and as a (radical) change in the law.35 The Su-
preme Court’s judgments in Obergefell, Janus, and Wayfair exemplify the point. 
There is a real sense in which these judgments were “new” law: they overturned 
prior authorities and upheld rights previously unrecognized by federal prece-
dent. But there is also a real sense in which these judgments were not new: they 
rested on long-developed constitutional authority (interpreting the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the First Amendment, and the Commerce Clause, respectively) 
and affirmed rights internalized by claimants, the judicial recognition of which 
had long been publicly pursued. The judgments did not suddenly appear one 
day out of a blue sky. Owing to the process of dispute and public litigation by 
which these cases rose through the courts, it cannot be said that these novel prec-
edents, on the day they were handed down, would have taken any prudent ob-
server of the law wholly by surprise. 
Jill E. Fisch has explored how the dynamic nature of adjudication implicates 
conceptions of judicial retroactivity, and her work presents a model for analyzing 
the stability of rules of law.36 Some legal rules can be understood as long-stand-
ing, settled, predictable, and o�-relied upon (and so in a “stable equilibrium”), 
while other rules are unpredictable and in a state of flux such that it would be 
 
Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudica-
tion, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 254-58 (1973) (discussing “whether a court, when dealing with a rule 
justified by a principle, may overrule a prior decision prospectively, or whether, as at common 
law, a retroactive overruling is required,” and concluding that “the answer is retroactive or not 
at all”); Andrew J. Wistrich, The Evolving Temporality of Lawmaking, 44 CONN. L. REV. 737, 
763-77 (2012) (acknowledging that “[a]djudication is inherently backward-looking” because 
“[i]t addresses past events, and it does so primarily in light of previously existing law,” but 
discussing how “common law adjudication always has been less past-oriented than is widely 
thought, and it has become even less so in recent decades”). 
35. See Fisch, supra note 19, at 1071 (considering the difficulty of “determining whether adjudica-
tion has created a new legal rule at all”); Mishkin, supra note 33, at 60 (noting that “even when 
‘new law’ must be made, it is o�en in fact a matter of the court articulating particular clear 
implications of values so generally shared in the society that the process might well be char-
acterized as declaring a preexisting law” (footnote omitted)); infra Section II.A.2. 
36. Fisch, supra note 19 passim; see also Dagan, American Legal Realism, supra note 19, at 134 (de-
scribing how “legal discourse tends to develop in a pattern of repeated shi�s . . . between pe-
riods of fixity and periods of innovation and change”); Hanoch Dagan, Doctrinal Categories, 
Legal Realism, and the Rule of Law, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1889, 1904 (2015) (same). 
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unreasonable to assume they will not change (an “unstable equilibrium”).37 Ret-
roactive law may be justified to bring certainty to unstable rules.38 The opposite 
generally holds for stable rules: retroactive change tends to be unjustifiably dis-
ruptive.39 This captures an essential distinction between legislation and judge-
made law.40 Legislation typically affects or overrides stable rules, hence the rule 
of law’s general prohibition on retroactive legislation. By contrast, “adjudication 
will rarely disturb a stable equilibrium.”41 This is due to the restrained nature of 
the adjudicative process: 
The lawmaking power of the courts is restrained by their inability to con-
trol their lawmaking agenda in a way that the legislative power is not. 
Courts can make law only as a by-product of deciding cases and, for the 
most part, have little role in determining which issues come before them 
for decision. Within the context of deciding a particular case, courts are 
further constrained by the requirement that their rules be tied to an ex-
plicit text or to common law precedents. In either case, the reasoned elab-
oration that provides legitimacy to judge-made rules demands that a 
court employ accepted interpretive principles rather than making naked 
policy judgments.42 
This seems right: judicial lawmaking is a backward-looking and compara-
tively modest lawmaking process. Fisch postulates, however, that a novel judg-
ment would be “revolutionary” when it disrupts stable legal rules.43 Fisch gives 
as examples “[d]ecisions in which the Supreme Court overrules its own prece-
dent or fashions a new principle of constitutional law.” 44  Such judicial 
 
37. See Fisch, supra note 19, at 1100-11 (developing these ideas). 
38. Id. at 1109 (“The likelihood of legal change in an unstable equilibrium makes reliance on the 
legal status quo unreasonable and thereby mitigates potential fairness problems arising out of 
retroactivity.”); id. at 1123 (explaining that in an unstable equilibrium, “retroactive lawmaking 
is an appropriate and efficient means of clarifying, correcting, and incrementally adjusting the 
regulatory climate”). 
39. Id. at 1105 (arguing that “[t]he existence of a stable equilibrium justifies the protection of 
reliance-based interests” via non-retroactive application of new rules). 
40. See id. at 1118 (“[A]s a descriptive matter, revolutionary legal change is most commonly asso-
ciated with the legislative process and . . . adjudicative lawmaking is typically evolutionary.”); 
see also Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 311-12 (1994) (“The principle that stat-
utes operate only prospectively, while judicial decisions operate retrospectively, is familiar to 
every law student.” (quoting United States v. Sec. Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 79 (1982))). 
41. Fisch, supra note 19, at 1107. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. at 1102 (“[W]e can associate disturbance of a stable equilibrium with revolutionary change. 
In an unstable equilibrium, evolutionary change is sufficient to produce a new position.”). 
44. Id. at 1107-08. 
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lawmaking, Fisch argues, more closely resembles legislating and warrants “the 
temporal flexibility of nonretroactivity.”45 Indeed, Fisch suggests that “constitu-
tional change frequently disrupts a stable equilibrium,” generating “substantial 
transition costs” that should not be compounded through retroactive application 
of novel precedent.46 
On this point, this Article pushes back on Fisch’s theory. Certainly, it is illu-
minating to consider the temporality of judge-made law in terms of stable and 
unstable equilibria. Some rules can be seen as more stable than others, and their 
stability may vary over time. But the move from stability to instability of judge-
made law is more fluid than Fisch’s theory suggests.47 It is not obvious that “sub-
stantial force” is required for an apparently stable judicial rule to become unsta-
ble.48 A rule progresses to instability when it becomes subject to question, good-
faith disagreement, and ultimately litigation. Litigation itself can expose the fa-
çade of a stable equilibrium by publicly calling into question the current author-
itative force of a rule. (This is not at all comparable to the legislative process. The 
process of proposing and debating a bill does not itself make current law more 
unstable, since it is clear that a bill is not law.) As dispute over a rule gains trac-
tion, and especially as the dispute works its way through and up the court sys-
tem, the rule is surely in an unstable equilibrium.49 Ultimately, an appellate court 
will be required to determine the state of the law to resolve the dispute. It will 
do so by employing accepted interpretive principles that are informed by legal 
authorities and assessing the dispute with retrospect to restore certainty over the 
issue and to reestablish stability.50 
 
45. Id. at 1108. 
46. Id. 
47. Equilibrium theory perhaps better explains legislative (non-)retroactivity than adjudicative 
(non-)retroactivity. Typically, when Congress enacts a statute to reform the law on some issue, 
it does so not because the superseded law was unclear or unstable, but because it was unpop-
ular as compared to the newly enacted law. Such statutes should apply prospectively so as not 
to disturb the stable equilibrium of the prior law. By contrast, when a statute as enacted pro-
duces confused or unexpected interpretations, the law may be in an unstable equilibrium. The 
only way to restore stability may be for Congress to pass corrective or curative legislation with 
retroactive effect. See id. at 1105-18. 
48. See id. at 1105 (“A stable equilibrium can be disrupted, but only through the application of 
substantial force.”). Moreover, it may only be with the benefit of hindsight that we can assess 
the nature of the equilibrium at issue. 
49. In adjudicating a novel claim, how can a court ever “conclude[] that the law is in a stable 
equilibrium” while the court’s judgment is effecting “legal change . . . sufficient to disturb that 
equilibrium?” Id. at 1106. If the court is effecting “disruption” in the law, the law is surely in 
an unstable equilibrium. 
50. Of course, ambiguity and uncertainty can never be fully expunged from the law, so expecta-
tions can never be completely stable. See Frederick Schauer, The Convergence of Rules and 
Standards, 2003 N.Z. L. REV. 303, 307-09. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3393077
the yale law journal 130:276  2020 
290 
The claim, in sum, is that due to the nature of adjudication, novel precedent 
is always the product of an unstable equilibrium. As such, it must operate under 
“a general rule of adjudicative retroactivity.”51 
C. Breadth of Non-Retroactivity Doctrine 
There are four basic dimensions to adjudicative non-retroactivity doctrine in 
the United States: 
•   State/federal: U.S. Supreme Court precedent determines non-retroac-
tivity doctrine for the federal courts only. Each state’s final appeals court 
is competent to determine the temporal implications of its own jurisdic-
tion’s judgments.52 
•   Criminal/civil: Courts and commentators tend to distinguish between 
criminal and civil cases when assessing the retroactivity of a new rule. In 
the penal context, there is a further distinction between collateral review 
(e.g., habeas petitions) and cases brought on direct appellate review.53 
•   Relief sought: A distinction is drawn between whether a remedy sought 
is forward-looking (e.g., injunctive relief) or backward-looking (e.g., 
damages or restitution). Ceteris paribus, courts that express concern 
about the retroactivity of their decisions tend to view forward-looking 
relief more favorably than backward-looking relief.54 
•   Temporal era: The prominence of, and preference for, non-retroactivity 
doctrine has waxed and waned over the past century. Judicial enthusi-
asm for non-retroactive adjudication peaked during the Warren Court 
 
51. Fisch, supra note 19, at 1110. 
52. Great N. Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364 (1932). 
53. See, e.g., Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1264 (2016); Johnson v. United States, 520 
U.S. 461, 467 (1997); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989); Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 
314, 328 (1987); Peter Bozzo, What We Talk About when We Talk About Retroactivity, 46 AM. J. 
CRIM. L. 13, 13 (2019) (discussing the doctrine concerning new rules of criminal law or pro-
cedure, noting that the Supreme Court’s case law is a “mess,” but peculiarly arguing that “[t]he 
theoretical incoherence of [non-]retroactivity doctrine is its greatest strength”). 
54. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677 (1974) (“[A] federal court’s remedial power [in 
a § 1983 action], consistent with the Eleventh Amendment, is necessarily limited to prospec-
tive injunctive relief . . . and may not include a retroactive award which requires the payment 
of funds from the state treasury . . . .” (first citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); and 
then citing Ford Motor Co. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459 (1945))). But cf. Wellington, 
supra note 34, at 254-58 (critiquing non-retroactivity doctrine’s distinction between forward- 
and backward-looking relief). 
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era.55 It has since been in decline and it seems likely to be disfavored by 
the current Roberts Court,56 even while U.S. non-retroactivity doctrine 
is increasingly influencing foreign common-law appellate courts.57 
Judicial non-retroactivity doctrine has particularly struggled to manage fed-
eral civil cases in which plaintiffs seek backward-looking monetary relief. Courts 
have strained to resolve such claims when brought in the light of a change in 
relevant law (subsequent cases) or in anticipation of a change (pending cases). 
It is these cases with which this Article is concerned. 
This Article does not venture to resolve the full breadth of issues that arise 
from judicial non-retroactivity doctrine. It does not directly address temporal 
issues at the state level, issues in the criminal context, or issues concerning in-
junctive relief. That said, non-retroactivity doctrine in these contexts has o�en 
intersected with the doctrine regarding federal civil monetary claims. In this re-
spect, the insights proffered in this Article may aid reassessments of non-retro-
activity doctrine in other contexts. While those contexts warrant full considera-
tion on their own merits, for the purposes of this Article, the relevant 
intersections can be briefly summarized. 
First, state courts have tended to look to U.S. Supreme Court precedent in 
formulating and assessing their own comparable doctrines. The persuasive force 
of federal precedent in this area seems, however, to be waning. Today, non-ret-
roactivity doctrine is on the whole more strongly maintained at the state level 
than it is at the federal level.58 
 
55. Roosevelt, supra note 28, at 1079, 1093. 
56. The idea that judgments create “new” law controverts Chief Justice Roberts’s (in)famous 
“balls and strikes” adjudicative philosophy. See Todd E. Pettys, The Myth of the Written Con-
stitution, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 991, 995, 1047 (2009). Prior to being elevated to the Su-
preme Court, then-Judge Gorsuch delivered an opinion for the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 
in which he opined that “the presumption of retroactivity attaching to judicial decisions was 
anticipated by the Constitution and inheres in its separation of powers” and noted that the 
Supreme Court “barely tolerate[s] the practice [of rendering purely prospective judicial deci-
sions] in the civil arena.” De Niz Robles v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1165, 1170 (10th Cir. 2015); see also 
Barr v. Am. Ass’n of Political Consultants, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 2335, 2366 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., con-
curring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing Justice Kavanaugh’s plu-
rality opinion for entertaining non-retroactivity as an adjudicative option when “prospective 
decisionmaking has never been easy to square with the judicial power”). Justice Scalia, whose 
seat Justice Gorsuch filled, considered prospective overruling “impermissible simply because 
it is not allowed by the Constitution.” James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 
548 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
57. The influence has, though, been modest and incremental. See infra note 173. 
58. See Richard S. Kay, Retroactivity and Prospectivity of Judgments in American Law, 62 AM. J. COMP. 
L. SUPPLEMENT 37, 42, 50 (2014); Stephen J. Hammer, Note, Retroactivity and Restraint: An 
Anglo-American Comparison, 41 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 409, 430 (2018). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3393077
the yale law journal 130:276  2020 
292 
Second, the Supreme Court developed its criminal non-retroactivity doctrine 
broadly in tandem with its civil counterpart. Section I.D outlines the doctrinal 
progression. This Article’s thesis is that judge-made law is inherently retroactive, 
but judges may resort to tools other than non-retroactivity that limit plaintiffs’ 
ability to reopen old cases under new law.59 It complements Herman Schwartz’s 
thesis that, in an early reply to Mishkin, criticized theories of adjudication that 
fail to embrace retroactivity fully.60 This position is broadly consistent with the 
Supreme Court’s modern trend toward affording new rules of criminal law ret-
roactive application while maintaining procedural limits on collateral rehearing 
of concluded cases.61 
Third, as to remedies, damages tend to operate retroactively (compensating 
for past loss), whereas injunctions tend to bear upon the defendant’s prospective 
conduct.62 Many suits in which non-retroactivity doctrine arises concern claims 
both for backward-looking monetary awards and for forward-looking injunc-
tions. The cases concerning unconstitutional taxes, discussed further in Section 
II.B, are prime examples. In American Trucking Ass’ns v. Smith,63 for example, the 
Supreme Court sanctioned an injunction against the defendant state from 
 
59. See infra Part III. 
60. Schwartz, supra note 34, at 752 (“[N]ewly declared constitutional criminal procedure rights 
are not newly conceived or newly relevant. Rather, they reflect fundamental principles of our 
legal system—principles implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. Regardless, then, of when 
it took place, a trial conducted in a manner inconsistent with these principles should not be 
permitted to stand.”); cf. id. at 746 (noting, as a constraint, that “cases in which a guilty plea 
was entered are generally immune from collateral attack”). 
61. See, e.g., McKinney v. Arizona, 140 S. Ct. 702, 709 (2020) (holding that state courts can re-
weigh aggravating and mitigating sentencing circumstances in collateral-review proceedings 
in light of new law); Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1261-62, 1268 (2016) (applying a 
new substantive constitutional rule as to criminal sentencing retroactively on collateral re-
view). The Supreme Court nevertheless continues to recognize “a separate non-retroactivity 
doctrine” under habeas corpus review, pursuant to which new constitutional rules are pre-
sumed not to apply retroactively unless they are “substantive” rules or “watershed” procedural 
rules. Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1419 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part) 
(discussing Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989)); see Steven W. Allen, Toward a Unified Theory 
of Retroactivity, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 105, 110-12 (2009); cf. Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1437 (Alito, 
J., dissenting) (criticizing Justice Kavanaugh for opining on this subject in the case “without 
briefing or argument,” and questioning the “new”-rule versus “old”-rule premise upon which 
the Teague test rests). The Supreme Court will revisit this exception to retroactivity in Edwards 
v. Vannoy, No. 19-5807 (Nov. 30, 2020) (hearing argument on the question “[w]hether this 
Court’s decision in Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390 (2020), applies retroactively to cases on 
federal collateral review”). 
62. Cf. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677-78 (1974) (denying injunctive relief that would have 
had the effect of ordering retroactive payment of benefits from a state, where the state con-
ceded that prospective injunctive relief was valid). 
63. 496 U.S. 167 (1990) (plurality opinion). 
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continuing to collect an unconstitutional tax but denied claims for monetary re-
lief for previously collected taxes. In the view of the Court’s plurality, equitable 
considerations favored forward-looking relief but weighed against retroactive 
remedies.64 
Finally, beyond the scope of this Article—yet of great importance—is the in-
fluence of U.S. non-retroactivity doctrine on foreign jurisdictions. In 2014, the 
Nineteenth Congress of the International Academy of Comparative Law gath-
ered in Vienna to review the subject of judicial prospectivity. In her report fol-
lowing the Congress, General Reporter Eva Steiner summarized how “common 
and civil law jurisdictions have had to reflect in recent years on the possible in-
troduction in their legal systems of the well-established [U.S.] practice of pro-
spective overruling.”65 This Article shows that, far from “well-established,” the 
doctrine of prospective-only overruling in the United States is in decline. More-
over, it argues that abandonment of the doctrine is justified. Foreign jurists in-
clined to look to U.S. practice in this area should adopt a more critical gaze. 
D. The Rise and Fall of Federal Non-Retroactivity Doctrine 
The development and decline of non-retroactivity doctrine over the past cen-
tury are well documented.66 A summary is sufficient to provide context. 
It has become conventional to explain judicial non-retroactivity as having 
progressed through a distinctive arc. As Stephen Hammer summarizes, the prac-
tice of prospective-only overruling “found acceptance in the 1930s, escalated in 
the 1960s, fell into disfavor in the 1980s, and was strictly curtailed in the 
1990s.”67 This arc emerged from “the old days of the common law,” when jurists 
 
64. Id. at 198-200. 
65. Eva Steiner, Judicial Rulings with Prospective Effects: From Comparison to Systematisation, in GEN-
ERAL REPORTS OF THE XIXTH CONGRESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ACADEMY OF COMPARATIVE 
LAW 15, 16 (Martin Schauer & Bea Verschraegen eds., 2017). 
66. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, 
HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 54-55 (7th ed. 2015); 
Elizabeth Earle Beske, Rethinking the Nonprecedential Opinion, 65 UCLA L. REV. 808, 826-43 
(2018); Beske, supra note 20, at 651-73; Bozzo, supra note 53, at 28-59; Richard H. Fallon, Jr. 
& Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. 
REV. 1731, 1738-58 (1991); Hammer, supra note 58, at 413-26; Toby J. Heytens, Managing Tran-
sitional Moments in Criminal Cases, 115 YALE L.J. 922, 972-79 (2006); Alison L. LaCroix, Tem-
poral Imperialism, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1329, 1348-67 (2010); Rhodes, supra note 4, at 390-403; 
Daniel B. Rice & John Boeglin, Confining Cases to Their Facts, 105 VA. L. REV. 865, 894-97 
(2019); Roosevelt, supra note 28, at 1081-1103; Shannon, supra note 34, at 816-833; Stephens, 
supra note 31, at 1517-58. 
67. Hammer, supra note 58, at 413. 
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embraced the declaratory theory of adjudication. 68  Scholars have o�en at-
tributed the declaratory theory to Lord Coke,69 but it is most commonly associ-
ated with Sir William Blackstone, who asserted “that judges are ‘not delegated 
to pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound the old one,’ and that 
when courts are called upon to overturn an existing precedent, they ‘do not pre-
tend to make a new law, but to vindicate the old one from misrepresentation.’”70 
In its strong form, the declaratory theory holds, in the words of Justice Story, 
that judicial decisions “are, at most, only evidence of what the laws are, and are 
not, of themselves, laws.”71 From this perspective, judges have no power to con-
strain the retroactive nature of their judgments because judging is an inherently 
backward-looking exercise. The judge’s role is to resolve disputes that arose in 
the past, and in so doing, the judge cannot escape making determinations on 
what the law was (past-tense) that governed. Retroactivity is inherent in the ju-
dicial function. As Justice Holmes opined, “Judicial decisions have had retro-
spective operation for near a thousand years.”72 
 
68. Roosevelt, supra note 28, at 1077. 
69. This attribution appears to be predicated on a widespread belief that Lord Coke wrote, “It is 
the function of a judge not to make, but to declare the law, according to the golden mete-
wand of the law and not by the crooked cord of discretion.” See, e.g., Anastasoff v. United 
States, 223 F.3d 898, 901 (8th Cir.), vacated on reh’g en banc, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000); 
Kansas v. Farry, 23 Kan. 731, 733 (1880); LEE J. STRANG, ORIGINALISM’S PROMISE: A NATURAL 
LAW ACCOUNT OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 106-07 & n.254 (2019); Allen, supra note 61, 
at 107 & n.13. Despite much investigation, however, I have been unable to locate this quotation 
within Lord Coke’s corpus. Lord Coke did say, “A good caveat to Parliaments to leave all causes 
to be measured by the golden and streight metwand of the law, and not to the incertain and 
crooked cord of discretion.” EDWARD COKE, THE FOURTH PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE 
LAWS OF ENGLAND 41 (London, M. Flesher, for W. Lee, and D. Pakeman 1644). But this is no 
clear endorsement of the declaratory theory. 
70. Allen, supra note 61, at 107 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *69); see Note, 
Prospective Overruling and Retroactive Application in the Federal Courts, 71 YALE L.J. 907, 907-08 
(1962); see also MATTHEW HALE, HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 67 (Charles Runnington ed., 
London, W. Strahan & M. Woodfall, for T. Cadell 4th ed. 1779) (“[English courts cannot] 
make a law, properly so called, (for that only the king and parliament can do); yet they have 
a great weight and authority in expounding, declaring, and publishing what the law of this 
kingdom is, especially when such decisions hold a consonancy and congruity with resolutions 
and decisions of former times; and though such decisions are less than a law, yet they are a 
greater evidence thereof than the opinion of any private persons, as such, whatsoever.”). 
71. Swi� v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842), overruled by Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 
64 (1938); see Kay, supra note 58, at 38 (“Joseph Story, a preeminent early American legal 
authority, embraced this idea with enthusiasm.”). 
72. Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 372 (1910) (Holmes, J., dissenting); cf. Gerald J. 
Postema, Philosophy of the Common Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 588, 589 (Jules L. Coleman, Kenneth Einar Himma & Scott J. Shapiro 
eds., 2004) (noting that “[l]egal historians widely agree that before the eighteenth century 
there was no firm doctrine of stare decisis in English common law”). 
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Belief in the declaratory theory of adjudication was shaken with the rise of 
legal realism. Two famous judgments in the 1930s encapsulated a new era of ad-
judicative reconceptualization. In Great Northern Railway Co. v. Sunburst Oil & 
Refining Co., the Supreme Court considered for the first time the constitutional-
ity of a state court’s decision to make its ruling non-retroactive.73 Justice Cardozo 
held that a state was competent to determine the temporal reach of its judgments 
according to “the juristic philosophy of the judges of her courts, their concep-
tions of law, its origin and nature,” and “the federal constitution,” he held, “has 
no voice upon the subject.”74 State courts have, accordingly, since developed a 
spectrum of doctrines that guide whether state laws should be “Sunburst-ed” so 
that their novel precedents apply only prospectively.75 
In Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,76 the Supreme Court repudiated the notion 
that judgments merely evince “an unchanging common law; instead, it recog-
nized that the common law was nothing more than [judges’] decisions.”77 In 
disclaiming any power of federal courts to determine state-law issues according 
to a general federal common law, Erie threw into doubt the soundness of the 
federal courts’ many prior judgments resolving issues in diversity jurisdiction 
unconstrained by state common law. Erie stood for the proposition that overrul-
ing created new law. This meant that “law could change; law could die”—in-
sights that exposed “the false unity of the Blackstonian model.”78 A new problem 
thus became salient: What law was to be applied to events that took place before 
the date of a law-changing decision? 
The federal courts found their voice on this problem in the 1960s, as judges 
grappled with the temporal implications of the Warren Court’s landmark crimi-
nal-procedure judgments. A�er the Supreme Court determined in Mapp v. Ohio 
that evidence obtained in violation of a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights 
was inadmissible in state courts, 79  the problem arose as to whether this 
 
73. 287 U.S. 358 (1932); see KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING AP-
PEALS 301-05 (1960). 
74. 287 U.S. at 364-65; cf. Rowan v. Runnels, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 134, 139 (1847), cited in Kay, supra 
note 58, at 46. 
75. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE 
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 604-08 (1994); Hammer, supra note 58, at 430; Kay, supra 
note 58, at 42, 50. 
76. 304 U.S. 64 (1938); see HART & SACKS, supra note 75, at 608-09. 
77. Roosevelt, supra note 28, at 1078; see Richard S. Kay, Construction, Originalist Interpretation and 
the Complete Constitution, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. ONLINE 1, 10 n.47 (2017) (referring to Erie as 
“the now prevalent positivist view”). 
78. Roosevelt, supra note 28, at 1088; see Stephen E. Sachs, Finding Law, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 527, 
570-79 (2019) (discussing Erie). 
79. 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). 
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exclusionary rule could aid persons already convicted. The Supreme Court in 
Linkletter v. Walker held by a majority that “in appropriate cases the Court may 
in the interest of justice make [a new] rule prospective.”80 Balancing factors of 
purpose, reliance, and effect of the new rule,81 the Court determined that collat-
eral-review proceedings were appropriately met by treating new rules as non-ret-
roactive. In Stovall v. Denno,82 the Court anointed the method of “selective” pro-
spectivity by holding that new rules must apply to the cases in which they are 
announced, but that cases brought by direct appellate review in the wake of a new 
rule would be resolved according to Linkletter’s balancing inquiry. The Burger 
Court extended this non-retroactivity precedent to civil cases. In Chevron Oil Co. 
v. Huson, the Court articulated a three-factor test to guide courts in determining 
whether a new legal rule should apply retroactively.83 This test—which has since 
been borrowed by many state courts—considers: 
(1) whether the decision to be applied non-retroactively establishes a new 
principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent or by deciding 
an issue of first impression; 
(2) if, in light of the new rule’s purpose and effect, retrospective operation 
would further or retard its operation; and 
(3) the extent of the inequity imposed by retroactive application, namely the 
injustice or hardship that would be caused by retroactive application.84 
Non-retroactivity doctrine has always divided courts85 and commentators,86 
and it ultimately fell out of favor with the Rehnquist Court. The Court first re-
turned to applying its precedent retroactively in criminal cases on direct review. 
In such cases, it had become too difficult for the Court to justify giving remedial 
relief to a successful criminal appellant through a selective prospective overruling 
 
80. 381 U.S. 618, 628 (1965). 
81. Id. at 636; see Roosevelt, supra note 28, at 1090. 
82. 388 U.S. 293, 300-01 (1967). 
83. 404 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1971). 
84. Kay, supra note 58, at 42. 
85. Justice Harlan spearheaded judicial opposition in the Supreme Court. See Fallon & Meltzer, 
supra note 66, at 1743; Kay, supra note 58, at 57. 
86. See, e.g., Thomas E. Fairchild, Limitation of New Judge-Made Law to Prospective Effect Only: 
“Prospective Overruling” or “Sunbursting,” 51 MARQ. L. REV. 254, 269 (1968) (“[I]t is not always 
possible nor wise to pull a rabbit out of the hat.”); Roosevelt, supra note 28, at 1090 (“The 
Linkletter analysis is deeply unsatisfying.”). 
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that would deny relief to other similarly situated parties.87 Not long a�er, the 
Court also turned against non-retroactivity in civil cases. In a series of judgments 
concerning claims for restitutionary relief from unconstitutional state tax laws, 
a majority of the Court disclaimed an inherent power to adjudicate non-retroac-
tively,88 denounced selective prospectivity,89 and endorsed a presumption that 
retroactivity is “overwhelmingly the norm.”90 The Court le� room for “pure” 
prospective overruling—wherein the Court would deny retroactive relief even to 
the party who brings the novel claim—but the current Roberts Court majority 
does not seem inclined toward it.91 The strong presumption now, articulated in 
Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation, is that 
[w]hen [the Supreme] Court applies a rule of federal law to the parties 
before it, that rule is the controlling interpretation of federal law and 
must be given full retroactive effect in all cases still open on direct review 
and as to all events, regardless of whether such events predate or postdate 
the announcement of the rule.92 
We have reached a point where non-retroactivity doctrine has lost favor in 
U.S. federal courts,93 although it remains popular with many legal scholars. It is 
employed to different degrees in state courts.94 And it is gaining traction in 
 
87. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 327-28 (1987). The Supreme Court continues, however, to 
recognize a separate non-retroactivity doctrine under habeas corpus review. See supra note 61. 
88. Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 222 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“When the 
federal courts have no equitable discretion, we have held a federal court has no authority to 
refuse to apply a law retroactively.”); id. at 201 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
89. Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993). 
90. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 535 (1991) (opinion of Souter, J., joined 
by Stevens, J.); see also McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 
18, 32 (1990) (discussing “the scope of a State’s obligation to provide retrospective relief” for 
unconstitutionally exacted taxes); Renée Burbank, Illegal Exactions, 87 TENN. L. REV. 315, 331 
& n.81 (2020) (identifying McKesson Corp. as signaling the Supreme Court’s abandonment of 
non-retroactivity doctrine in unlawful government-exaction cases). 
91. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
92. 509 U.S. at 97; see Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 752 (1995) (affirming Har-
per); Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 279 n.32 (1994) (characterizing Harper as 
“establish[ing] a firm rule of retroactivity”). 
93. Beske, supra note 20, at 647; cf. Masur & Mortara, supra note 22, at 1016 & n.263 (noting that 
some federal courts have interpreted Harper to permit courts to “issue purely prospective rul-
ings, so long as they do not apply those rulings to the parties who brought the case”); Elliot 
Watson, The Revival of Reliance and Prospectivity: Chevron Oil in the Immigration Context, 36 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 245, 261-64 (2012) (describing a case in which the Ninth Circuit applied 
the Chevron Oil test but characterizing its approach as “an exception to the general rule”). 
94. See Hammer, supra note 58, at 430; Kay, supra note 58, at 42, 50. 
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foreign courts.95 Following the arc of federal non-retroactivity doctrine, it would 
seem that “[t]he end of all the Court’s explorings has been to arrive, more or less, 
where it started.”96 
ii .  non-retroactivity frameworks 
The decline of federal non-retroactivity doctrine can be explained in part by 
widespread dissatisfaction with the prevailing frameworks that have sought to 
justify it.97 There is no agreement within the judiciary or academy as to how the 
doctrine should be conceived. Jurists have grappled with firm rules, discretion-
ary balancing tests, and strong presumptions, and no approach has won consen-
sus.98 Instead, from the case law and commentary we can distill five distinct 
frameworks for understanding the doctrine. These frameworks are not mutually 
incompatible but are instead different conceptual perspectives on the problem. 
This Part describes and critiques these frameworks by way of a prelude to Part 
III’s rights-based understanding of law’s temporal reach. 
A. Legal-Philosophical Framework 
Courts and commentators commonly frame the temporal implications of ad-
judication as reflecting “one of the great jurisprudential debates” about the na-
ture of law.99 Namely, do judges “find” or “make” law? The notion of finding law 
is said to hew to natural-law philosophy; and making law, to legal positivism 
and legal realism. The predominant view today is that judge-made law is law 
made by judges; that the declaratory theory of adjudication is dead; and so when 
judges create law there is no philosophical objection to applying their new law 
only to future events. 
Such framing is open to several objections, as addressed below. In brief, first, 
despite contentions to the contrary, it is not absurd to suggest that legal norms—
like social norms—can be “found” independent of formal sources.100 Second, it 
 
95. See infra notes 141-150. 
96. Roosevelt, supra note 28, at 1103; see Allen, supra note 61, at 106 (“[T]he Supreme Court has 
completely remade [retroactivity doctrine] twice in the last fi�y years, casting off the existing 
practice to replace it, all at once, with a completely new and comprehensive approach to the 
problem.”). 
97. Roosevelt, supra note 28, at 1104. 
98. See Lehn, supra note 29, at 572-73. 
99. See, e.g., Beavers v. Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., 881 P.2d 1376, 1377 (N.M. 1994); 
Hammer, supra note 58, at 430-32. 
100. Sachs, supra note 78, at 527. 
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is not clear that resolving the jurisprudential debate bears on the question of ret-
roactivity. Critics o�en fail to appreciate that the declaratory theory is not hostile 
to legal-positivist and realist outlooks: judges can be seen to make law through 
declaring the rules and principles that govern disputes before them. Conversely, 
natural-law philosophy is not necessarily incompatible with non-retroactivity. 
Indeed, principles of natural law seem to be just as readily invoked to support 
prospective adjudication. Thus, the legal-philosophical debate is largely orthog-
onal to the question of retroactivity. And third, the legal-philosophical frame-
work invariably descends into intractable debate.101 As the following discussion 
elucidates, it is not a feasible framework for settling the temporal implications of 
adjudication. 
1. Description 
The idea that common-law principles or right interpretations of statutes 
might preexist their articulation in judicial decisions is associated with Black-
stone’s natural-law tradition. Blackstone described judges as “the living oracles” 
of the common law who were “sworn to determine, not according to [their] own 
private judgment, but according to the known laws and customs of the land; not 
delegated to pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound an old one.”102 
John Austin’s positivist theory challenged this idea by maintaining that judges 
do make law when they pronounce new rules or overturn past judgments. Austin 
considered it a “childish fiction employed by our judges . . . that . . . common 
law is not made by them, but is a miraculous something made by nobody, exist-
ing . . . from eternity, and merely declared from time to time by the judges.”103 
The Supreme Court has long employed this philosophical contest to frame 
the problem of judicial retroactivity. In Sunburst Oil, Justice Cardozo alluded to 
the Blackstonian theory when he said that a state court delivering novel prece-
dent may “hold to the ancient dogma that the law declared by its courts had a 
Platonic or ideal existence before the act of declaration,” so that when overruling 
past precedent, “the discredited declaration will be viewed as if it had never been, 
 
101. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 361 (1962) (“Do 
the judges find the law or do they make it? If you pose this question in the world of correct—
or incorrect—doctrine, you enter a never-ending battle.”); Deryck Beyleveld & Roger 
Brownsword, The Practical Difference Between Natural-Law Theory and Legal Positivism, 5 OX-
FORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 22-23 (1985) (suggesting that the debate between positivism and nat-
ural-law theory is only conceptually, but not practically, significant); Tim Kaye, Natural Law 
Theory and Legal Positivism: Two Sides of the Same Practical Coin?, 14 J.L. & SOC’Y 303, 317-18 
(1987) (suggesting that the debate may no longer even be conceptually significant). 
102. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *69. 
103. 2 JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 634 (Robert Campbell ed., London, John Mur-
ray 5th ed. 1885). 
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and the reconsidered declaration as law from the beginning.”104 In other words, 
a state court could apply its new rules retroactively on the premise that they ex-
pound what was always the correct view of the law. But if a state court’s “juristic 
philosophy” aligned with Austin’s theory, it could choose to adopt non-retroac-
tivity and “say that decisions of its highest court, though later overruled, are law 
[nonetheless] for intermediate transactions.”105 
The Court in Linkletter explicitly framed the problem as a contest between 
Blackstone and Austin. Justice Clark for the Court cited Blackstone’s Commen-
taries as grounding the declaratory theory of adjudication, and with it the idea 
that an overruled decision “was thought to be only a failure at true discovery and 
was consequently never the law.”106 By contrast, Justice Clark noted, “Austin 
maintained that judges do in fact do something more than discover law; they 
make it interstitially by filling in with judicial interpretation the vague, indefi-
nite, or generic statutory or common law terms that alone are but the empty 
crevices of the law.”107 Past precedent thus remains “an existing juridical fact un-
til overruled” and so “intermediate cases finally decided under it are not to be 
disturbed.”108 Rather, new judge-made rules can be applied prospectively. Jus-
tice Clark characterized Austin’s theory as ascending in acceptance among courts 
and commentators, and Blackstone’s philosophy as a theory in decline. He con-
cluded that “there seem[ed] to be no impediment—constitutional or philosoph-
ical—to the use of” prospective overruling of past precedent.109 The Court was 
“neither required to apply, nor prohibited from applying, a decision retrospec-
tively.”110 
Those who invoke legal philosophy to frame the temporal scope of novel 
precedent tend to assume three propositions. The first is that the declaratory 
theory rests on the implausible notion that judges only “find” law.111 The theory, 
it is said, presupposes that “law is objective and constant. It exists ‘out there,’ 
 
104. Great N. Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358, 365 (1932) (citations omitted). 
105. Id. at 364. 
106. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 623 (1965) (citation omitted). 
107. Id. at 623-24. 
108. Id. at 624. 
109. Id. at 628. 
110. Id. at 629. 
111. John Martinez, Taking Time Seriously: The Federal Constitutional Right to Be Free from “Star-
tling” State Court Overrulings, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 297, 301 (1988) (“According to the 
now-outdated ‘declaratory’ or ‘Blackstonian’ theory, courts merely ‘found’ the law rather than 
‘made’ it. . . . The modern theory of judicial decision-making, o�en attributed to Professor 
Austin, acknowledges that courts make law; they do not simply find it.”). 
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waiting to be ‘found’ by a court.”112 Consider a typical characterization of what 
it means for judges to declare the law: 
The declaratory theory of the common law is the hypothesis that judges 
who decide cases (when they are not following precedents, obeying rigid 
rules of evidence, or interpreting and applying statutes) do not make but 
instead find law. In other words, the declaratory theory is that what is 
now commonly called “judge-made law” is actually preexisting law that 
judges discover and not something that they create.113 
It follows that in novel cases, judges do not wield discretion to legislate new 
rules. Rather, they draw on principles ascertainable generally in the body of law 
to elucidate that which is not clearly posited in the legal sources. Retroactive ad-
judication hangs on the assumption that every rule of law preexists its articula-
tion by a court. But Austin blew up this assumption and with it the rationale for 
adjudicative retroactivity. 
A second common proposition is that the declaratory theory of adjudication 
is rooted in natural-law philosophy and subsists in conflict with legal positivism. 
That law may be found through the “ethical intuitionism” of the judges aligns 
the theory with natural law. 114  That law may be found outside of the legal 
sources chides against the central tenet of legal positivism. The “counterpart” to 
the declaratory theory, then, “is the positivist theory, which acknowledges that 
courts do indeed make law.”115 Judge-made law under this theory can be “new.” 
And as such, it need not govern “old” disputes, but can be applied only prospec-
tively. Thus, it is said that Blackstone and Austin represent “two opposing juris-
prudential theories of retroactivity.”116 
A third proposition is that the legal system has outgrown the declaratory 
theory. The debate is over: judges make law. The adjudicatory function must, 
then, be conceived through a positivist or realist lens. It is o�en said that “[i]f 
the declaratory theory of the common law was ever truly believed in, it is no 
 
112. Lehn, supra note 29, at 574. 
113. Brian Zamulinski, Rehabilitating the Declaratory Theory of the Common Law, 2 J.L. & CTS. 171, 
171 (2014). 
114. Id. 
115. Lehn, supra note 29, at 576. 
116. Chen, supra note 6, at 1421; see Andrew J. Bowen, Fairy Tales and the Declaratory Theory of 
Judicial Decisions, 1999 SCOTS L. TIMES 327, 328 (referring to “two competing theories of judi-
cial decision making, the declaratory theory and the change theory”); LaCroix, supra note 66, 
at 1349 (“[T]he majority of the Supreme Court’s cases dealing with adjudicative retroactivity 
view the choice of retroactivity as implicating the dichotomy between what the Court has 
termed the Blackstonian or ‘declaratory’ model of law and the Austinian or ‘positive law’ 
model.”); Martinez, supra note 111, at 301. 
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longer.”117 Criticisms of the declaratory theory—and of jurists who lend it cre-
dence—have become frequent and blunt to the point of condescension. The pre-
dominant view is that the declaratory theory is a “myth,”118 a “fiction,”119 a “fairy 
tale,”120 a “nightmare,”121 and an “ancient dogma”122 that is “inherently circular,” 
excessively “formalist,” and “antiquated.”123 The idea that “judges do no more 
than discover the law that marvelously has always existed, awaiting only the ju-
dicial pen that would find the right words for all to heed” is “moonspinning.”124 
It also “lacks the virtue of being true.”125 The claim that courts find law is said to 
be “routinely contravened” by judges and is “less and less useful each day.”126 
The theory has been “ridiculed,”127 “discredited,” “abandon[ed],”128 and “irre-
trievably lost.”129 Therefore, its proponents are either “naive”130 formalists who 
are easily “fool[ed],” 131  or they are disingenuous and probably concealing 
 
117. Hammer, supra note 58, at 410; see Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 66, at 1759 (suggesting that 
“[i]t would be only a slight exaggeration to say that there are no more Blackstonians”); Liron 
Shmilovits, The Declaratory Fiction, 31 KING’S L.J. 59, 73-74 (2020) (“[T]wo centuries a�er 
Bentham’s rebellion against the orthodoxy of the declaratory theory, there is probably no legal 
theory more o�en repudiated than it; so much so, that deriding it is a mark of sophistica-
tion.”). 
118. Roger J. Traynor, Quo Vadis, Prospective Overruling: A Question of Judicial Responsibility, 28 
HASTINGS L.J. 533, 535 (1977); cf. Mishkin, supra note 34, at 63 (“If the view be in part myth, 
it is a myth by which we live and which can be sacrificed only at substantial cost.”). 
119. Munroe Smith, State Statute and Common Law, 2 POL. SCI. Q. 105, 121 (1887); see Griffin v. 
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 26 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the judgment); Kleinwort Ben-
son Ltd. v. Lincoln City Council [1999] 2 AC 349 (HL) 378 (Lord Goff of Chieveley) (appeal 
taken from Eng.). 
120. Lord Reid, The Judge as Lawmaker, 12 J. SOC’Y PUB. TEACHERS L. 22, 22 (1972). 
121. Richard McManus, Predicting the Past: The Declaratory Theory of the Common Law—From Fair-
ytale to Nightmare, 12 JUD. REV. 228, 245 (2007). 
122. Great N. Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358, 365 (1932); see also 5 JEREMY BEN-
THAM, Truth Versus Ashhurst; Or, Law as It Is, Contrasted with What It Is Said to Be, in THE 
WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 233, 235 (John Bowring ed., London, Simpkin, Marshall & Co. 
1823) (calling it “dog-law”). 
123. Fisch, supra note 19, at 1080, 1082. 
124. Traynor, supra note 118, at 535. 
125. Masur & Mortara, supra note 22, at 1019. 
126. Id. 
127. Kay, supra note 58, at 64. 
128. Hammer, supra note 58, at 409, 411. 
129. Kay, supra note 58, at 66. 
130. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 546 (1991) (White, J., concurring in 
the judgment); see also id. at 549 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“I am not so na-
ive . . . as to be unaware that judges in a real sense ‘make’ law.”). 
131. Masur & Mortara, supra note 22, at 1019. 
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devious agendas.132 Judges who employ the theory perhaps only “pretend[] to 
hold” it133 for “politically expedient” purposes.134 Blackstone himself, appar-
ently, “presented the ‘declaratory theory’ with a wink and a nod.”135 
Thus, we reach a purported solution: to turn our backs on the theory. To 
recognize that “we do not believe in fairy tales any more.”136 For ostensibly 
“[e]ver since the legal realists, sophisticated legal observers have understood that 
the courts make law, just as legislatures and agencies do.”137 So enlightened 
courts face a simple inquiry: they need only determine whether a novel precedent 
establishes “a new principle of law”138 or constitutes “a clear break with the 
past.”139 If so, non-retroactivity will be justifiable. As Jonathan Masur and Adam 
Mortara explain, “If the rule is not new, it will apply in every case; if the rule is 
new, the court must decide whether it should be applied retroactively or purely 
prospectively, following . . . considerations related to reliance interests and social 
costs . . . .”140 
 
132. See Allan Beever, The Declaratory Theory of Law, 33 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 421, 422 (2013). 
133. Beavers v. Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., 881 P.2d 1376, 1380 (N.M. 1994) (discussing 
Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 107 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring)). 
134. Masur & Mortara, supra note 22, at 1019. 
135. Albert W. Alschuler, Rediscovering Blackstone, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 37 (1996). 
136. Reid, supra note 120, at 22. 
137. Masur & Mortara, supra note 22, at 1019; cf. sources cited supra note 22 (distinguishing legis-
lative from judicial lawmaking). 
138. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106 (1971). 
139. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 248 (1969). 
140. Masur & Mortara, supra note 22, at 1010. For a discussion of reliance interests and social costs, 
see id. at 1002-03. 
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This framework has gained traction in other jurisdictions too.141 Judges of 
the highest courts of India,142 Ireland,143 the United Kingdom,144 Israel,145 New 
 
141. Steiner, supra note 65, at 15-16. South Africa’s Constitution specifically empowers courts to 
limit the retrospective effect of judgments striking down unconstitutional laws. S. AFR. 
CONST., 1996, § 172(1)(b)(i); see Masiya v. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions 2007 (5) SA 30 (CC) at 53, 
[51] (S. Afr.). 
142. Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, (1967) 2 SCR 762, 808 (India) (discussing the relevance of 
“two doctrines familiar to American Jurisprudence, one . . . described as Blackstonian theory 
and the other as ‘prospective over-ruling,’” and endorsing the latter in the case); see A.R. 
Blackshield, “Fundamental Rights” and the Economic Viability of the Indian Nation: Part Three: 
Prospective Overruling, 10 J. INDIAN L. INST. 183 (1968). 
143. Murphy v. Att’y Gen. [1982] 1 IR 241, 293-94 (Ir.) (treating as persuasive the practice of “[t]he 
American Supreme Court . . . of deciding . . . whether a ruling which upsets what was re-
garded as the law should operate retrospectively or merely prospectively”); see A. v. Governor 
of Arbour Hill Prison [2006] 4 IR 88, 116-17 (Ir.) (“In modern constitutional systems we have 
moved on from [Blackstone’s] perception of the law, at least in its purest form, but even when 
viewed through Blackstone’s prism the common law did not envisage absolute retroactivity of 
judicial decisions and did not permit previous cases, even though finally determined on prin-
ciples that were ‘never law’ to be reopened.”); cf. P.C. v. Minister for Soc. Prot. [2018] IESC 
57, [39] (Ir.) (noting that only a minority of Supreme Court judges have approved of prospec-
tive-only overruling). 
144. Nat’l Westminster Bank plc v. Spectrum Plus Ltd. [2005] 2 AC 680 (HL), [34] (appeal taken 
from Eng.) (“[Blackstone’s declaratory] theory is still valid when applied to cases where a 
previous decision is overruled as wrong when given. Most overruling occurs on this basis. 
These cases are to be contrasted with those where the later decision represents a response to 
changes in social conditions and expectations. Then, on any view, the declaratory approach is 
inapt.”); see Mary Arden, Prospective Overruling, 120 LAW Q. REV. 7 passim (2004). 
145. LCA 8925/04 Solel Boneh Bldg. & Infrastructure Ltd. v. Estate of Alhamid [2006] (1) IsrLR 
201, 216 (Isr.) (“The declaratory theory of law has not acquired great strength in Israel; there 
is no constitutional obstacle that prevents recognizing th[e] possibility [of giving precedents 
merely prospective force].”); id. at 225-26, 243 (contending that retrospectivity should be the 
exception, not the rule, for judicial lawmaking); see Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov, Time and Judicial 
Review in Israel: Tempering the Temporal Effects of Judicial Review, in THE EFFECTS OF JUDICIAL 
DECISIONS IN TIME 207, 223-26 (P. Popelier, S. Verstraelen, D. Vanheule & B. Vanlerberghe 
eds., 2014). 
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Zealand,146 Bangladesh,147 Singapore,148 Ghana,149 and Canada have indicated 
that when courts venture to change the law, they are not shackled by the declar-
atory theory’s demand for retroactivity. For example, Canada’s apex court has 
said: 
When the Court is declaring the law as it has existed, then the Blacksto-
nian approach is appropriate and retroactive relief should be granted. On 
the other hand, when a court is developing new law within the broad 
 
146. Chamberlains v. Lai [2007] 2 NZLR 7, [136] (N.Z.) (“We are changing the law in the present 
case. . . . We are not declaring [the law]; nor are we simply correcting a mistaken view of the 
law. Blackstone might have put it that way but we cannot. We are changing the law because 
of a change in perceptions over time of what public and legal policy require.”); see Jesse Wall, 
Prospective Overruling—It’s About Time, 12 OTAGO L. REV. 131, 133-34 (2009). But cf. Ha v New 
South Wales (1997) 189 CLR 465, 504 (Austl.) (“The adjudication of existing rights and obli-
gations as distinct from the creation of rights and obligations distinguishes the judicial power 
from non-judicial power. Prospective overruling is thus inconsistent with judicial power on 
the simple ground that the new regime that would be ushered in when the overruling took 
effect would alter existing rights and obligations. If an earlier case is erroneous and it is nec-
essary to overrule it, it would be a perversion of judicial power to maintain in force that which 
is acknowledged not to be the law.” (citations omitted)); see James Edelman, Chief Justice 
French, Judicial Power and Chapter III of the Commonwealth Constitution, in ESSAYS IN HONOUR 
OF CHIEF JUSTICE FRENCH 81, 101-04 (Henry Jackson ed., 2019). 
147. Khan v. Bangladesh, ADC Vol IX (A), 10 (2012) (Bangl.) (citing Golak Nath v. State of Pun-
jab, (1967) 2 SCR 762 (India), Great N. Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358 
(1932), and Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), and concluding that “[o]ur Constitution 
does not expressly or by necessary implication speak against the doctrine of prospective over-
ruling”); see M. Jashim Ali Chowdhury, Bangladesh’s Inconsistency with the Doctrine of Prospec-
tive Invalidation, in CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES IN ASIA 33, 34 (Po Jen Yap ed., 2019). 
148. Public Prosecutor v. Hue An Li, [2014] SGHC 171, [124] (Sing.) (“Our appellate courts (that 
is, our High Court sitting in its appellate capacity and our Court of Appeal) . . . have the dis-
cretion, in exceptional circumstances, to restrict the retroactive effect of their pronounce-
ments. This discretion is to be guided by [four] factors . . . .”); see WenXiong Zhuang, Pro-
spective Judicial Pronouncements and Limits to Judicial Law-Making, 28 SING. ACAD. L.J. 611, 612 
(2016). But cf. Hong Kong v. Wa, [2006] 9 H.K.C.F.A.R. 614, [18] (H.K.) (considering that 
“[o]n any view, the power to engage in prospective overruling, if it exists, is an extraordinary 
power,” and finding it not necessary to decide whether Hong Kong courts can exercise the 
power); see Andrew Li, Reflections on the Retrospective and Prospective Effect of Constitutional 
Judgments, in THE COMMON LAW LECTURE SERIES 2010, at 21, 24-32 (Jessica Young & Rebecca 
Lee eds., 2011). 
149. Kpebu v Attorney General, [2016] GHASC 15, [36] (Ghana) (“Under the doctrine of pro-
spective overruling, which has its origin in American jurisprudence, and which has been 
adopted, developed and applied in deserving cases in other jurisdictions, including India, Ma-
laysia, Singapore, United Kingdom, Uganda and other Commonwealth countries, this court 
has power to decide whether to limit the retroactive effect of the declaration of invalidity.”); 
see Stephen Kwaku Asare, Inconsequential Declarations of Unconstitutionality and Unconstitu-
tional Consequential Orders: The Case of Professor Stephen Kwaku Asare v Attorney General 
and General Legal Council, 63 J. AFRICAN L. 463, 473-77 (2019). 
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confines of the Constitution, it may be appropriate to limit the retroactive 
effect of its judgment.150 
The legal-philosophical framework thus concerns the problem of whether a 
novel precedent in issue is “new” law. 
2. Critique 
The problem so stated begs the question. Even putting legal philosophies 
aside, there can o�en be genuine disagreement as to whether some novel prece-
dent is really “new” law. Take, as examples, Obergefell and Janus. If these cases 
announced “new” precedent and overrode past law, then perhaps their holdings 
should apply only to disputes occurring a�er the Supreme Court delivered its 
judgments. But if these cases articulated principles that were always discernable 
in the Constitution, then the judgments merely corrected aberrant precedent and 
their holdings ought to govern past cases. The new-law inquiry predominantly 
turns on perspective and thus is easily manipulable based on how it is framed.151 
That, of course, was the reason the Court in Sunburst Oil le� the determination 
to “the wisdom” of individual state courts’ “philosophies”152: it thought there 
was no right answer to the problem. 
A deeper criticism can be leveled against the legal-philosophical approach to 
retroactivity: that it misconceives the declaratory theory of adjudication and un-
fairly caricatures its proponents. It attacks a straw man.153 John Finnis charges 
“the declaratory theory’s despisers” with failing to confront “its essential, nor-
mative claim”—that as a theory of adjudication it encapsulates “an important el-
ement in judicial duty . . . of judges to differentiate their authority and respon-
sibility, and thus their practical reasoning, from that of legislatures.”154 It is the 
judge’s adjudicatory role that compels this duty: 
[A]djudication is not the telling of some story which if accurate might be 
called history—or prescient prediction—and if inaccurate a myth or fairy 
tale. Adjudication is the effort to identify the rights of the contending 
parties now by identifying what were, in law, the rights and wrongs, or 
 
150. Canada (Attorney General) v. Hislop, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 429, [93] (Can.); see Daniel Guttman, 
Hislop v. Canada: A Retroactive Look, 42 SUP. CT. L. REV. (2d) 547, 552-53 (2008). 
151. See supra Section I.B. 
152. Great N. Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358, 365 (1932). 
153. Beever, supra note 132, at 425-30; see Shmilovits, supra note 117, at 69-79. 
154. J.M. Finnis, The Fairy Tale’s Moral, 115 LAW Q. REV. 170, 173 (1999). 
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validity or invalidity, of their actions and transactions when entered upon 
and done.155 
Contrary to popular belief, the declaratory theory is far from dead.156 Its es-
sence is simply that judges determine the law by looking to the past.157 Judges 
do not legislate. Rather, they recognize158 or elucidate159 the law within the con-
straints of adjudication. The apparent inadequacies of Blackstone’s descriptive 
account of judicial decisionmaking do not erode the principles that it embod-
ies,160 including, and especially, the retroactive nature of judicial decisions. 
The three propositions outlined in the preceding Section miss the mark. 
First, the idea that judging involves “finding” law cannot be dismissed out of 
hand. Stephen Sachs disputes the critics’ charge that as a matter of theory “law 
has to come from somewhere” and “judges can’t discover norms that no one ever 
made.”161 If social norms can be “found,” why not law? Copy editors and dic-
tionary authors routinely and uncontroversially “declare” standard English, for 
instance, though the rules of language derive from no formal source. Language 
norms also change and diverge, yet they have determinate content independent 
 
155. Id. at 172; see Paul Troop, Why Legal Formalism Is Not a Stupid Thing, 31 RATIO JURIS. 428, 432-
33 (2018). 
156. See Beever, supra note 132, at 423 (“Despite contemporary condemnation of the declaratory 
theory, the modern law remains committed to it.”); Jason Iuliano, The Supreme Court’s Noble 
Lie, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 911, 924-25 (2018) (discussing the American judiciary’s commitment 
to the declaratory theory); Shmilovits, supra note 117, at 81 (“Whether we like it or not, the 
declaratory theory is still alive and well. It is widely condemned and widely applied.”); see also 
James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 535-36 (1991) (opinion of Souter, J., 
joined by Stevens, J.) (“[T]he declaratory theory of law, according to which the courts are 
understood only to find the law, not to make it . . . comports with our received notions of the 
judicial role . . . .” (citations omitted)). 
157. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
158. LLEWELLYN, supra note 101, at 361-62 (explaining that the debate over whether judges find or 
make law is meaningless, because judges simultaneously do both—“their decision is . . . quite 
literally found and recognized, as well as made”—and they do so constrained and guided by legal 
materials and context); see DAGAN, RECONSTRUCTING, supra note 19, at 61-63 (discussing 
Llewellyn’s theory of adjudication); Dagan, American Legal Realism, supra note 19, at 131-36 
(same). 
159. JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, RECOGNIZING WRONGS 19, 239-40, 244, 254-
55, 363-64 (2020) (describing judicial decisionmaking as “elucidative”—a process of recogniz-
ing rights and duties); see CARDOZO, supra note 26, at 124-41 (discussing the judicial power to 
declare law). 
160. Jessie Allen, Blackstone, Expositor and Censor of Law Both Made and Found, in BLACKSTONE AND 
HIS CRITICS 41, 44-49 (Anthony Page & Wilfrid Prest eds., 2018) (defending Blackstone and 
discussing how the declaratory theory submits judges’ individual will to the direction of law). 
161. Sachs, supra note 78, at 527; see also Zamulinski, supra note 113, at 171 (discussing, from a nat-
ural-law perspective, judges’ “ability to apprehend moral truths”). 
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of the sources in which words are expressed.162 Finding law, Sachs contends, is 
“a real and plausible option for a modern legal system.”163 Such a contention 
does not hinge on a defense of Blackstone. Modern jurisprudence may have out-
grown Blackstone, but it need not abandon a declaratory view of adjudication. 
Mishkin notes that “while the Blackstonian conception is not entirely valid, nei-
ther is it wholly wrong.”164 Most cases can readily be taken to be resolved on the 
basis of foregoing law—whether by statute or stare decisis—and most judicial 
decisions explicitly have retroactive effect. 
Second, it is wrong to assume that the declaratory theory is inconsistent with 
the positivist or realist view of judges as lawmakers.165 Staunch positivists and 
realists comprise some of the declaratory theory’s keenest defenders.166 Justice 
Scalia’s opinions on judicial retroactivity, for instance, reflect the normative ac-
count that Finnis outlines—though the two jurists are philosophically una-
ligned. Scalia was unapologetically hostile to the idea of judges employing nat-
ural-law principles that might “render judgments that contradict positive 
law.”167 And he accepted that “courts have the capacity to ‘make’ law.”168 But, he 
insisted, they do so within the constraints of adjudication. Unlike legislatures, 
 
162. Sachs, supra note 78, at 531. 
163. Id. at 527. 
164. Mishkin, supra note 33, at 60; see LaCroix, supra note 66, at 1350; Kermit Roosevelt III, A 
Retroactivity Retrospective, with Thoughts for the Future: What the Supreme Court Learned from 
Paul Mishkin, and What It Might, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1677, 1682 (2007). 
165. Beever, supra note 132, at 426; Sachs, supra note 78, at 530-32. 
166. Even those who maintain that the law is “what the judge says,” Reid, supra note 120, at 22, or 
“does,” BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO, Jurisprudence, in SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN NA-
THAN CARDOZO 7, 12 (photo. reprint 1980) (Margaret E. Hall ed., 1947) (describing the view 
of the “neo-realists”), must recognize that judges speak and act from a perspective of hind-
sight. 
167. ANTONIN SCALIA, SCALIA SPEAKS: REFLECTIONS ON LAW, FAITH, AND LIFE WELL LIVED 248 
(2017). 
168. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1177 (1989) [here-
ina�er Scalia, The Rule of Law]; see James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 549 
(1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“I am not so naive . . . as to be unaware that 
judges in a real sense ‘make’ law.”); ANTONIN SCALIA, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law Sys-
tem: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MAT-
TER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 9-14 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) 
(acknowledging that judges make law and explaining that the retroactivity of judicial law-
making compels a modest judicial mindset); cf. Hammer, supra note 58, at 431-32 (considering 
the New Mexico Supreme Court’s insinuation that Scalia’s conception of adjudication was 
disingenuous); Lehn, supra note 29, at 575 (dubiously attributing to Scalia the intuition “that 
because the law does not actually change, the ‘new’ law was in fact always also the ‘old’ law”). 
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judges do not make new rules “out of whole cloth.”169 They must ground their 
decisions in the preceding legal materials: “in the text that Congress or the Con-
stitution has provided.”170 For Scalia, the declaratory theory simply reflects the 
modest judicial attitude that judges must hold. Recognizing that their lawmak-
ing power is constrained, they should commit to making law only “as judges make 
it, which is to say as though they were ‘finding’ it—discerning what the law is, 
rather than decreeing what it is today changed to, or what it will tomorrow be.”171 
To cast off that constraint, he contended, would be “to alter in a fundamental 
way the assigned balance of responsibility and power among the three 
branches.”172 
A constraining, “more realistic” account of the declaratory theory also ap-
peared across the pond in a seminal decision of the House of Lords.173 In his 
swansong judgment, Lord Goff of Chieveley—whose juridical philosophy main-
tained that “[p]ragmatism must be the watchword”174—accepted as “inevitable” 
that “in reality . . . the law is the subject of development by the judges.”175 Since 
judicial lawmaking “is what actually happens,” Lord Goff sought to “look at the 
declaratory theory of judicial decision with open eyes.”176 He dismissed the “his-
torical” notion of “an ideal system of the common law, which the judges from 
time to time reveal in their decisions.”177 But he did not regard the declaratory 
theory “as an aberration of the common law;” he described it, instead, as “an 
inevitable attribute of judicial decision-making.”178 Lord Goff considered the 
 
169. Scalia, The Rule of Law, supra note 168, at 1183; see GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 159, at 
252. 
170. Scalia, The Rule of Law, supra note 168, at 1183. 
171. James B. Beam, 501 U.S. at 549 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
172. Id.; see Peter Cane, The Common Law, the High Court of Australia, and the United States Supreme 
Court, in APEX COURTS AND THE COMMON LAW 66, 77 (Paul Daley ed., 2019). 
173. Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. Lincoln City Council [1999] 2 AC 349 (HL) 377 (Lord Goff of 
Chieveley) (appeal taken from Eng.); see Bowen, supra note 116, at 331 (“The decision in 
[Kleinwort] is thus extremely important insofar as it held that the victor in the clash was the 
declaratory theory.”); Jane Convery, Lord Goff ’s Swansong: Restitution, Mistake of Law, and the 
Retrospective Effect of Judicial Decisions, 3 EDINBURGH L. REV. 202, 216 (1999) (criticizing the 
majority Law Lords’ “acceptance of the declaratory theory”); Peter Mirfield, A Challenge to the 
Declaratory Theory of Law, 124 LAW Q. REV. 190, 190 (2008) (observing that “[t]he English 
judiciary continues to maintain its institutional commitment to the declaratory theory of 
law”); cf. Hammer, supra note 58, at 412 (supposing that “English judges, like their American 
counterparts, reject the declaratory theory”). 
174. Robert Goff, The Search for Principle, 69 PROC. BRIT. ACAD. 169, 186 (1984). 
175. Kleinwort Benson, [1999] 2 AC at 377. 
176. Id. 
177. Id. at 378. 
178. Id. at 379. 
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essential elements of the declaratory theory to be “the doctrine of precedent” and 
the practice of “development, usually . . . very modest development, of existing 
principle.”179 So characterized, Lord Goff thought that even “radical” departures 
from previously established principle “must nevertheless be seen as a develop-
ment of the law, and treated as such.”180 And what it meant to treat it as such was 
that “when the judges state what the law is, their decisions do . . . have a retro-
spective effect.”181 
To a similar end, the eminent British judge Lord Reid “debunked the notion 
that judges declare but do not make law”182 and ridiculed the theory that one 
could find the common law “in some Aladdin’s cave” through “knowledge of the 
magic words Open Sesame.”183 But even he did not escape the constraints of the 
declaratory theory by venturing to disavow its central tenet: that “judge-made 
law is always retrospective.”184 It is not a contentious proposition that judges de-
termine the law in the context of past disputes. One does not need to be a “nat-
ural lawyer” to recognize retroactivity as a basic feature of adjudication. 
The converse position is equally tenuous: that the natural-law perspective 
rejects the notion of law changing, and that it necessarily rejects non-retroactiv-
ity. This is the claim that when judges overrule precedent they simply correct 
errors of past judges, so natural law demands retroactivity in adjudication. This 
proposition flounders, however, under the assessment of Lon Fuller, the preemi-
nent theorist of the law’s internal morality. Fuller acknowledged that judges de-
velop the law. He also recognized the paradox “that courts, in order to avoid the 
appearance of legislating, cast their legislative enactments in the harshest possi-
ble form, making them ex post facto.”185 While accepting the presumption that 
“a retroactive law is truly a monstrosity,”186 Fuller showed that in most cases ju-
dicial retroactivity can be justified, both as a matter of legal morality and prag-
matic adjudication.187 Nevertheless, for Fuller, adjudication did not demand ret-
roactivity in all cases: “Theoretically, a court might distinguish between 
[obviously retroactive] decisions and those which announce a rule or standard 
 
179. Id. at 378. 
180. Id. 
181. Id.; see Cane, supra note 172, at 90. 
182. Anthony Mason, The Judge as Law-Maker, 3 JAMES COOK UNIV. L. REV. 1, 1 (1996). 
183. Reid, supra note 120, at 22. 
184. Id. at 23; see Beever, supra note 132, at 432-33. 
185. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 391 (1978). 
186. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 53 (rev. ed. 1969). 
187. Id. at 53-57, 92, 240-41. 
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that seems ‘new,’ even though it may represent a reasoned conclusion from fa-
miliar premises.”188 
In exceptional cases of “new” law, some judgments could be “prospective 
only.”189 Such cases would, however, have to be the exception to the norm of 
retroactive adjudication in order to maintain the stability of the legal system.190 
Moreover, it is clear that principles of natural right and natural justice un-
derlie many claims for non-retroactivity. Arguments for prospective overruling 
are o�en grounded in basic rule-of-law notions of fundamental fairness,191 reli-
ance on settled law,192 predictability of law,193 fair notice of legal change,194 and 
closure and finality of legal liability.195 Retroactive adjudication, it seems, is not 
an essential condition of natural-law jurisprudence. 
And so, at the third proposition—to abandon the declaratory model on legal-
philosophical grounds—we reach an impasse. The declaratory theory of adjudi-
cation does not hew only to one side of the legal-philosophical debate. Nor does 
the notion of judicial retroactivity. Arguments from natural law, legal positivism, 
and legal realism can be, and have been, corralled both for and against retroactive 
adjudication. Even if the debate were resolved, then, determining whether in a 
given case a law is “new”—and how its temporality should be understood—
would remain a puzzle. 
3. Summary 
The idea that the (non-)retroactivity puzzle can be solved by taking sides in 
the Blackstone/Austin debate is fundamentally misconceived. A clear answer to 
 
188. Fuller, supra note 185, at 392. 
189. Id. 
190. Id. 
191. See, e.g., James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 536 (1991) (opinion of Souter, 
J., joined by Stevens, J.) (“[T]o apply the new rule to parties who relied on the old would 
offend basic notions of justice and fairness.”); Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. 
Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 371 (1991) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (basing non-retroactivity doc-
trine on the principle of fairness and “fundamental notions of justified reliance and due pro-
cess”); Fisch, supra note 19, at 1084; Daniel E. Troy, Toward a Definition and Critique of Retro-
activity, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1329, 1330-31 (2000). 
192. See infra Section II.B. 
193. E.g., Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 66, at 1763-67. 
194. E.g., Guido Calabresi, Retroactivity: Paramount Powers and Contractual Changes, 71 YALE L.J. 
1191, 1191 n.2 (1962); Troy, supra note 191, at 1342. 
195. E.g., Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 212 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Lin-
kletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 627 (1965); Thyssenkrupp Steel N. Am., Inc. v. United States, 
886 F.3d 1215, 1223 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Kay, supra note 58, at 52. 
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law’s temporal implications does not lie within an intractable philosophical de-
bate. Attempts to find it there will inevitably be “misguided, inconclusive, and 
unproductive.”196 
B. Right-Reliance Balancing Framework 
Might the solution lie not in philosophy but in functionalism? Pamela Ste-
phens suggests that the inquiry into whether a novel precedent is “new” law is 
“merely code language for the reliance interests involved.”197 The function of 
non-retroactivity doctrine should be to resolve parties’ competing interests. 
Many commentators favor the idea that the temporal fallout of new law should 
be tempered by balancing recognition of new rights with others’ expectations 
and reliance on the state of the law at the time they acted. Justice O’Connor’s 
judicial opinions also endorsed this view. Yet accounts of a right-reliance balanc-
ing framework are frequently too simplistic and fail to address basic questions 
regarding whose reliance is relevant, as well as when reliance interests are mate-
rial. The lack of a coherent answer to these questions dooms the framework. 
1. Description 
The crux of the problem with judicial retroactivity lies in the unfairness of 
applying new rules to events that preceded a court’s novel precedent. People who 
fail to anticipate a legal change will have interacted and transacted against the 
backdrop of the “old” rule. Parties may have acted in reliance on some clear stat-
utory or common-law rule that affirms principle of law X, or in the reasonable 
expectation that the relevant principle of law was X. These interests will be upset 
if a court later overrules the “clear past precedent” or delivers a ruling on a point 
that “was not clearly foreshadowed.”198 A subsequent ruling that the relevant 
principle of law is ¬X may undercut the reasonable bases on which parties pre-
viously interacted and transacted. 
Incentive distortions might then follow. The potential for new decisions to 
change past law creates pervasive uncertainty. Fear of disruptive legal change 
may deter people from transacting on the basis of current settled law and lead to 
 
196. Roosevelt, supra note 28, at 1084 n.42; see also Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 66, at 1764 n.187 
(endorsing “a philosophically unambitious account” of non-retroactivity doctrine). 
197. Stephens, supra note 31, at 1573. 
198. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106 (1971). 
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underinvestment.199 Judges may also become “hesitant to discard an outmoded 
rule due to the transition’s impact on settled expectations”200 and the adminis-
trative costs of effecting change.201 If overall the new rule is superior to the old, 
judicial reluctance to apply it may stymie “efficient legal reform.”202 
Non-retroactivity doctrine functions to preserve prior expectation and reli-
ance interests while facilitating implementation of superior new rules of law for 
the future. A note in this Journal once opined that the doctrine “allows a court to 
have its cake and eat it too—to overrule an outmoded precedent without having 
to disappoint the justified expectations of anyone.”203 Applying the doctrine, 
past events remain governed by the past law, and new events by the new law. As 
Masur and Mortara aver, prospective overruling “decouple[s] a judicial deci-
sion’s prospective effect—which is presumptively positive—from the backward-
looking harm it might do to investment-backed expectations and reliance inter-
ests.”204 It “enables courts to . . . chang[e] bad law without upsetting the reason-
able expectations of those who relied on it.”205 
How is this achieved? Through judicial cost-benefit analysis.206 The Court 
in Chevron Oil explicitly directed judges to “weigh the merits and demerits” of 
retroactively applying new rules in each case and to “weigh[] the inequity im-
posed by retroactive application.”207 Justice O’Connor, who authored several sig-
nificant opinions favoring non-retroactivity doctrine, invoked the “balanc[ing]” 
 
199. Masur & Mortara, supra note 22, at 974 (“[L]egal instability can upset reliance interests and 
create problems of inadequate investment regardless of whether the change in the law is gen-
erally helpful or harmful.”). 
200. Rhodes, supra note 4, at 403. 
201. Fisch, supra note 19, at 1119. 
202. Rhodes, supra note 4, at 408; see also Gil J. Ghatan, The Incentive Problem with Prospective Over-
ruling: A Critique of the Practice, 45 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 179, 192-99 (2010) (arguing 
that non-retroactivity doctrine suppresses plaintiffs’ incentives to argue for efficient changes 
in the law); see Masur & Mortara, supra note 22, at 982 (suggesting that the costs of upsetting 
reliance-based interests may “lead courts to refrain from changing the law, even when they 
believe that the law is not optimally calibrated”). 
203. Note, supra note 70, at 912. 
204. Masur & Mortara, supra note 22, at 968. 
205. Traynor, supra note 118, at 542. 
206. William W. Berry III, Normative Retroactivity, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 485, 506 (2016) (framing 
“the retroactivity inquiry in terms of the normative impact of the new constitutional rule at 
issue”); Lehn, supra note 29, at 566 (suggesting that “the only viable solution to the retroac-
tivity problem is a cost-benefit test” and “that the reliance interest is at the heart of this test”). 
207. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1971) (quoting Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 
618, 629 (1965)). 
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of competing interests.208 Reliance is a major interest that has informed the Su-
preme Court’s landmark judgments.209 The merits of upholding private rights 
as articulated by the courts (which counsel in favor of retroactivity) are balanced 
against parties’ “good-faith” expectations and reliance on the state of the law at 
the time they acted (which “counsel in favor of nonretroactivity” of new 
rules).210 Despite its seeming demise before the Rehnquist Court, Chevron Oil-
style balancing continues implicitly to inform judicial reasoning today.211 Ste-
phens suggests that the justifiability of a party’s reliance on a prior rule can be 
determined by “how well established the prior rule of law was, how clear it was, 
[and] perhaps whether there was reason (in the form of evolving, eroding 
caselaw) to predict a change.”212 This framework sets up a neat dichotomy be-
tween the interests of those who relied on the old rule and those seeking to ben-
efit from the new rule: the new rule’s temporal reach depends on whose interests 
are ultimately more compelling. 
2. Critique 
This is, however, an overly simplistic précis. In order to understand how re-
liance interests affect the scope of a new rule of law, we must first understand 
whose reliance is relevant, as well as when reliance interests are material in the 
process of interaction and litigation. The jurisprudence is opaque and incon-
sistent on both of these points. 
 
208. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 558 (1991) (O’Connor, J., dissenting); 
see also Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 181-86 (1990) (plurality opinion) (apply-
ing the balancing approach to non-retroactivity doctrine). 
209. John Bernard Corr, Retroactivity: A Study in Supreme Court Doctrine as Applied, 61 N.C. L. REV. 
745, 773 (1983) (observing that among the factors the Court considers in its retroactivity anal-
yses, reliance “perhaps stirs the greatest empathy”); Shannon, supra note 34, at 813 (“The 
problem usually takes the form of reliance; because one or more parties . . . relied on the ‘old’ 
law, it would be unfair to apply the ‘new’ law to those parties.”); Stephens, supra note 31, at 
1560 (“The fairness which formed the rationale for pure or modified prospectivity, was of a 
type which focused on reliance.”); Jason Tzu-cheng Kuo, Note, Retroactivity of Refund Claims 
for Unconstitutional State Taxes: How Helpful Is the Chevron Oil Test?, 45 TAX LAW. 889, 893 
(1992) (“Constitutional violations should be classified into at least two types, one in which 
there is no reliance . . . , and another in which there is demonstrated reliance.”). 
210. Chen, supra note 6, at 1435; see Traynor, supra note 124, at 542 (contending that retroactivity 
of novel precedent would “upset[] the reasonable expectations of those who relied” on prior 
law). 
211. See Beske, supra note 20 passim. 
212. Stephens, supra note 31, at 1573. 




There is no satisfactory answer as to whose reliance interests should be taken 
into account. A narrow focus (that considers the litigants’ interests) means the 
law will be one thing for people who can prove reliance and another thing for 
people who cannot. A broad focus (that considers anyone’s interests) is nebulous 
and may well subvert litigants’ own interests. 
Consider first the narrow focus. One might expect the argument for non-
retroactivity to hinge on the mutual reliance on the old rule by all of the “liti-
gants” to the case.213 If parties were operating in the shadow of the prior rule, 
intuitively it seems unfair to revise the basis of their interaction a�er the fact in 
a way that neither party would have expected. Commentary on non-retroactivity 
doctrine frequently refers to protecting “the parties’” reliance interests.214 But 
case law shows that mutual reliance of litigants is not pertinent. Indeed, parties’ 
interests are o�en at odds. One party may litigate seeking to challenge the status 
quo, while others plead reliance on the status quo to constrain the scope of any 
subsequent legal change.215 Reliance arguments are considered particularly per-
suasive when the party pleading reliance is a public body for which the fallout of 
legal change would be disruptive.216 Where, for instance, a court strikes down 
an unconstitutional tax, a state’s “good faith reliance on a presumptively valid 
statute”217 and its “exceedingly strong interest in financial stability”218 will tend 
to weigh in favor of restricting backward-looking relief. 
More broadly, relevant interests may extend beyond litigants. The reliance 
interests of nonparties who stand to be adversely affected by a change in the law 
seem to weigh against retroactive implementation of a new rule. Indeed, it is far 
from clear that actual reliance is pertinent at all.219 Supreme Court precedent in-
dicates that the impact on general categories of people might be the more 
 
213. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106 (1971). But see Fisch, supra note 19, at 1086 
(“Looking to the litigants’ interests . . . provides little guidance.”). 
214. See Stephens, supra note 31, at 1569. 
215. See Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 218-19 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
216. See Stephens, supra note 31, at 1574. 
217. McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 44 (1990). 
218. Id. at 37. 
219. See Note, supra note 70, at 945 (suggesting that “in a great many cases . . . the parties will have 
acted without any knowledge at all of what the governing law was” and so they cannot realis-
tically claim to be surprised by a change in the law; “whatever law is finally held to govern 
their conduct, whether it be the old rule or the new rule, will be a new rule to them”). 
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significant consideration than the impact on the parties to the case.220 Justice 
O’Connor favored an expansive view of relevant reliance interests. Her judg-
ments invoked non-retroactivity to protect the reliance interests not just of im-
mediate parties,221 but also of nonparty state or government entities,222 govern-
ment officers tasked with enforcing an overruled law,223 and even the legislatures 
that enacted the law224 and the judges who interpreted it.225 In American Truck-
ing Ass’ns v. Smith, Justice O’Connor emphasized the importance of giving “great 
weight to the reliance interests of all parties affected by changes in the law.”226 In 
her dissent in James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, she characterized prospec-
tive overruling as necessary to protect the interests of “every jurisdiction in the 
Nation that reasonably relied on” the previous rule of law.227 It would seem that 
so long as someone—whether or not a party to proceedings—relied on a previous 
rule of law, their interest will tilt the scales toward non-retroactivity of novel 
precedent. Such appeal to general reliance may well subvert, rather than protect, 
litigants’ own reliance interests. 
b. When? 
As to the temporal question, is it reliance on the old rule at the time of trans-
action, at the time of litigation, or at the time of judicial resolution that is rele-
vant? And how should courts take account of shi�s in a party’s reliance? The 
jurisprudence on these points is also unclear. It is useful in this regard to revisit 
the two scenarios that implicate retroactivity discussed in Section I.A. Pending 
cases are those brought at a time when the old rule was seen to be in force. In 
these cases, it is tempting to assume that at the time the parties interacted, their 
 
220. See Kay, supra note 58, at 42 (“[C]ourts almost always consider categories of cases[,] not the 
presence or absence of reliance by the particular parties before the court.”). But see Stephens, 
supra note 31, at 1574 (“[I]t should be actual reliance in the usual case, which will be necessary 
to overcome the presumption of retroactivity.”). 
221. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 370 (1991) (O’Connor, 
J., dissenting) (emphasizing “respondents’ entirely proper reliance” on the prior rule). 
222. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989). 
223. Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 185 (1990) (plurality opinion). 
224. Id. at 182. 
225. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 66, at 1791 n.318 (noting the Supreme Court’s seeming concern 
for “protecting the reliance interests or sensibilities of state court judges rather than those of 
state and local officials”). But see Schwartz, supra note 34, at 756 (“Nor is it clear who would 
be harmed by complete retroactivity. State judges might be offended, but they certainly would 
not be harmed.”). 
226. 496 U.S. at 185 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added). 
227. 501 U.S. 529, 551 (1991) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
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reliance interests were aligned with the “old” rule. This may be true of plaintiffs 
who sue seeking to take advantage of the old rule without anticipating it being 
overruled. But what of pioneering plaintiffs—such as the Obergefell plaintiffs—
who believed the old rule was wrong and sought to challenge it by reference to 
some other, better rule?228 Their reliance was never on the old rule, but instead 
on a competing rule or constitutional principle. Should non-retroactivity doc-
trine draw a distinction between cases according to differences in the parties’ 
respective accounts of reliance? 
And what of those subsequent cases—like those that followed in Obergefell’s 
wake—where a plaintiff, whose interaction was apparently governed by the old 
rule, seeks (without violating other procedural constraints)229 to rely on a new 
rule announced by a court? It is not necessarily the case that plaintiffs simply 
shi� their reliance interests from the old rule to the new rule when it suits them. 
Successive plaintiffs might always have viewed the old rule as unjust or uncon-
stitutional yet not had the means or fortitude to challenge their treatment under 
it until some favorable, novel precedent was handed down. Should such circum-
stances negate the inference that they “relied” on the old rule at all? Or should 
such cases raise the specter of opening the floodgates, so as to warrant non-ret-
roactivity? It is difficult to ascertain when reliance interests are material in these 
cases. 
i. Pending Cases 
The reliance interest is premised on the unfairness of rules “changing” be-
tween the time a party acts and the time its actions are adjudicated.230 This un-
fairness seems particularly stark when a plaintiff has brought suit seeking to in-
voke rule X, but rule X is replaced with rule ¬X before the plaintiff ’s suit is 
resolved. That is what happened in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson,231 a case that be-
came the high watermark of the Supreme Court’s civil non-retroactivity doc-
trine. Huson had filed a personal-injury action two years a�er he was injured on 
Chevron Oil’s offshore drilling rig. Federal precedent at that time held that mar-
itime law governed offshore injuries, and Chevron Oil did not challenge the 
timeliness of Huson’s claim under the admiralty laches doctrine. However, while 
the claim was pending, the Supreme Court handed down Rodrigue v. Aetna 
 
228. The old rule in this case being state laws that “define marriage as a union between one man 
and one woman.” Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 653-54 (2015). The new rule being an 
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment that protects the petitioners’ “right to marry or 
to have their marriages, lawfully performed in another State, given full recognition.” Id. at 655. 
229. Such as res judicata or limitations periods. See infra Section III.B. 
230. See Lehn, supra note 29, at 565. 
231. 404 U.S. 97 (1971). 
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Casualty & Surety Co., holding that injuries occurring on fixed offshore platforms 
were governed not by maritime law but by the law of the adjacent state.232 One 
of the implications of Rodrigue, though it was not the subject of that litigation, 
was that such claims would be subject to state statutes of limitations. Chevron 
Oil sought to invoke Rodrigue to dismiss Huson’s claim because he had filed it 
outside of the adjacent state of Louisiana’s more restrictive one-year limitations 
statute. 
It is easy to see how reliance interests tilted the Court in favor of restraining 
the retroactive effect of Rodrigue in Huson’s case. Chevron Oil had not initially 
questioned the applicability of maritime law to the suit. Huson had not antici-
pated that the governing precedent would change. Both parties, it seems, “relied” 
on maritime law governing their dispute, at least until it served the defendant’s 
interests to argue otherwise. The Court considered it “inequitable” to hold Hu-
son to the one-year limitations period when at the time “he could not have 
known the time limitation that the law imposed upon him.”233 The inference is 
that if Huson’s case had been resolved before Rodrigue, it would have succeeded, 
and that Huson should not be penalized by the happenstance of when his case 
was heard. But this inference only holds because Chevron Oil did not challenge 
maritime law’s jurisdiction at the outset. Had Chevron Oil always pleaded state 
limitations law in response to Huson’s claim,234 thereby setting up the sort of 
argument that ultimately succeeded in Rodrigue, it is not obvious that the balance 
of competing reliance interests would necessarily have favored Huson. 
Novel precedent does not inevitably disrupt mutual reliance interests in 
pending cases.235 The more recent case of Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde236 pro-
vides a stark counter-illustration to Chevron Oil. Hyde, too, suffered an injury 
attributable to the defendant. She filed suit three-and-a-half years a�er her ac-
cident. Ohio’s limitations period for personal injury was two years, but Hyde 
sought to rely on a statutory exception that tolled limitations while a defendant 
was not “present” in the state.237 In reply, the Pennsylvania-based defendant ar-
gued that Hyde’s claim was barred by the two-year limitations period, and that 
the tolling provision was unconstitutional and so did not apply. Thus, from the 
outset of the litigation, the parties “relied” on different rules of law. Before the 
 
232. 395 U.S. 352, 355 (1969). 
233. Chevron Oil, 404 U.S. at 108 (quoting Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 706 (1969)). 
234. It is far from definitive that “[t]he most [Huson] could do was to rely on the law as it then 
was.” Id. at 107; see infra Section III.C. 
235. Fisch, supra note 19, at 1086 (“[T]he actual degree to which a new rule affects justified reliance 
interests varies considerably from case to case.”). 
236. 514 U.S. 749 (1995). 
237. Id. at 751 (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.15(A) (1991)). 
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case reached trial, the U.S. Supreme Court delivered judgment in Bendix Autolite 
Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc., holding that the Ohio limitations-tolling pro-
vision for out-of-state defendants violated the Commerce Clause.238 In this con-
text, it is not so easy to conceive of Bendix as disrupting the parties’ reliance inter-
ests, as it simply reflected Reynoldsville Casket’s position from the outset. Hyde 
was not caught off guard in the way Huson was caught off guard. Reynoldsville 
Casket did not need to rely on Bendix to advance its limitations argument. It 
invoked the arguments that informed the reasoning in Bendix from the outset. 
The Supreme Court then unanimously rejected the argument that Hyde’s reli-
ance on the pre-Bendix understanding of the law should trump the presumptive 
retroactivity of the holding in Bendix.239 Reynoldsville Casket prevailed under 
the “new” law. 
Chevron Oil and Reynoldsville Casket were cases concerning plaintiffs’ reliance 
on an old rule. More commonly, it is defendants who invoke non-retroactivity to 
curb the impact of a change in the status quo. The argument seems compelling 
that defendants should not be penalized for relying on some unchallenged legal 
rule that is impugned only at a future date.240 But once a legal rule is challenged, 
pleas of reliance seem more dubious. Why should a defendant on notice of a 
challenge to the validity of a legal rule nevertheless continue to benefit from 
pleading reliance on that rule? 
In this regard, the Supreme Court’s decision in American Trucking Ass’ns v. 
Smith is problematic.241 Smith arose out of a constitutional challenge brought by 
out-of-state truckers to Arkansas’ Highway Use Equalization Tax Act (HUE Tax 
Act), a tax statute enacted in March 1983 with effect from July 1983.242 The plain-
tiffs filed suit in May 1983, contending that the HUE Tax Act violated clauses of 
both the state and federal constitutions. Thus, the HUE Tax Act was subject to 
judicial review from the outset. While the case was being litigated, Arkansas con-
tinued to levy the tax without escrow. A�er failing in the state courts,243 the 
plaintiffs sought certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court, but the Court held 
their appeal pending decision on a materially similar case, American Trucking 
 
238. 486 U.S. 888, 891 (1988). 
239. Reynoldsville Casket, 514 U.S. at 758-59; see also Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. 
Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 364 (1991) (retroactively applying a new statute-of-limitations in-
terpretation). 
240. See discussion of subsequent cases infra Section II.B.2.b.ii. 
241. 496 U.S. 167 (1990). 
242. See id. at 206 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing the HUE Tax Act). 
243. See Am. Trucking Ass’n v. Gray, 707 S.W.2d 759, 761-63 (Ark. 1986) (relying on the Supreme 
Court’s prior decisions upholding flat taxes). 
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Ass’ns v. Scheiner.244 The Supreme Court delivered Scheiner in June 1987, holding 
that Pennsylvania’s unapportioned flat highway-use tax violated the Commerce 
Clause, and remanded the Arkansas case back to the Arkansas Supreme Court.245 
In light of the new precedent, the Arkansas Supreme Court ruled the HUE tax 
unconstitutional, but it declined to order restitution of taxes back to 1983, hold-
ing that Scheiner did not apply retroactively.246 On further appeal to the U.S. Su-
preme Court, a four-Justice plurality247 in Smith held that Scheiner did not apply 
to taxation of highway use prior to the date it was decided (namely, June 23, 
1987). That was because Scheiner had established “a new principle of law,” and 
its retroactive application was neither necessary nor appropriate.248 The State of 
Arkansas, the plurality held, had “relied on valid, existing precedent in enacting 
and implementing its tax.”249 They considered that the “inequity of unsettling 
actions taken in reliance on those precedents [was] apparent,” as refunds of pre-
vious taxes paid “could deplete the state treasury, thus threatening the State’s 
current operations and future plans.”250 
This is an unsatisfying presentation of the respective reliance interests in 
Smith. The four plurality Justices characterized the State of Arkansas as having 
relied in “good faith” on “presumptively valid” law.251 True, the HUE Tax Act 
was not clearly invalid when enacted.252 But even before the HUE Tax Act came 
into effect, its lawfulness and constitutionality were challenged in court. The 
state was on notice from the outset that its reliance might not be well placed. The 
plaintiffs, meanwhile, placed their reliance in the U.S. Constitution and the State 
of Arkansas Constitution, clauses of which they contended invalidated the HUE 
 
244. 483 U.S. 266 (1987). 
245. Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Gray, 483 U.S. 1014 (1987). 
246. Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Gray, 746 S.W.2d 377, 379 (Ark. 1988) (ordering restitution only back 
to the date of Justice Blackmun’s escrow order on August 14, 1987). 
247. Justice Scalia joined as a fi�h vote concurring with the plurality’s judgment, writing separately 
because he thought that Scheiner was wrongly decided and it was necessary to curb its conse-
quential impact. See Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 202 (1990) (Scalia, J., con-
curring in the judgment). For further discussion, see infra Section II.E.1. 
248. Smith, 496 U.S. at 187 (plurality opinion). 
249. Id. at 183. 
250. Id. at 182; see also James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 558 (1991) (O’Connor, 
J., dissenting) (emphasizing states’ reliance interests “at a time when most States are strug-
gling to fund even the most basic services”). 
251. Smith, 496 U.S. at 186 (plurality opinion) (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 209 
(1973)). This argument has also been used to justify the non-retroactivity of Obergefell, 576 
U.S. 644 (2015), and Janus, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018). See supra notes 6, 9. 
252. Cf. McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 46 (1990) (noting 
that the state could “hardly claim surprise” at the invalidation of the tax scheme at issue, given 
that it was “virtually identical” to a scheme previously invalidated by the Court). 
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Tax Act. The plaintiffs ultimately succeeded on their primary argument—their 
reliance was shown to be well placed. Why should the unsuccessful defendant 
state’s reliance trump the long-held reliance interests of the successful plain-
tiffs?253 
ii. Subsequent Cases 
The reliance assumption—that retroactive application of new rules to past 
transactions is unfair because at the time of transaction, the parties would have 
“relied” on the old rule—fails in pending cases, and it is similarly difficult to de-
fend in subsequently filed cases. These are cases where a plaintiff files a claim 
only a�er the new rule is delivered. For several reasons, we cannot assume that 
plaintiffs’ reliance shi�s from the old rule to the new rule in such cases, or that 
filing suit gives rise to unfairness that favors defendants’ reliance on the old rule. 
First, the line between pending and subsequent cases is procedural, not sub-
stantive. A plaintiff who files suit challenging a rule of law before an appellate 
court hands down a novel precedent that overturns that rule may have pleaded 
the exact same arguments as the principal plaintiff whose case became the vehicle 
for change.254 They might also be materially the same arguments that subse-
quent plaintiffs bring when they seek to take advantage of the new rule. The 
difference is one of timing, not substantive pleading. 
Second, there are any number of reasons why plaintiffs might not file suit to 
vindicate a rights violation before a novel precedent is handed down. They may 
lack the resources, the competence, or the confidence to pioneer proceedings. 
Such plaintiffs might even comprise those with particularly sympathetic circum-
stances but who are only in a position to pursue their rights via class-action pro-
ceedings led by others. This does not mean we can presume that such plaintiffs 
viewed the old rule as valid and constitutional at the time they labored under it, 
such that their suit under the new rule should be subject to dismissal. 
Third, the inquiry into parties’ actual reliance is unhelpful. Changes in prec-
edent invariably affect countless parties and nonparties to litigation—many of 
whom will, and perhaps many more of whom will not, have “relied” on the old 
rule.255 The non-retroactivity analysis attempts an impossibly ambitious balanc-
ing exercise between manifold competing interests. But, as Justice Souter 
 
253. See infra Section III.B. 
254. See Walter V. Schaefer, The Control of “Sunbursts”: Techniques of Prospective Overruling, 42 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 631, 645 (1967) (arguing that “[t]oo many irrelevant considerations, including 
the common cold, bear upon the rate of progress of a case through the judicial system” for it 
to be a salient basis for distinguishing rights). 
255. See Fairchild, supra note 86, at 260. 
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insisted in James B. Beam, the substantive law cannot “shi� and spring” accord-
ing to “the particular equities” of individual parties’ claims, like “whether they 
actually relied on the old rule and how they would suffer from retroactive appli-
cation of the new.”256 For “reliance on cases subsequently abandoned” is “a fact 
of life if not always one of jurisprudential recognition.”257 
Recognizing these problems in a series of tax-restitution cases, a majority of 
the Supreme Court post-Smith shrank from treating reliance interests as persua-
sive when advanced by defendants in cases brought following a novel precedent. 
In James B. Beam, the plaintiffs had sought a refund of Georgia state excise taxes 
on imported liquor paid between 1982 and 1984, a�er the Supreme Court in June 
1984 struck down a materially similar tax statute in Hawaii.258 Writing an opin-
ion in support of the Court’s judgment,259 Justice Souter applied this “new” rule 
retroactively, though he acknowledged the suspicion that such plaintiffs “only 
exploit others’ efforts by litigating in the new rule’s wake.”260 Countering that 
charge, Justice Souter maintained that these “putative hangers-on . . . are merely 
asserting a right that the Court has told them is theirs in law.”261 Such plaintiffs 
“cannot be characterized as freeloaders any more than those who seek vindication 
under a new rule on facts arising a�er the rule’s announcement. Those in each 
class rely on the labors of the first successful litigant.”262 
Moreover, Justice Souter continued, using non-retroactivity doctrine to dis-
tinguish between pending and subsequent cases would only exacerbate admin-
istrative burdens, because “distinguishing between those [plaintiffs] with cases 
pending and those without would only serve to encourage the filing of replicative 
suits when this or any other appellate court created the possibility of a new rule 
by taking a case for review.”263 
 
256. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 543 (1991) (opinion of Souter, J., joined 
by Stevens, J.), cited with approval in Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993); 
see Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swi�-Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394, 406 n.6 (2006). 
257. James B. Beam, 501 U.S. at 536 (opinion of Souter, J., joined by Stevens, J.). 
258. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984). 
259. Justice Souter’s opinion was joined only by Justice Stevens. The opinion was supplemented 
by three others that concurred in the judgment and by one dissent authored by Justice O’Con-
nor for herself, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justice Kennedy. 
260. James B. Beam, 501 U.S. at 542 (opinion of Souter, J., joined by Stevens, J.) (adding that “Beam 
had yet to enter the waters at the time of our decision in Bacchus, and yet we give it Bacchus’ 
benefit”). 
261. Id. Justice Souter continued, “The applicability of rules of law is not to be switched on and off 
according to individual hardship.” Id. at 543. 
262. Id. at 542. 
263. Id. at 542-43. 
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A similar approach was taken in Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation.264 
The Harper plaintiffs had sought a refund of Virginia state taxes discriminatorily 
imposed on their federal retirement benefits a�er the Supreme Court struck 
down as unconstitutional a materially similar tax scheme in Michigan.265 While 
Michigan had conceded that restitution was the appropriate remedy, Virginia did 
not. The Virginia Supreme Court declined to apply the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
new precedent retroactively,266 even a�er it reevaluated the plaintiffs’ suit in 
light of James B. Beam.267 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed. Applying James B. 
Beam, Justice Thomas held that when the Court “applies a rule of federal law to 
the parties before it, that rule is the controlling interpretation of federal law and 
must be given full retroactive effect” in both pending and subsequent cases.268 
The Court majority rejected Justice O’Connor’s position that defendants’ reli-
ance interests should take precedence unless the defendant acted in a manner akin 
to bad faith.269 The majority did not do so for “fairness” reasons, although, pa-
tently, unfairness can ensue from applying disparate rules to principal and suc-
cessive parties.270 Instead, the Court invoked “basic norms of constitutional ad-
judication” to prioritize applying precedent—including new rules—equally to 
all.271 In so doing, the Court majority repudiated the technique of selective pro-
spective overruling altogether. 
3. Summary 
The right-reliance balancing framework calls on courts to weigh the costs 
and benefits to parties of applying new rules retroactively. This framework is 
malleable to the point of being manipulable. Notions of reliance can readily be 
 
264. 509 U.S. 86 (1993). 
265. Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of the Treasury, 489 U.S. 803 (1989). 
266. Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 401 S.E.2d 868 (Va. 1991). 
267. Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 410 S.E.2d 629 (Va. 1991). 
268. Harper, 509 U.S. at 97. 
269. Id. at 135 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
270. See, e.g., Molitor v. Kaneland Cmty. Unit Dist. No. 302, 163 N.E.2d 89, 96-97 (Ill. 1959) (in-
itially using selective prospectivity to grant relief to one student who brought a personal-in-
jury suit as a test case against his school following a serious bus crash, while denying relief to 
other victims of the same crash (including the test plaintiff ’s siblings) whose cases were pend-
ing—a disparity in treatment that was only rectified in subsequent proceedings), revisited in 
182 N.E.2d 145 (Ill. 1962); see also Fairchild, supra note 86, at 268-69 (discussing Molitor); 
Hammer, supra note 58, at 423-24 (noting the unfairness of the initial Molitor holding). 
271. Harper, 509 U.S. at 87 (quoting Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322 (1987)); see also Reich 
v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106, 114 (1994) (“[T]axpayers need not have taken any steps to learn of 
the possible unconstitutionality of their taxes at the time they paid them. Accordingly, they 
may not now be put in any worse position for having failed to take such steps.”). 
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tamed to meet decisionmakers’ desired ends. It remains unclear whose reliance is 
pertinent to the assessment, and whether the inquiry is a subjective or objective 
one. Nor is it clear when in the process of interaction and litigation reliance in-
terests become material. The upshot of this framework, it would seem, is that so 
long as someone, somewhere, at some time might have relied on the “old” rule, 
their interest will weigh against retroactive application of the “new” rule. This is 
not a stable foundation on which to rest the doctrine. 
C. Choice-of-Law Framework 
Perhaps the problem with the right-reliance balancing framework is that it 
emphasizes the wrong dichotomy. Sunburst Oil suggested that novel precedent 
presents courts with a “choice” between applying old law and applying new 
law.272 In the 1950s, Henry Hart and Albert Sacks characterized Sunburst Oil-
type cases as raising a “problem of the conflict of laws in time.”273 This charac-
terization has endeared itself to some judges at the highest level. Under scrutiny, 
however, it does not fare well. The choice-of-law framework bears the same 
flaws as the legal-philosophical and right-reliance balancing frameworks. 
Though intuitively appealing, it is not a workable method for determining the 
temporal reach of novel precedent. 
1. Description 
According to Hart and Sacks’s “conflict of laws in time” theory, the problem 
with new law arising from the judicial branch is that 
the substantive content of its laws is constantly changing. . . . Again and 
again, in many varied types of situations, the question[] presents itself: 
Should this matter be settled in accordance with the law as it was or ap-
peared to be at one or another past point of time or in accordance with 
the law as it appears to be now?274 
This question, which sets up a dichotomy between old law and new law from 
which an adjudicating court must choose, was first articulated in earnest at the 
 
272. Great N. Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364 (1932); see Richard H.S. Tur, 
Time and Law, 22 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 463, 473 (2002). 
273. HART & SACKS, supra note 75, at 606. 
274. Id. at 616. 
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federal level in Smith.275 Justice O’Connor contended that when reliance inter-
ests weigh in favor of non-retroactivity, lower courts considering subsequent 
cases should apply the law that governed at the time of the transaction in issue. 
This meant that 
[i]f the operative conduct or events occurred before the law-changing 
decision, a court should apply the law prevailing at the time of the con-
duct. If the operative conduct or events occurred a�er the decision, so 
that any reliance on old precedent would be unjustified, a court should 
apply the new law.276 
The choice-of-law framework proposes that a legal issue may be subject to 
different laws that correspond to two different temporal periods. That is because 
“when the Court changes its mind, the law changes with it.”277 The judge’s task 
is to apply the law that governed at the time the issue in dispute arose.278 
Justice Souter built upon this framework in James B. Beam. He explained that 
whether a new rule applies retroactively “is properly seen in the first instance as 
a matter of choice of law,”279 which leaves a court with three options: (1) to apply 
the new rule “fully retroactive[ly]” (a practice Justice Souter described as “over-
whelmingly the norm”);280 (2) to overrule “purely prospective[ly];”281 or (3) to 
apply “modified, or selective, prospectivity” by “apply[ing] a new rule in the case 
in which it is pronounced, then return[ing] to the old one with respect to all 
others arising on facts predating the pronouncement.”282 Justice Souter rejected 
this third option of selective prospectivity as contrary to “principles of equality 
 
275. Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 191 (1990) (plurality opinion); see Fallon & Melt-
zer, supra note 66, at 1757 (noting that “[t]he four Justices in the [Smith] plurality adopted a 
starkly positivist outlook”). 
276. Smith, 496 U.S. at 191 (plurality opinion). But see id. at 218-19 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
277. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 550 (1991) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
278. Justice O’Connor in Smith rejected the dissent’s framing of this problem as involving not a 
choice of law but a choice of remedy. Non-retroactivity doctrine, Justice O’Connor maintained, 
is “better understood as part of the doctrine of stare decisis, rather than as part of the law of 
remedies.” Smith, 496 U.S. at 196 (plurality opinion); see Stephens, supra note 31, at 1535; Kuo, 
supra note 209, at 892-93; infra Section II.D. 
279. James B. Beam, 501 U.S. at 534-35 (opinion of Souter, J., joined by Stevens, J.), endorsed by 
Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 131-32 (1993) (O’Connor, J., dissenting); see 
Hans W. Baade, Time and Meaning: Notes on the Intertemporal Law of Statutory Construction and 
Constitutional Interpretation, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 319, 326 (1995); Kuo, supra note 209, at 899. 
280. James B. Beam, 501 U.S. at 535 (opinion of Souter, J., joined by Stevens, J.). 
281. Id. at 536. 
282. Id. at 537. 
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and stare decisis,”283 a rejection that the Harper majority later affirmed.284 And 
though Justice Souter and Justice O’Connor were in agreement that judicial ret-
roactivity was a choice-of-law problem, they parted ways in its application. For 
Justice Souter, once it was found that a new rule had been applied to the parties 
in the principal case in which it was articulated, the rejection of selective pro-
spectivity le� the Court only one option: to apply the new rule retroactively “for 
all others.”285 Such was the case in James B. Beam. In contrast, Justice O’Connor 
in dissent contended that the Court’s failure to deal with retroactivity when strik-
ing down the unconstitutional state tax at issue was an oversight that ought not 
to be perpetuated when reliance interests weighed on the side of prospective 
overruling.286 Her view would suggest that the Court should explicitly pro-
nounce the temporal scope of its judgments in future landmark cases.287 The 
Supreme Court has not, however, adopted such an approach.288 
2. Critique 
The choice-of-law framework hinges on the premise “that parties should be 
judged by the law in effect at the time of their actions” and so the judicial inquiry 
should focus on “what the transaction-time law [was].” 289 There are several 
problems with the framework. 
First, despite impressions, the choice-of-law framework “bears no obvious 
resemblance” to conflict-of-laws analysis. 290  In the field of conflict of laws, 
choice of law is a preliminary procedural inquiry that determines which jurisdic-
tion’s laws govern a substantive dispute. 291  It is employed, for instance, in 
 
283. Id. at 540. But see id. at 550 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
284. 509 U.S. at 97. 
285. James B. Beam, 501 U.S. at 543 (opinion of Souter, J., joined by Stevens, J.). 
286. See id. at 550-51 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Kuo, supra note 209, at 891. 
287. James B. Beam, 501 U.S. at 550 (O’Connor, J. dissenting). But see Note, supra note 70, at 951 
(“When a federal court overrules a prior decision and announces a new rule of law by applying 
it to the litigants in the case or controversy before it, it should withhold any statement as to 
the retroactive effect of the new rule. The question of whether the new rule should be applied 
retroactively should not be decided until it is presented to a court as an actual case and con-
troversy.”). 
288. Far from it. Since the mid-1990s, the Court has largely avoided the subject of judicial non-
retroactivity. See infra note 318. 
289. Roosevelt, supra note 28, at 1080. 
290. Id. 
291. HERMA KAY, LARRY KRAMER, KERMIT ROOSEVELT & DAVID L. FRANKLIN, CONFLICT OF LAWS: 
CASES—COMMENTS—QUESTIONS 415 (10th ed. 2018). 
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determining whether federal law or state law governs a case.292 The choice-of-
law inquiry relevant to retroactivity, by contrast, is neither preliminary, nor pro-
cedural, nor jurisdictional. It is a substantive inquiry into the rights of the parties 
that directly determines how a dispute should be resolved. It is unhelpful to con-
flate these two concepts. 
Second, the choice-of-law framework is not actually about choosing between 
two laws. It is about finding what the law was during a specific temporal pe-
riod.293 The pertinent question, as Justice O’Connor characterized it in Smith, is 
whether a transaction was governed by the “old” law or the “new” law.294 This 
inquiry reintroduces the conundrum of the legal-philosophical framework. The 
judge’s decision on which law prevailed at the time of the parties’ transaction will 
invariably be informed by their personal perspective and their philosophy of law 
and adjudication. As already addressed, such inquiry is “unworkable in principle 
and in practice.”295 
Third, to the extent that the choice-of-law framework does give judges a 
meaningful choice between (temporal) laws, that choice, at least according to 
Justice O’Connor, is guided by the right-reliance balancing framework.296 It is 
therefore subject to the same criticisms as that framework.297 
Finally, it is not clear whether, or why, the choice-of-law framework should 
focus on the time of the parties’ transaction rather than the time of their dispute. 
Roosevelt’s critique is premised on an example of “a transaction between two 
parties” where a lawsuit is “filed immediately therea�er.”298 But transactions are 
not necessarily reducible to discrete moments, nor is there necessarily immediacy 
between when parties first interact and when a dispute arises between them. A 
party has no right of action until it has suffered a wrong or experienced a rights 
violation. Is rights violation (i.e., the event that causes the plaintiff to sue) not 
“the operative conduct or event[]” on which the choice-of-law inquiry should 
focus? 299  This supposition suggests a further complexity: the relevant rule 
might change between the time of the transaction and the time of the dispute, 
 
292. Kuo, supra note 209, at 899. 
293. A variant of the choice-of-law framework is Jill E. Fisch’s equilibrium theory of (non-)retro-
activity doctrine. See supra Section I.B. 
294. Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 191 (1990) (plurality opinion). 
295. Roosevelt, supra note 28, at 1081; see, e.g., Smith, 496 U.S. at 212 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (con-
tending that the impugned Arkansas flat tax “violated the Constitution before our decision in 
Scheiner”). 
296. See Smith, 496 U.S. at 183 (plurality opinion). 
297. See supra Section II.B.2. 
298. Roosevelt, supra note 28, at 1080. 
299. Smith, 496 U.S. at 218-19 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see id. at 191 (plurality opinion). 
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and change again between the time of dispute and the time of judgment. In such 
circumstances, how should the judge choose? 
3. Summary 
The choice-of-law framework asks courts to identify what the law was at the 
time of the transaction in issue. This framework bears the same flaws as the le-
gal-philosophical and right-reliance balancing frameworks, while injecting fur-
ther complexity of its own. The characterization of a legal rule as either “old” or 
“new” may vary based on decisionmakers’ individual perspectives and legal phi-
losophies, how they choose to factor in reliance interests, and when they con-
sider operative conduct or events to be material. Such scope for variation in ju-
dicial approach can offer little certainty or stability to parties assessing their 
rights and duties in a dynamic legal order. 
D. Remedial Framework 
Instead of asking what law governed at the time of transaction, many schol-
ars favor asking what law governs at the time of judgment. That is, “[c]ourts 
should apply their current best understanding of the law to all cases before them, 
regardless of whether the best understanding at the time of the transaction 
would produce a different result.”300 Under this approach, judgments will al-
ways operate retroactively for the purpose of determining what the law was, but 
courts may employ equitable considerations to curb the remedial impact of un-
expected judicial changes in the law. Alas, the central inquiry of the remedial 
framework—whether legal change was anticipatable—cannot produce princi-
pled distinctions between cases warranting retroactive relief and those not. 
1. Description 
The idea that the impact of new law should be addressed through the law of 
remedies was urged by Justice Harlan II in a series of minority opinions delivered 
in the twilight of his tenure on the Supreme Court.301 In United States v. Estate of 
 
300. Roosevelt, supra note 28, at 1117; see Frederic Bloom, The Law’s Clock, 104 GEO. L.J. 1, 51 n.321 
(2015) (“A time of decision rule would help close the transition window, making it clearer 
what law applies in any particular instance—even if the law changed during litigation.”). 
301. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 675 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part); United States v. Estate of Donnelly, 397 U.S. 286, 295 (1970) (Harlan, J., concur-
ring); Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 256 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Grif-
fith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322 (1987) (noting that the Court had since “embraced to a 
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Donnelly, a case concerning civil non-retroactivity doctrine, Justice Harlan ex-
pressed “fear” that endeavors to distinguish new law from old risked “en-
snar[ing]” the Court in “a retroactivity quagmire.”302 Instead, he endorsed ap-
plying novel precedent retroactively to all cases until doctrines of limitation or 
res judicata placed them “beyond challenge.”303 “Any uncertainty engendered by 
this approach should,” he thought, “be deemed part of the risks of life.”304 Rele-
vant “equitable considerations,” such as “reliance,” could then be addressed “in 
the determination of what relief is appropriate in any given case.”305 On this ap-
proach, new law presents a problem for remedies, not substantive rights. 
Justice Harlan’s contention that “‘[r]etroactivity’ must be rethought” has 
prevailed.306 Current Supreme Court precedent characterizes the issue as a ques-
tion for remedies.307 Justice Stevens for the dissenting justices in Smith, for ex-
ample, adopted Justice Harlan’s framework.308 He contended that Chevron Oil 
and its progeny could be shown, on “[c]lose examination,” to concern “a reme-
dial principle for the exercise of equitable discretion by federal courts” rather 
than “a choice-of-law principle.”309 This was a revisionist reading of the Court’s 
precedent that Justice O’Connor sharply criticized in her plurality opinion.310 
Justice O’Connor’s aversion to the remedial framework was short lived, how-
ever, as the Court’s majority increasingly soured on non-retroactivity doctrine. 
In Harper, the Court’s majority implicitly accepted the remedial framework, 
though it declined to limit the remedial impact of its novel precedent in the 
 
significant extent the comprehensive analysis presented by Justice Harlan in [the Mackey and 
Desist] opinions”). 
302. Estate of Donnelly, 397 U.S. at 295. 
303. Id. at 296. 
304. Id. 
305. Id. 
306. United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 548 (1982) (citing Desist, 394 U.S. at 258 (Harlan, J., 
dissenting)). 
307. Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 761 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the 
judgment); Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106, 114 (1994); Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 
U.S. 86, 98 (1993); see Harper, 509 U.S. at 112 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring 
in the judgment). 
308. Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 210 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see Fallon & 
Meltzer, supra note 66, at 1757. 
309. Smith, 496 U.S. at 219-20 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. 
Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 535 (opinion of Souter, J., joined by Stevens, J.) (“Once a rule is found 
to apply ‘backward,’ there may then be a further issue of remedies, i.e., whether the party 
prevailing under a new rule should obtain the same relief that would have been awarded if the 
rule had been an old one.”). 
310. Smith, 496 U.S. at 195-96 (plurality opinion). 
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case.311 Justice O’Connor, now in dissent, maintained that “[t]he questions of 
retroactivity and remedy are analytically distinct.”312 However, concerned about 
“the Court’s revisions to the law of retroactivity,” which were restricting its “au-
thority to temper hardship,” Justice O’Connor herself invoked the remedial ap-
proach.313 She objected to retroactive remedies being “unanticipated windfall[s]” 
to plaintiffs, imposing on defendant states “unanticipated financial burdens” that 
are ultimately borne by “blameless and unexpecting taxpayers” of those states.314 
Her priority was to preserve the Court’s ability “to avoid injustice by taking eq-
uity into account when formulating the remedy for violations of novel constitu-
tional rules.”315 
Justice Kennedy gave the last substantive Supreme Court judgment on this 
matter. Writing for himself and Justice O’Connor in Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. 
Hyde, he reiterated the remedial framework316 but “postpon[ed] extended dis-
cussion of reliance interests as they bear upon remedies” for a suitable future 
case.317 Surprisingly, the Supreme Court has not since found such a case.318 This 
has not dampened academic interest in non-retroactivity doctrine, however. 
Richard Fallon and Daniel Meltzer were the first to theorize the remedial 
framework in earnest in an influential article in the Harvard Law Review.319 
Many scholars have embraced their perspective since. 320  Fallon and Meltzer 
 
311. Harper, 509 U.S. at 98 (1993); see id. at 112 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment). 
312. Id. at 131 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
313. Id. at 133, 136. 
314. Id. at 129-31 (emphasis added). 
315. Id. at 136. 
316. 514 U.S. 749, 761 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
317. Id. at 764. 
318. At least not in the civil context. See also Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 243 (2011) (seem-
ingly endorsing Justice Harlan’s approach to the retroactive effect of new rules of criminal 
procedure, while citing the since-abandoned plurality opinion in Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Smith, 
496 U.S. 167 (1990), for the proposition that “[r]emedy is a separate, analytically distinct 
issue [from retroactivity]”); cf. id. at 254 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“What we are actually de-
termining when we assess the ‘retroactivity’ of a new rule is not the temporal scope of a newly 
announced right, but whether a violation of the right that occurred prior to the announcement 
of the new rule will entitle a criminal defendant to the relief sought.” (quoting Danforth v. 
Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 271 (2008))); cases cited supra note 61 (citing recent criminal-law 
cases). 
319. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 66, cited in Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 103 
(1993) (Scalia, J., concurring), and id. at 133, 136 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
320. See, e.g., John M. Greabe, Remedial Discretion in Constitutional Adjudication, 62 BUFF. L. REV. 
881, 927-28 (2014) (“[T]he Court should use a purely remedial framework—and not selective 
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contended that “the concept of ‘new’ law” reflects a practical issue about the “rel-
ative unpredictability” of legal change, an issue “best understood as addressing 
a question within the law of remedies.”321 They outlined a theory of constitu-
tional remedies that seeks to accommodate the sometimes-competing interests 
in providing “effective redress to individual victims of constitutional violations” 
and in adequately “keep[ing] government within the bounds of law.”322 Satis-
faction of these two interests, they suggested, sometimes warrants substitution-
ary remedies and sometimes even the withholding of remedies. The barometer 
for restricting remedies should depend on the novelty and unpredictability of 
the legal change at issue. For Fallon and Meltzer, “legal rules and principles are 
new to the extent that, ex ante, their recognition as authoritative would have 
been viewed as relatively unlikely by competent lawyers.”323 When a defendant 
violates foreseeable or “established law,” withholding remedies on the basis of 
cost or administrative disruption will offend interests in rights protection, fair-
ness, and sound incentive structures.324 By contrast, when a defendant “might 
have thought their conduct constitutionally valid, there is less need to impose a 
‘penalty’ to deter future misconduct”—especially, Fallon and Meltzer contended, 
when the defendant is a government official.325 In such cases, when rights are 
relatively unpredictable ex ante, “the moral strength of a plaintiff ’s claim to re-
lief” may not be compelling.326 The “interest in individual redress” in such cases 
 
prospectivity or any other non-retroactivity doctrine—to protect the public interest from the 
costs of constitutional innovation.”); John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitu-
tional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87, 90 (1999) (explaining that remedial limits “facilitate[] constitu-
tional change by reducing the costs of innovation”); Roosevelt, supra note 28, at 1107 
(“[R]emedial analysis is the only acceptable route to prospective results . . . .”); Kuo, supra 
note 209, at 901 (“[F]ocusing on remedies . . . avoids Chevron Oil’s obsession with the exist-
ence of new or old laws.”) see also Rhodes, supra note 4, at 411 (“[R]emedial relief may be 
manipulated to mitigate society’s reliance costs from legal change”); Shannon, supra note 34, 
at 842-43 (suggesting that “[t]he most sophisticated version” of the prospective approach that 
separates “the issue of the ‘applicable’ rule of law . . . from the issue of the appropriate rem-
edy” is “that advanced by Richard H. Fallon, Jr., and Daniel J. Meltzer”). 
321. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 66, at 1736; see also United States v. Estate of Donnelly, 397 U.S. 
286, 295 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (considering the impulse “to avoid jolting the expec-
tations of parties to a transaction”). 
322. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 66, at 1736. 
323. Id. at 1763. 
324. Id. at 1793. 
325. Id.; see id. at 1795-96 (“[A]djustment of remedies when a constitutional violation is quite un-
predictable exacts little toll on the aspiration to keep government generally within constitu-
tional bounds.”). 
326. See id. at 1797. 
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may have to “yield” to other interests, which could warrant the withholding of 
remedies.327 
2. Critique 
The remedial framework invokes the language of equity, but its conceptual-
ization of equity is sui generis. The remedial framework is not grounded in tra-
ditional equitable considerations of prejudice or hardship to a defendant.328 It is 
grounded in speculative considerations regarding the foreseeability or predicta-
bility of legal change. This is its flaw. 
The line Fallon and Meltzer strive to draw—between whether or not a novel 
precedent was “relatively unpredictable”—remains highly indeterminate. Their 
task is similar to the inquiry concerning whether a judgment represents “a clear 
break with the past.”329 It is not clear how this should be decided.330 Fallon and 
Meltzer would define new law “narrowly” so that “rules and decisions that are 
clearly foreshadowed, . . . reflect ordinary legal evolution, . . . or are dictated by 
precedent” could not be a basis for withholding remedies.331 Curiously, this po-
sition suggests that the Supreme Court’s decision in Janus was not “new” law, 
since public-sector unions had “been on notice for years” that the tide of consti-
tutional precedent was turning against them.332 Janus should, accordingly, have 
retroactive effect. Yet “any effort to define the requisite degree of novelty will 
necessarily be spongy and highly manipulable. The signals sent by the Supreme 
Court in application will be at least as important as the precise verbal formula-
tion.”333 
One upshot of the inquiry into the predictability of legal change would seem 
to be to drive a wedge between pending and subsequent cases on any issue. That 
is because those who file suit pleading novel claims, challenging unfavorable 
precedent, reveal by their actions an anticipation that their complaint is recog-
nizable in law. Under the remedial framework, the opposite inference could be 
drawn against those who sit back until a�er unfavorable precedent is overturned. 
For instance, when the Supreme Court delivers a landmark judgment that is fol-
lowed by a flood of lawsuits that seek to invoke the right that the judgment 
 
327. Id. at 1791. 
328. See infra Section III.B. 
329. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 66, at 1831 (citing McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages 
& Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18 (1990)). 
330. See Kuo, supra note 209, at 901. 
331. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 66, at 1817. 
332. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2484 (2018). 
333. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 66, at 1796. 
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upheld, there may be compelling fairness and reliance reasons to frame the Su-
preme Court’s judgment as novel precedent and to restrict backward-looking re-
lief.334 Janus could be understood as such an example. It could be inferred that 
public-sector workers who “litigat[e] in the new rule’s wake”335 do so only be-
cause they did not foresee the Supreme Court overturning its precedent (con-
cerning the compulsory deduction of union agency fees), and so their claim (for 
restitution of past-collected fees) should yield to the defendants’ reliance and 
administrability interests. But the same cannot be said of all those plaintiffs who 
already had cases pending in federal courts on the day Janus was handed 
down.336 Nor could it be said of the principal plaintiffs in the Janus case itself. 
For those plaintiffs, legal change was clearly foreseeable and predictable because 
it was the very thing their lawsuits sought. There could be no basis for withhold-
ing relief from such plaintiffs according to the remedial framework. Indeed, Fal-
lon and Meltzer favored the method of selective prospectivity precisely because 
it would vindicate the expectation interests at least of principal plaintiffs who suc-
cessfully litigate their rights.337 
This critique can be taken further. Novelty and unpredictability of legal 
change are characterized as objective inquiries. Fallon and Meltzer define these 
inquiries according to the expectations of “competent lawyers”338 or what gov-
ernment officials “reasonably might have thought.”339 That being so, it seems 
irrelevant that subsequent plaintiffs might not have anticipated legal change 
when there are principal plaintiffs and plaintiffs with cases pending who did. 
Since novel precedent is invariably preceded (and caused) by at least one party 
who fights for it, legal change will invariably be (nontrivially) anticipatable be-
fore the date a court hands down a landmark judgment. This insight shakes a 
core assumption of the remedial framework. If the principal plaintiffs to a novel 
case are able to foresee or predict legal change when filing suit, then others—be 
they potential plaintiffs or defendants—ought to be able to do so as well. 
 
334. Cf. Fisch, supra note 19, at 1083 (“Viewing retroactivity purely in remedial terms, although 
appealing in theory, is unsatisfying. From the perspective of the litigant, winning the applica-
tion of a particular rule of law has little value unless the litigant is entitled to the relief justified 
by that rule.”). 
335. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 542 (1991) (opinion of Souter, J., joined 
by Stevens, J.). 
336. See, e.g., Lee v. Ohio Educ. Ass’n, 951 F.3d 386 (6th Cir. 2020); Danielson v. Inslee, 945 F.3d 
1096 (9th Cir. 2019); see also Chemerinsky & Fisk, supra note 9, at 43 n.9 (citing pending 
agency-fee-refund cases). 
337. This preserves litigant incentives to raise novel claims. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 66, at 
1806-07; cf. Roosevelt, supra note 28, at 1108 (“Formalism may be a vice, but incoherence is 
no virtue, and incoherence is what selective prospectivity brings.”). 
338. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 66, at 1763. 
339. Id. at 1793. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3393077
the yale law journal 130:276  2020 
334 
Subsequent claims for past grievances should therefore be viable so long as they 
are filed within the requisite limitations period. And if that premise is accepted, 
then the distinction that the remedial framework utilizes to grant remedies in 
some cases and withhold them in others collapses. The framework provides no 
principled basis for withholding remedies at all. 
3. Summary 
The remedial framework seeks to delineate retroactive remedies by reference 
to the foreseeability or predictability of legal change. Even its proponents con-
cede that this inquiry is necessarily “spongy and highly manipulable,”340 weak-
ening its interpretive force. Further, where legal change is found to be foreseea-
ble or predictable for some parties, it seems doubtful that the remedial 
framework can justify any limits on retroactive remedies for others. The very 
process of litigation renders legal change anticipatable. As such, the framework 
is unable rationally to contain the temporal scope of novel precedent. 
E. Exceptionality Framework 
The final framework can be addressed briefly, for it is not a theory of non-
retroactivity so much as a contingency of last resort. 
1. Description 
It should not be controversial to state that judicial retroactivity is “over-
whelmingly the norm.”341 During the Warren Court’s foray into non-retroactive 
adjudication, Thomas Fairchild observed that “the technique of prospective 
overruling” was employed “as an exceptional expedient when the traditional ret-
roactivity would wreak more havoc in society than society’s interest in stability 
will tolerate.”342 He endorsed maintaining this cautious approach.343 Similarly, 
in Reynoldsville Casket, Justices Kennedy and O’Connor sought to preserve non-
 
340. Id. at 1796. 
341. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 535 (1991) (opinion of Souter, J., joined 
by Stevens, J.); cf. Masur & Mortara, supra note 22, at 1016 (suggesting that “courts remain 
free to issue purely prospective rulings, so long as they do not apply those rulings to the parties 
who brought the case”). 
342. Fairchild, supra note 86, at 254. 
343. Id. at 269. 
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retroactivity at least in “exceptional cases” where important fairness and reliance 
interests demanded it.344 
A curious example of non-retroactivity being implicitly endorsed as a last 
resort was Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Smith. Justice Scalia was no fan 
of non-retroactivity doctrine. He rejected all of the aforementioned frame-
works.345 He was labeled a “neo-Blackstonian,”346 which in his case can only 
mean he assented to the function of the declaratory theory of adjudication, albeit 
not to Blackstone’s formal account of it.347 Nevertheless, in Smith, Justice Scalia 
added the fi�h vote to Justice O’Connor’s judgment for the Court, which refused 
plaintiffs’ claims for retroactive relief brought in light of the Court’s decision in 
Scheiner, because in his view, expressed in his Scheiner dissent, that case was 
wrongly decided.348 Justice Scalia said that while ordinarily stare decisis would 
cause him to uphold a decision of the Supreme Court as precedent for successive 
cases, he could not cast a vote that would impose liability upon a litigant when 
he had already declared that no such liability should lie.349 Employing the lan-
guage of non-retroactivity, Justice Scalia refused to “upset th[e] litigant’s settled 
expectations” by applying against them a decision that had “overruled prior 
law.”350 
2. Critique 
There is little substance to an exceptionality approach to non-retroactivity. 
Lacking a conceptual framework, there are no firm principles to guide judges as 
to when a case warrants “exceptional” treatment. This gives rise to concerns that 
non-retroactivity will be too o�en, too rarely, or too arbitrarily employed. 
A series of tax-restitution cases in England presents a cautionary tale to this 
effect. In England, prospective overruling is “a wholly exceptional” resort.351 It 
 
344. Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 761 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
345. Id. at 759-61 (Scalia, J., concurring); James B. Beam, 501 U.S. at 548-49 (Scalia, J., concurring 
in the judgment). 
346. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 66, at 1757. 
347. See supra Section II.A.2. 
348. See Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 202-05 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (citing Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 303-06 (1987) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting)). 
349. See Smith, 496 U.S. at 204-05 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
350. Id. at 205 (emphasis omitted). 
351. Nat’l Westminster Bank plc v. Spectrum Plus Ltd. [2005] 2 AC 680 (HL), [74] (appeal taken 
from Eng.); see also Ramdeen v. State [2015] AC 562 (PC), [90] (appeal taken from Trin. & 
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was not employed when, around the turn of the millennium, corporate groups 
that operated within the European Union sued the U.K. Government for dis-
criminatory tax treatment under the U.K. corporation and value-added-tax stat-
utes.352 A�er the corporate groups’ substantive claims were upheld in landmark 
appellate judgments, further plaintiffs filed suit seeking restitution of their past 
paid taxes, in some cases dating back to 1973 (when the U.K. joined the Euro-
pean Economic Community).353 The plaintiffs claimed that they could not have 
“discovered” their mistakes of law 354 in paying the taxes until the corporate 
groups’ novel claims had been upheld by the courts, thereby (retroactively) clar-
ifying the legal landscape. England, like most U.S. states, applies a discovery rule 
to determine when the statute of limitations begins to run in cases of “mis-
take.”355 Applying this rule, limitation was thought not to run against any of the 
plaintiffs’ claims until the date the novel precedent on which their arguments 
relied was handed down.356 This led the English courts to uphold as timely 
claims for restitution in respect of three decades of tax payments. This under-
standing of the retroactivity of novel precedent threatened to neuter the statute 
of limitations in cases of “mistake of law” in England, exposing billions of 
pounds of past-collected revenue to litigation.357 Yet, even these circumstances 
did not tempt any English judge to adopt the exceptional method of prospective 
 
Tobago) (“[I]n very exceptional cases, European and common law courts do have power to 
declare the law with prospective effect only[.]”); Canada (Attorney Gen.) v. Hislop, [2007] 1 
S.C.R. 429, [140] (Can.) (Bastarache, J., concurring) (“[R]etroactivity of a constitutional 
remedy . . . is the norm in our constitutional jurisprudence, not the exception.”). 
352. Mitchell, supra note 15, at 1. 
353. See Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Comm’rs for Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs [2018] 
STC 1657 (UKSC); Test Claimants in the Franked Inv. Income Grp. Litig. v. Comm’rs of Her 
Majesty’s Revenue & Customs [2017] STC 696 (EWCA). 
354. Mistake of law was the basis of their cause of action. ANDREW BURROWS, A RESTATEMENT OF 
THE ENGLISH LAW OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 10(1) (2012); see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RES-
TITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 5 cmt. g (AM. LAW INST. 2011). 
355. Limitation Act 1980, c. 58, § 32(1) (Eng.); see 2 CALVIN W. CORMAN, LIMITATION OF ACTIONS 
§ 8.3 (1991); infra note 381. 
356. Deutsche Morgan Grenfell Grp. Plc v. Her Majesty’s Comm’rs of Inland Revenue [2007] 1 AC 
558 (HL), [31], [71], [144], applied in FII Test Claimants, [2017] STC 696, [372] (“[I]n the 
case of a point of law which is being actively disputed in current litigation the true position is 
only discoverable . . . when the point has been authoritatively resolved by a final court.”); cf. 
Samuel Beswick, Discoverability Principles and the Law’s Mistakes, 136 LAW Q. REV. 139, 140 
(2020) (arguing that this ratio decidendi contravenes the text, principles, and policies of limi-
tations law). The Supreme Court abandoned this interpretation and overruled Deutsche Mor-
gan Grenfell in Test Claimants in the Franked Inv. Income Grp. Litig. v. Comm’rs for Her Majesty’s 
Revenue & Customs, [2020] UKSC 47, [253]. 
357. McManus, supra note 121, at 236; Mitchell, supra note 15, at 1. 
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overruling.358 Lacking any clear standards, the doctrine cannot be employed in 
a consistent and principled manner. 
3. Summary 
Non-retroactivity doctrine is widely accepted to be an exception to the ordi-
nary course of retroactive adjudication. But being an exception cannot be its only 
feature. Otherwise, its implementation can only be arbitrary. 
iii .  right-of-action framework 
The five preceding frameworks each seek to explain how novel precedent af-
fects parties’ rights. What these frameworks have in common is that they focus 
primarily on the rights of principal plaintiffs—those who pioneer novel proceed-
ings. The content of those plaintiffs’ judicially determined rights is then treated 
as governing successive parties’ claims. In other words, each of the frameworks 
presupposes that successive litigants’ rights to legal recourse depend upon the 
timing and outcome of principal plaintiffs’ cases. This is not, however, how 
rights of action are conventionally conceived. And this is why non-retroactivity 
doctrine has found no satisfactory framework. 
This Part outlines an alternative framework grounded in conventional com-
mon-law reasoning. This framework reorients judges’ focus onto the claims that 
are currently before them—those over which they have direct jurisdiction. It em-
braces the retroactivity of judicial precedent: disputes over rights can only be 
resolved from a perspective of hindsight and cannot, it is contended, feasibly be 
insulated from developments in precedent. While rejecting the premises of 
(non-)retroactivity jurisprudence, the right-of-action framework nevertheless 
shares with that jurisprudence three core features: 
 
358. See Edelman, supra note 146, at 103-04 (suggesting that the doctrine of prospective overruling 
should not govern claims in mistake of law); cf. Stephens, supra note 31, at 1568 (commenting 
that in U.S. law, “should the [C]ourt announce a new rule of law that provides a cause of 
action where one did not exist before, a litigant may not take advantage of that to bring a case 
barred by the relevant statute of limitations”). 
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(1) A focus on the rights of action of the parties before an adjudicating court. 
This focus influenced the judicial opinions of Justice Stevens,359 Justice 
Souter,360 and Justice Scalia,361 in particular.362 
(2) A view that rights should be construed through the court’s “current best 
understanding of the law.”363 In other words, judges should apply deci-
sion-time law, rather than seek to identify some different transaction-
time law. This was the view adopted by Justice Harlan364 and endorsed 
by Roosevelt.365 
(3) A concern to avoid remedies that do injustice to either party. This con-
cern underlaid the judicial opinions of Justice O’Connor 366  and in-
formed the remedial framework developed by Fallon and Meltzer.367 
The right-of-action framework outlined in this Part takes no position in the 
legal-philosophical debate,368 and it does not turn on whether one adopts a for-
malist or a functionalist understanding of rights of action. Further, the right-of-
action framework eschews the assumptions of the right-reliance balancing 
framework. Reliance, clearly, is a proxy for hardship. But it is a superfluous 
proxy. We already have a body of doctrine designed to relieve defendants from 
the hardship of the ordinary course of the law: equity. Equitable principles—not 
 
359. Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 214 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[O]nce a 
determination has been made that a party is properly before the Court and a new decisional 
rule properly states the law, interests of repose should play no role in determining the sub-
stantive legal rights of parties.”); see Shannon, supra note 34, at 874 (“The focus must remain 
on the parties and the issues before the court, and the law announced must be the law that is 
applied to those parties in resolution of those issues.”). 
360. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 542 (1991) (opinion of Souter, J., joined 
by Stevens, J.) (“[T]he putative hangers-on . . . are merely asserting a right that the Court has 
told them is theirs in law.”). 
361. Smith, 496 U.S. at 201 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Either enforcement of the 
statute at issue . . . was unconstitutional, or it was not; if it was, then so is enforcement of all 
identical statutes in other States, whether occurring before or a�er our decision . . . .”). 
362. See also Note, supra note 70, at 937 (emphasizing that decisions of retroactive application 
should be made “in the context of actual cases and upon actual facts”). 
363. Roosevelt, supra note 28, at 1117. 
364. United States v. Estate of Donnelly, 397 U.S. 286, 297 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) 
(“[C]ourts should apply the prevailing decisional rule to the cases before them.”). 
365. Roosevelt, supra note 28, at 1117. 
366. See supra Sections II.B-C. 
367. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 66, at 1833. 
368. In this respect it is “a philosophically unambitious account” of law’s temporal implications. Id. 
at 1764 n.187. See supra Section II.A. 
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amorphous appeals to fairness, efficiency, or reliance—should be employed 
when the ordinary adjudication of rights in light of novel precedent would lead 
to injustice. 
The right-of-action framework makes no use of the choice-of-law frame-
work, either, for as Section II.C showed, that framework involves no meaningful 
choice between laws and distracts from the core problem. In contrast, it is ac-
cepted that the remedial and the exceptionality frameworks embody some im-
portant principles—especially that withholding remedies for rights violations 
should be the exception, not the rule. Yet, they fall short of facilitating consistent 
and principled reasoning. There is a better way to rationalize the temporal scope 
of novel precedent. 
This Part proceeds as follows. Section III.A reframes the core problem. It 
contends that the salient temporal period is not when an appellate court hands 
down novel precedent, but when novel rights of action become justiciable. In 
other words, it is when a plaintiff comes to have a valid legal complaint to plead 
to a court. This inquiry—whether a novel claim is properly before a court—is 
informed by two complementary temporal369 inquiries: ripeness doctrine and 
limitation law’s accrual inquiry. Understanding these principles of law is key to 
understanding the temporal nature of rights of action. 
Section III.B considers the limits on rights of action recognized in law. The 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has long acknowledged important temporal lim-
its and defenses, including res judicata, collateral estoppel, limitations, laches 
and acquiescence, and stays of judgment. Section III.B argues that these doc-
trines can properly constrain injustices that might arise from construing past 
rights through decision-time law. 
Section III.C summarizes the implications of this framework. It argues that 
the framework avoids the flawed assumptions of the contemporary non-retroac-
tivity frameworks and provides the soundest rationalization of the temporal 
scope of novel precedent. 
A. Justiciability of Rights of Action 
The problem of novel precedent concerns whether “new” rules apply to past 
transactions and disputes. Does the interpretation of law upheld in a principal 
case inform the content of successive plaintiffs’ rights? The answer ultimately 
depends on whether successive plaintiffs can obtain a judgment requiring 
 
369. Justiciability encompasses a number of nontemporal doctrines as well, such as standing. See 
Russell W. Galloway, Basic Justiciability Analysis, 30 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 911, 921-32 (1990); 
Jonathan R. Siegel, A Theory of Justiciability, 86 TEX. L. REV. 73, 129-38 (2007). This Article 
employs the term justiciability in its narrower, temporally oriented sense. 
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defendants to provide redress in their case. This response may seem circular, but 
it is not.370 It relies on a principled and pragmatic demarcation between persons 
with timely legal claims and those without. The key is to understand when it is 
that plaintiffs gain the power to sue in a case: in other words, when they gain a 
right of action. 
A right of action is a legal power. When the law grants persons who have 
suffered a substantive rights violation a right of action, it enables them—if they 
comply with applicable procedures—to obtain a court order compelling another 
person to take actions to remedy the violation. John Goldberg and Benjamin 
Zipursky define a right of action as a plaintiff ’s legal “power to obtain a remedy” 
from the defendant.371 As such, it is more than simply the right to file a claim or 
to have one’s day in court. It is a “right to prosecute an action with effect.”372 
Whereas substantive rights have an air of timelessness—I always have a right 
not to be assaulted by you—a right of action is a time-bounded power. It em-
powers a plaintiff to hold a defendant accountable for a specific rights violation 
occurring at an identifiable point in time. It has a lifespan: it can be pursued only 
once there are valid grounds for alleging a deprivation of a substantive legal 
right,373 and it can expire if the plaintiff takes no action.374 
Before we can understand how novel precedent affects successive plaintiffs’ 
rights, we must first understand when it is that a plaintiff is able to assert a right 
of action. That moment occurs when the plaintiff ’s grievance becomes justiciable 
before a court. Justiciability concerns whether a court is able to hear and adjudi-
cate on a plaintiff ’s grievance. Nonjusticiable claims include those that are not 
 
370. GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 159, at 98-99. 
371. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights and Responsibility in the Law of Torts, in 
RIGHTS AND PRIVATE LAW 251, 268 (Donal Nolan & Andrew Robertson eds., 2011) [hereina�er 
Goldberg & Zipursky, Rights and Responsibility]; see also John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. 
Zipursky, Seeing Tort Law from the Internal Point of View: Holmes and Hart on Legal Duties, 75 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1563, 1567 (2006) (defining a right of action as “a power to seek recourse 
through law that belongs to the right holder whose rights have been violated by the doing of 
the wrong”). 
372. GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 159, at 98 (quoting Patterson v. Patterson, 59 N.Y. 574, 578-
79 (1875) (emphasis added)). 
373. As discussed later in this Section, this is ultimately determined by a court assessing the com-
plaint with hindsight, “deciding whether the fabric of law that already exists is such that plain-
tiff is entitled to relief from the court.” Benjamin C. Zipursky, Philosophy of Private Law, in 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, supra note 72. 
374. Rights of action expire according to the governing laws of limitation and other time-sensitive 
doctrines and defenses. See infra Section III.B. 
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“ripe”375 or that have not “accrued.”376 The “ripeness” inquiry is generally con-
cerned with whether a claim is premature (i.e., has been filed too early), and the 
“accrual” inquiry with when the limitations clock begins to run against a claim. 
Both inform the temporal lifespan of rights of action—the “when” of adjudica-
tion.377 Though taxonomically distinct, these doctrines concern the same thing: 
the point in time at which a plaintiff may file and begin to litigate her claim for 
a court-ordered remedy.378 This point is ultimately determined by the particular 
circumstances of each plaintiff ’s case. 
Ordinarily, rights of action ripen and accrue (the terms are interchangeable) 
when the relevant rights violation occurs—when, for example, a physical inter-
action that appears to meet the definition of a battery happens. But what of those 
would-be plaintiffs who do not know that they have a viable right of action? 
Perhaps their injuries are concealed, or they do not understand their options for 
civil recourse, or the state of the law is unstable. Does the right of action stay 
dormant while it remains unfound? 
Courts have long grappled with this problem in the limitations context. The 
traditional view was that rights of action accrue when the material facts on which 
they are based occur, so the limitations period would run whether or not a po-
tential plaintiff had actual knowledge of those material facts.379 The contempo-
rary prevailing view is that an action accrues “when the claimant discovers, or in 
 
375. In constitutional law, a claim is ripe when the issue pleaded is either “purely legal” or needs 
no “further factual development,” and the challenged conduct has a “sufficiently direct and 
immediate” impact on the plaintiff. Michael Aaron DelGaudio, From Ripe to Rotten: An Exam-
ination of the Continued Utility of the Ripeness Doctrine in Light of the Modern Standing Doctrine, 
50 GA. L. REV. 625, 641 (2016). 
376. See Bloom, supra note 300, at 27. In limitation law, generally “a cause of action does not accrue 
until a party has a right to enforce the claim.” Schulz v. Milne, No. 95-15703, 1996 WL 570498, 
at *2 (9th Cir. Oct. 3, 1996) (quoting Norco Constr., Inc. v. King Cty., 801 F.2d 1143, 1146 
(9th Cir. 1986)); see 1 CALVIN W. CORMAN, LIMITATION OF ACTIONS § 6.1 & n.12 (1991). 
377. See Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363 
passim (1973). 
378. See Erwin Chemerinsky, A Unified Approach to Justiciability, 22 CONN. L. REV. 677, 696 (1990) 
(“[T]he ripeness test [is] used to assess whether the plaintiff is legally entitled to relief.”); 
Daniel Zacks, Claims, Not Causes of Action: The Misapprehension of Limitations Principles, 48 
ADVOCS.’ Q. 165, 169 n.12 (2018) (suggesting that whether a cause of action “completes, ac-
crues, arises, or ripens . . . all means the same thing: the date on which the cause of action first 
becomes viable”); see also, e.g., Bayou Des Familles Dev. Corp. v. United States, 130 F.3d 1034, 
1038 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (considering when plaintiff ’s claim became “ripe for adjudication, start-
ing the statute of limitations clock”); Boerger v. Levin, 812 F. Supp. 564, 566 n.4 (E.D. Pa. 
1993) (“Since the claim is not yet ripe, the limitations period cannot have begun.”). 
379. Stephen V. O’Neil, Accrual of Statutes of Limitations: California’s Discovery Exceptions Swallow 
the Rule, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 106, 106 (1980) (“The basic principle governing the accrual of 
limitation periods states that they run from the date of injury.”). 
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the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the acts constituting 
the alleged violation.”380 This “discoverability”381 inquiry is an objective one, 
which defers time until a plaintiff is reasonably in a position to pursue a right of 
action. When someone fraudulently conceals a harm they have caused to a 
would-be plaintiff, for instance, that plaintiff ’s right of action will accrue only 
once they have the ability to discover the concealed harm.382 Non-retroactivity 
doctrine would seem to cast novel principles of law in a similar way—as having 
been concealed from would-be plaintiffs until “the date of the decision announc-
ing the principle.”383 The date of judicial announcement is typically taken to be 
the point at which something “new” happens that creates and disrupts others’ 
legal rights and duties. It is seemingly the date that plaintiffs discover (or rea-
sonably should discover) the “new” law. This date is taken to be the fulcrum for 
determining whether the new law governs past rights retroactively or applies 
only prospectively. 
Yet, even if novel principles of law are subject to a discoverability analysis,384 
it would be an error to hold that novel rights cannot be discovered until they are 
 
380. Winnett v. Caterpillar, Inc., 609 F.3d 404, 408 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Noble v. Chrysler 
Motors Corp., 32 F.3d 997, 1000 (6th Cir. 1994)); see Fleishman v. Eli Lilly & Co., 465 
N.Y.S.2d 735, 737 (1983) (Gibbons, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining 
that declaring a limitations period expired before it can be discovered seeks “to declare the 
bread stale before it is baked”); see also Adam Bain & Ugo Colella, Interpreting Federal Statutes 
of Limitations, 37 CREIGHTON L. REV. 493, 553 (2004) (tracing the discovery rule of accrual for 
federal limitations statutes to Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 169-71 (1949)); cf. TRW Inc. v. 
Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 37 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring) (calling the discovery rule “bad wine 
of recent vintage”). 
381. This concept is more commonly known in the United States as “the discovery rule.” Lonny 
Hoffman & Bret Wells, The Exceptions Prove the Rule: Recalibrating the Discovery Rule and Eq-
uitable Fraud Exceptions to the Legal Injury Rule, 71 BAYLOR L. REV. 63, 83 (2019). This Article 
prefers “discoverability” to “discovery” for three reasons: to distinguish the limitation doc-
trine from the procedural practice of document discovery; to reinforce that discoverability in-
corporates an objective inquiry; and to align the analysis with other common-law jurisdictions 
that recognize this limitation doctrine. See ANDREW MCGEE, LIMITATION PERIODS 137 para. 
8.002 (8th ed. 2018). 
382. 2 CORMAN, supra note 355, §§ 9.9, 11.5. 
383. Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 187 (1990) (plurality opinion). 
384. Cf. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 122 (1979) (“We are unconvinced that for statute 
of limitations purposes a plaintiff ’s ignorance of his legal rights and his ignorance of the fact 
of his injury or its cause should receive identical treatment.”); Marrero Morales v. Bull S.S. 
Co., 279 F.2d 299, 301 (1st Cir. 1960) (“[I]gnorance of one’s legal rights does not excuse a 
failure to institute suit . . . . This principle is applicable not only to ignorance of substantive 
legal rights but also to ignorance of the procedures of law by which a more favorable doctrine 
of substantive law can be sought.” (citations omitted)); Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co., 751 P.2d 923, 
929 (Cal. 1988) (“[I]t is the discovery of facts, not their legal significance, that starts the 
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first articulated by an appellate court. Rights of action may ripen and accrue even 
while a plaintiff is ignorant of the law or while binding precedent stands against 
the plaintiff ’s case.385 That is because justiciability doctrines are not concerned 
with the plaintiff ’s certainty of litigation success. They are concerned with the 
plaintiff ’s ability to plead an action before a court. The law on any point may be 
unclear, but it is presumptively discoverable by virtue of plaintiffs’ right to access 
the courts, whose function it is to rule upon and elucidate the law. A right of 
action accrues when, as a matter of fact and law, one has a reasonable basis for 
claiming to have suffered a substantive rights violation. When the suit rests on a 
novel theory of liability, or on an argument for a change in substantive law, this 
feature of rights of action gives rise to a paradox: one does not know whether 
one “really” has a right of action—as opposed to a claimed or putative right of 
action—until there is a ruling on the merits. But if the plaintiff prevails on the 
merits, the plaintiff ’s claim (asserted from the outset of litigation) to be entitled 
to enlist the courts to obtain a remedy from the defendant is vindicated. In this 
sense, the accrual of rights of action precedes courts’ determinations of novel 
principles of law. This is inevitable from the sequential nature of litigation: judg-
ment can only follow the filing of a (novel) claim. A�er all, it takes a challenge to 
the status quo for new rules to develop.386 
When a new rule is announced, it may spur litigation by others, but its issu-
ance does not affect the justiciability of others’ rights of action. Same-sex couples 
in America had a right of action each time they were denied marriage certificates 
even before June 26, 2015,387 as did public-sector employees before June 27, 2018 
each time agency fees were deducted without their consent.388 On each occasion, 
affected persons gained a right to object, to plead to a court that they had been 
wronged, to litigate their substantive rights, and to seek recourse for the viola-
tions they faced. That is how Obergefell and Janus reached the Supreme Court in 
the first place. The numerous plaintiffs who had similar pending cases when the 
 
statute.”); Passmore v. Watson, 337 P.3d 84, 87 (Mont. 2014) (“A statute of limitations begins 
to run when all facts relevant to a claim are known or through reasonable diligence could be 
known. The rule does not apply to legal theories.” (emphasis omitted)). 
385. 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 136 (2020). 
386. Where parties have access to the courts, it is therefore wrong to suggest that “it is unfair to 
parties to judge them by law about which they had no way of knowing.” Roosevelt, supra note 
28, at 1105. 
387. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 680-81 (2015). Similarly, employees who were fired for 
being homosexual or transgender had rights of action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 even before June 15, 2020, when the Supreme Court held that such employer conduct 
amounts to sex discrimination. Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1754 (2020). 
388. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2486 (2018). 
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Supreme Court handed down judgment in Obergefell389 and Janus390 had already 
been advancing viable rights of action. Moreover, the fact that others might have 
awaited the Court’s landmark decisions before litigating their own past griev-
ances does not mean that their rights of action were not already justiciable. The 
opportunity to litigate objectively subsisted regardless of whether individuals sub-
jectively appreciated their legal position. 
As noted, there is an element of conditionality built into the idea of rights of 
action. A complaint, when filed, is merely an allegation, or a claimed right of ac-
tion. That claim is not vindicated (or perfected) until the plaintiff establishes 
that the law entitles her to entry of judgment in her favor.391 This is where legal 
argumentation and precedent comes in. The plaintiff must (be able to) prove 
that the defendant violated a substantive legal duty owed to the plaintiff, which 
conferred on the plaintiff a substantive legal right as against the defendant. In 
determining whether the parties are governed by a substantive right-duty rela-
tion, the successive court must interpret the relevant facts and law. In interpret-
ing the law, the court should heed all relevant—including novel—precedent. 
That is because the considerations that persuaded an appellate court to (re)in-
terpret the law in a novel case—whether driven by discrepancies in doctrine, 
principle, or policy—are considerations that also could have been employed by 
(successive) plaintiffs before the (successive) court when pleading their own 
case. As the Supreme Court insisted in Danforth v. Minnesota, “the underlying 
right necessarily pre-exists [the Court’s] articulation of the new rule.”392 Timely 
legal claims ought therefore to be assessed by courts “apply[ing] their current 
best understanding of the law to all cases before them.”393 
The temporal question, then, is not whether new law applies backwards to 
create new rights. It is whether, back when the plaintiff suffered the violation 
they complain of (i.e., when their right of action ripened or accrued), “the fabric 
of law that already exist[ed] [was] such that plaintiff is entitled to relief from 
the court.”394 The “fabric of law” is the authority that the court draws upon in 
coming to its (novel) judgment. Though jurists disagree as to what counts as 
 
389. See Nicolas, supra note 4, at 397-400. 
390. See supra note 336 and accompanying text. 
391. GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 159, at 98-99; Goldberg & Zipursky, Rights and Responsi-
bility, supra note 371, at 265-66; see Baade, supra note 279, at 340 (noting that those who seek 
change bear the burden of argument). 
392. 552 U.S. 264, 271 (2008). 
393. Roosevelt, supra note 28, at 1117. 
394. Zipursky, supra note 373, at 627. This inquiry does not require us to answer whether the new 
rule was always the law, or to determine precisely when in time the law changed. We only have 
to answer whether it is the law for these plaintiffs’ grievances that are justiciable before the court 
today. See infra note 419. 
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legitimate authority—as to the place of positive sources, morality, and social con-
ditions in judicial reasoning—there is significant common ground on the idea 
that legal authority constrains adjudication.395 Legal authority in Obergefell en-
compassed Federal Due Process doctrine. In Janus it encompassed First Amend-
ment doctrine. This notion must be understood to be flexible enough to envelop 
all those novel arguments that are open to plaintiffs to invoke on the facts, and 
to recognize that principles and interpretations of law can develop and change in 
a manner that may bear upon claims being adjudicated.396 Within this rubric, 
when a pleaded action encounters an unfavorable rule, the pertinent question is 
not when has the rule changed but when could the plaintiff have made the case for 
change. It is from then that the plaintiff ’s right of action can be considered justi-
ciable. And it is from then that the plaintiff can, in making their case, invoke the 
same principles and reasoning to persuade the immediate court as may have per-
suaded an appellate court in another case to hand down a novel precedent. 
In sum, trial courts should “apply the prevailing decisional rule to the cases 
before them,” as Justice Harlan implored.397 This framework aligns with the dis-
sent’s view of adjudication that Justice O’Connor criticized in Smith: that a court 
should simply “determine whether a case was properly before it and, if so, apply 
current law,” allowing the “retroactivity question” to pass by altogether.398 This 
view would seem to comport with the prevailing position of the Court following 
Harper.399 The temporal scope of novel precedent should be understood not in 
terms of a rule’s retroactivity, but in terms of its justiciability. 
B. Limits on Rights of Action 
Non-retroactivity doctrine presumes that novel precedent creates novel 
rights for the future, not the past. But when a past transaction or dispute is liti-
gated in light of a new rule, proponents of this doctrine do not take the date of 
 
395. This is the essence of “the judicial cra�.” Scalia, The Rule of Law, supra note 168, at 1183; see 
DAGAN, RECONSTRUCTING, supra note 19, at 50-59; GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 159, at 
252-53; Dagan, American Legal Realism, supra note 19, at 140-43. 
396. See Dagan, American Legal Realism, supra note 19, at 130, 135 n.57, 136 (considering legal-real-
ist, legal-positivist, and legal-interpretivist views on the reforming, refining, and evolving of 
law). 
397. United States v. Estate of Donnelly, 397 U.S. 286, 297 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
398. Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 191 (1990) (plurality opinion) (disapproving of 
Justice Stevens’s dissent); see Roosevelt, supra note 28, at 1117. 
399. Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993); see supra note 92 and accompanying 
text. 
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the novel judgment as the point from which limitation begins to run.400 They 
assume limitation begins as it ordinarily does: upon accrual or discoverability of 
the action.401 This steers the puzzle into “topsy-turvy land”402: if novel rights 
did not “exist” in the past then they could not begin to accrue until the novel 
precedent was handed down. But if the limitations statute was already running 
at that time, then viable rights have already accrued. It is surely axiomatic that “a 
statute of limitations does not begin to run against a cause of action before that 
cause of action exists.”403 Limitations statutes ensure timely litigation by penal-
izing plaintiffs who sleep on their rights. Yet, how can “a man . . . sleep on a right 
he does not have”?404 
The solution is to recognize that the judicial function is inherently retroac-
tive. 405 Precedent today necessarily informs how we should understand past 
rights. That does not mean new rights of action are unlimited in scope. They are 
subject to defenses. Interests of justice and fairness are embodied in long-recog-
nized temporal limits on rights of action.406 This Section describes these doc-
trines, and seeks to explain why one in particular, laches, has untapped potential 
as a tool to ensure justice in the face of novel precedent. 
1. Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel 
The doctrine of res judicata bars plaintiffs from relitigating claims that have 
already been finally adjudicated.407 Collateral estoppel precludes the relitigation 
of judicially determined issues.408 Parties who have had their day in court do not 
get a second bite at the apple even when the weight of precedent has 
 
400. And it would not be prudent to do so, as the English experience shows. See supra Section 
II.E.2. 
401. Stephens, supra note 31, at 1568. 
402. Dincher v. Marlin Firearms Co., 198 F.2d 821, 823 (2d Cir. 1952) (Frank, J., dissenting) (“Ex-
cept in topsy-turvy land you can’t die before you are conceived . . . or miss a train running on 
a non-existent railroad.”); see also Susan D. Glimcher, Statutes of Limitations and the Discovery 
Rule in Latent Injury Claims: An Exception or the Law?, 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 501, 501 (1982) (cit-
ing Dincher). 
403. Dincher, 198 F.2d at 823. 
404. Id. 
405. See supra Section I.B. 
406. See McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452, 2481 (2020). 
407. See Lehn, supra note 29, at 590-92. 
408. Id. at 585-87. 
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subsequently shi�ed in their favor.409 If that seems unfair,410 it is, as Justice Har-
lan maintained, “part of the risks of life.”411 The rule of law requires that a plain-
tiff has an opportunity to put forward their case and argue it as best they can 
before the courts. It does not require that a plaintiff is able to keep returning to 
the courts, filing successive suits in respect of the same event, until they finally 
win. It is more important that litigation have a determinate end so that rights 
can be fixed.412 
2. Limitation 
Once a right of action has ripened and accrued (i.e., once the rights violation 
complained of has occurred or become discoverable), a corresponding limita-
tions period will begin to run.413 The period is fixed by statute.414 The limita-
tions clock ticks regardless of the perceived stability or instability of the relevant 
law at issue.415 The clock is paused by filing suit. A plaintiff who fails to file a 
complaint that asserts their right of action before expiry of the limitations period 
will usually be barred from doing so at a later date.416 A�er a specified period, 
 
409. See Stephens, supra note 31, at 1568; see also James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 
529, 541 (1991) (opinion of Souter, J., joined by Stevens, J.) (discussing res judicata and pro-
cedural barriers such as statutes of limitations as constraints on one’s ability to press a claim 
based on new law). In the criminal context (which is beyond the scope of this Article), de-
fendants have a (constrained) right to have their case revisited on collateral review. See supra 
note 61. 
410. See Fairchild, supra note 86, at 267. 
411. United States v. Estate of Donnelly, 397 U.S. 286, 296 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
412. See Kay, supra note 58, at 52 (“At some point adjudication comes to an end and unsuccessful 
civil litigants are denied the solace of newer and friendlier law.”); Arthur Ripstein, The Rule of 
Law and Time’s Arrow, in PRIVATE LAW AND THE RULE OF LAW 306, 307 (Lisa M. Austin & 
Dennis Klimchuk eds., 2014) (providing a formal account of limitations periods as essential 
to the rule of law); Jeremy Waldron, Superseding Historic Injustice, 103 ETHICS 4, 15-16 (1992) 
(giving reasons to think that rights fade and change with time such that historic injustices can 
be superseded by contemporary circumstances). 
413. See supra note 378. 
414. 1 CORMAN, supra note 376, § 1.5, at 75. 
415. 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 135 (2020) (“The discovery rule . . . is not applicable to a sit-
uation where a plaintiff waits to file suit or a claim until he or she has some assurance of 
success on the merits of his or her claim. . . . The operation of the statute of limitations is not 
postponed where plaintiffs are in possession of all the facts necessary to determine whether 
they have a cause of action but are ignorant of the law on which their claim is based.”). 
416. Id. § 313. This applies unless the defendant waives the limitations defense or, exceptionally, a 
court applies a statutory or equitable discretion to waive or extend the ordinary limitations 
period. Id. § 133. 
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the law treats the would-be defendant’s actions as “beyond challenge” in the in-
terests of finality and closure.417 
The effects of retroactive adjudication should not, then, be overstated. When 
judicial precedent “changes” the law, it is not necessarily pronouncing on the law 
for all time in the past.418 It is determining the law affecting those claims still 
justiciable within the limitations period. Unless a court somehow retains juris-
diction to adjudicate disputes from centuries ago, it will have no occasion to rule 
authoritatively on what the law was that governed such centuries-old dis-
putes.419 Statutes of limitations serve a crucial function in curbing the fallout of 
judicial change. 
3. Laches and Acquiescence 
Non-retroactivity doctrine was developed to counter the hardship borne by 
parties who acted and transacted on the basis of an understanding of law that is 
subsequently upended by novel precedent. Non-retroactivity proponents cast 
this hardship as a problem of new law retroactively changing past rights and 
threatening reliance interests. The core problem, though, is not ex post recali-
bration of rights and duties. It is having to wait to find out what one’s rights and 
duties really are. The core problem, in other words, is delay. 
If parties to a transaction knew on day one that their transaction was legally 
defective, it would hardly be unfair or inefficient for their transaction to be re-
calibrated to fit the law. But parties typically have no such knowledge in non-
retroactivity cases. To the contrary, parties may endure significant delay between 
a transaction and when it is challenged in court, as well as significant delay be-
tween suit and when the law is finally determined by judicial decision. Most of 
the time this delay is simply accepted as the inevitable cost of practical justice. If 
a novel judgment takes a party by surprise, at least its effects are constrained only 
to events falling within the statute of limitations and outside the doctrines of res 
judicata and collateral estoppel. 
In exceptional cases, though, even such constrained disruption may be 
thought by a court to be too much. It is in such cases that courts have tended to 
 
417. United States v. Estate of Donnelly, 397 U.S. 286, 296 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring); see 
supra note 412. 
418. This is the stuff of (intractable) jurisprudential debate. See supra Section II.A. 
419. Courts are not in the habit of adjudicating grievances occurring a hundred years ago because 
those rights of action expired long ago. It is therefore not necessary to answer whether, for 
example, a court would adjudicate a suit brought today against D1 for invading P1’s privacy in 
1919 in the same way as it would adjudicate a suit brought today against D2 for invading P2’s 
privacy in 2019, because any right of action P1 had in 1919 is no longer justiciable today. The 
only pertinent question is whether in 2019 D2 breached a duty owed to P2. 
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turn to non-retroactivity doctrine. This Section suggests that courts can better 
mitigate the fallout of legal change by employing established equitable principles 
than by seeking to resuscitate non-retroactivity doctrine. The Supreme Court 
has long cast its non-retroactivity judgments in terms of “equitable considera-
tions,”420 but it has not imbued that notion with substantive content.421 This 
Section proposes to do just that: to put forward an alternative way that judges 
can limit “new” rights in exceptional cases. Given the essential problem is delay, 
courts should turn away from non-retroactivity doctrine and toward the equita-
ble doctrines of laches and acquiescence, guided by the maxim that “equity aids 
the vigilant, not the indolent.”422 
a. Description 
Laches and acquiescence are closely related doctrines.423 Laches arises when 
a claimant’s delay is unreasonable and causes prejudice to the defendant.424 It 
 
420. Estate of Donnelly, 397 U.S. at 296 (Harlan, J., concurring), cited in Harper v. Va. Dep’t of 
Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 133 (1993) (O’Connor, J., dissenting), Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Smith, 
496 U.S. 167, 190 (1990) (plurality opinion), and Smith, 496 U.S. at 215 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing); see James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 543-44 (1991) (opinion of 
Souter, J., joined by Stevens, J.) (“[N]othing we say here precludes consideration of individ-
ual equities when deciding remedial issues in particular cases.”); id. at 547 (Blackmun, J., con-
curring in the judgment) (characterizing the argument against “selective application of new 
rules” as “a question of equity”); id. at 551, 557-58 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (discussing “the 
equities of retroactive application”); Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 108 (1971) (not-
ing that retroactive application of a statute of limitations might produce “substantial inequi-
table results”). 
421. Cf. Kuo, supra note 209, at 895-96 (“Equity considerations have included: (1) the length of 
time during which the taxes have been paid, (2) the availability of other remedies, (3) the 
administrability of refunding retroactively, and (4) the policy implications of retroactive re-
funds.” (footnotes omitted)). 
422. EATON, supra note 21, at 52. 
423. So much so that some courts and commentators subsume acquiescence into laches. See, e.g., 
30A C.J.S. Equity § 142 (2020); J.D. HEYDON, M.J. LEEMING & P.G. TURNER, MEAGHER, GUM-
MOW AND LEHANE’S EQUITY: DOCTRINES AND REMEDIES § 38-015, at 1086 (5th ed. 2015); SA-
RAH WORTHINGTON, EQUITY 36 (2d ed. 2006). 
424. Samuel L. Bray, A Little Bit of Laches Goes a Long Way: Notes on Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer, Inc., 67 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 1, 2 (2014) (“[L]aches is not concerned merely with 
the fact of delay. It matters why the plaintiff delayed bringing the claim and what effect that 
delay had on the defendant. In doctrinal terms, the delay must be ‘unreasonable’ and cause 
‘prejudice.’”); see 2 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS AD-
MINISTERED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA § 419, at 171-72 (S.F., Spencer W. Symons ed., 
5th ed. 1941) (1882) (defining laches as “such neglect or omission to assert a right as, taken in 
conjunction with the lapse of time, more or less great, and other circumstances causing prej-
udice to an adverse party, operates as a bar in a court of equity” (quoting Cahill v. Superior 
Court, 78 P. 467, 469 (Cal. 1904))). 
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concerns the claimant’s inaction “a�er an act is done.”425 Acquiescence arises 
when a claimant knows or has the means of knowing her rights but unreasonably 
delays in asserting them.426 It concerns “inaction during performance of an act” 
that amounts to tacit assent to the act later complained of.427 For both doctrines, 
the relevant inaction is failure to bring timely suit.428 
The foundations of these doctrines, fundamental to equity jurisdiction, were 
long ago encapsulated by the Lord Chancellor, Lord Camden, as follows: 
A court of equity which is never active in relief against conscience, or 
public convenience, has always refused its aid to stale demands, where 
the party has slept upon his right and acquiesced for a great length of 
time. Nothing can call forth this court into activity, but conscience, good 
faith, and reasonable diligence; where these are wanting, the court is pas-
sive, and does nothing. Laches and neglect are always discountenanced, 
and therefore from the beginning of this jurisdiction, there was always a 
limitation to suits in this court.429 
Laches and acquiescence are exceptions to the ordinary rule that violations 
of justiciable rights warrant a remedy. They give courts discretion to cut off liti-
gation of rights of action even when initiated within a normal statutory limita-
tions period. Their criterion of unreasonableness, combined with prejudice to the 
defendant (in respect of laches) or tacit assent of the claimant (in respect of ac-
quiescence), sets a high threshold. Where defendants can overcome this thresh-
old, however, these doctrines can be powerful and pragmatic tools for constrain-
ing the fallout of lawsuits brought in the light of new law. 
Laches and acquiescence concern whether claimants failed to pursue legal 
rights with reasonable diligence. This equitable inquiry mirrors (and indeed 
 
425. 30A C.J.S. Equity § 142 (2020). 
426. 27A AM. JUR. 2D Equity § 113 (2020); 30A C.J.S. Equity § 151 (2020); HEYDON, LEEMING & 
TURNER, supra note 423, § 38-070, at 1094; WORTHINGTON, supra note 423, at 36. 
427. Bay Newfoundland Co. v. Wilson & Co., 4 A.2d 668, 671 (Del. Ch. 1939); 30A C.J.S. Equity 
§ 142 (2020); see Dock & Terminal Eng’g Co. v. Pa. R.R. Co., 82 F.2d 19, 20 (3d Cir. 1936) 
(finding plaintiff ’s inaction to be “tacit consent or acquiescence”); J. GEORGE N. DARBY & 
FREDERICK ALBERT BOSANQUET, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS IN 
ENGLAND AND IRELAND 351-52 (London, William Maxwell & Son 1867) (“A person . . . [acqui-
esces] if he lie[s] by with full knowledge of his rights, and tacitly allows conduct which is 
inconsistent with them . . . .”); 3 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, supra note 424, § 817, at 245-46 
(Spencer W. Symons ed., 5th ed. 1941) (1883) (outlining a narrow definition of acquiescence). 
428. 30A C.J.S. Equity § 151 (2020). 
429. Smith v. Clay (1767) 29 Eng. Rep. 743, 744, cited with approval in Hayward v. Nat’l Bank, 96 
U.S. 611, 617-18 (1877), and Bowman v. Wathen, 42 U.S. (1. How.) 189, 193 (1843). 
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informed)430 the “discoverability” inquiry in the limitations context. The perti-
nent period of delay begins when the claimant “discovered or by the exercise of 
reasonable diligence should have discovered the wrong of which he or she com-
plains.”431 This will typically coincide with the point at which a claim becomes 
“ripe such that a court could entertain it.”432 This point can be understood in 
several ways—as the point when the material elements of the alleged rights vio-
lation have all occurred, when the claimant is reasonably in a position to pursue 
a right of action, or when the claimant has the ability to plead an action before a 
court.433 
Like the limitation inquiry, the equitable inquiry is concerned with when 
rights of action become justiciable. As Section III.A showed, this may be well 
before an appellate court hands down a novel judgment. Reflecting on the equi-
table doctrine of laches, Andrew Kull and Ward Farnsworth suggest: “Certain 
restitution plaintiffs—such as parties who lie low and wait to see how prices de-
velop, before deciding whether to ratify or rescind a voidable transaction—offer 
textbook examples of the conduct that laches is designed to frustrate.”434 The 
same could, by analogy, be said of claimants who lie low and wait to see how 
legal precedent develops. 
What amounts to unreasonable delay will “depend on the peculiar equitable 
circumstances” of each case.435 Unreasonableness is not governed by any fixed 
rule or period of time. Courts will consider whether a claimant’s delay had a sig-
nificant impact on the litigation and the parties’ positions and whether it could 
be adequately explained. There can o�en be significant delay between the accrual 
of a novel right of action and when suit is filed—particularly in those cases where 
claims are only brought a�er some landmark Supreme Court judgment is deliv-
ered. Delay can be significant without necessarily being extensive. It may be sig-
nificant if, during the period of delay, the defendant takes actions and changes 
their position in reliance on their presumed rights because the would-be plaintiff 
has not formally challenged their actions by filing suit. 436  In such cases, 
 
430. See Hoffman & Wells, supra note 381, at 76-86. 
431. 30A C.J.S. Equity § 151 (2020). 
432. Id. 
433. See supra Section III.A. 
434. ANDREW KULL & WARD FARNSWORTH, RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT: CASES AND 
NOTES 504 (2018). 
435. The Key City, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 653, 660 (1871), cited in Czaplicki v. Hoegh Silvercloud, 351 
U.S. 525, 533 (1956). 
436. E.g., Perry v. Judd, 471 F. App’x 219, 222 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding that laches barred relief 
sought by Republican-primary presidential candidates who had “displayed an unreasonable 
and inexcusable lack of diligence,” which “significantly harmed the defendants” in delaying 
by several months their constitutional challenge to Virginia’s ballot requirements). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3393077
the yale law journal 130:276  2020 
352 
particularly where reliance could be expected, a court might quite appropriately 
characterize certain delay as “unreasonable.” 
A finding of laches depends—in addition to unreasonable delay—upon prej-
udice to the defendant. Prejudice may be evidentiary in nature: it may stem from 
a loss of evidence or witnesses. Or it may be expectations based: it may stem 
from the defendant having taken “actions or suffered consequences that it would 
not have, had the plaintiff brought suit promptly.”437 Defendants might, for in-
stance, change their position in reliance on a claimant’s inaction by spending 
money received prior to learning the money is the subject of a restitutionary 
claim. Laches is a useful safety valve within the right-of-action framework.438 It 
is a more principled mechanism for alleviating prejudice to parties than is non-
retroactivity doctrine. Consider, for example, how it could apply following Janus. 
Given that public-sector unions had for many years relied on statute and prece-
dent to validate the collection of compulsory agency fees,439 a court might well 
be justified in invoking laches to stem the “flood of class action lawsuits” brought 
in Janus’s wake, which have “threaten[ed] to bankrupt unions around the na-
tion.”440 That is because litigants’ delay may have prejudiced unions by not alert-
ing them that the money collected was subject to challenge. Unions could be 
understood to have changed their position when they spent and distributed in-
coming revenue, rather than holding it in escrow pending the outcome of litiga-
tion. Arguably, these cases could meet the doctrine’s exceptional threshold. A 
court could in its discretion use laches to limit the scope of any valid restitution-
ary claims to, say, the fees collected in the X months prior to plaintiffs filing 
suit—rather than the full period of collection covered by the limitations statute. 
A finding of acquiescence depends—in addition to unreasonable delay—
upon a claimant’s constructive knowledge and tacit assent to the alleged rights 
violation. A claimant may acquiesce by failing to object to a transaction by filing 
suit in respect of it within a reasonable time. What must be (able to be) known 
are the relevant facts (in other words, the material elements) that make up the 
right of action. This doctrine can play a particularly significant role in curbing 
 
437. Danjaq LLC v. Sony Corp., 263 F.3d 942, 955 (9th Cir. 2001); see Roger Young & Stephen 
Spitz, SUEM—Spitz’s Ultimate Equitable Maxim: In Equity, Good Guys Should Win and Bad 
Guys Should Lose, 55 S.C. L. REV. 175, 188 (2003) (“[Equity] would not easily reward someone 
who caused undue prejudice to another by sleeping on his rights.”). 
438. See Henry E. Smith, Equity as Meta-Law, 130 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 65-
67) (on file with author) (considering how equity’s moralizing maxims operate as a safety 
valve); Kenneth Ayotte, Ezra Friedman & Henry E. Smith, A Safety Valve Model of Equity as 
Anti-Opportunism 11-12 (Mar. 30, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=2245098 [https://perma.cc/T6C3-3MQM]. 
439. The most significant precedent, of course, was Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 
209 (1977). 
440. Tang & Smith, supra note 9, at 24. 
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“opportunistic” tax-restitution suits.441 The doctrine is said to have “frequently 
been applied in taxpayers’ actions” where claimants unreasonably delay filing 
suit a�er having had “express or implied knowledge or notice of the matter com-
plained of.”442 Generally, tax exactions can be challenged and reviewed once 
paid. It is submitted that once a claimant is in a position to challenge the legality 
of a tax exaction, they ought to do so in a timely manner. It is not an exercise of 
reasonable diligence to await first the outcome of some other taxpayer’s litigation 
and, in the event of their success, to sue only in their wake.443 
What distinguishes the approach here from the non-retroactivity frame-
works is that the defense will only prevail where defendants can demonstrate 
prejudice or tacit assent sufficient to justify the court’s intervention. They must 
point to evidence. Otherwise, plaintiffs are entitled to retroactive relief to vindi-
cate their rights violations. Unlike under the non-retroactivity frameworks, 
claims of general reliance on “old” law will not suffice. 
It is worth highlighting how the laches and acquiescence defenses under the 
right-of-action framework differ, in particular, from the “equitable considera-
tions” employed under the remedial framework.444 The remedial framework 
seeks to delineate retroactive remedies based on the foreseeability or predictabil-
ity of legal change. Unpredictable changes in the law provide a basis for denying 
retroactive relief under that framework. Yet, since unpredictability is an objective 
inquiry, the remedial framework can only ever capture too much or too little. 
Either a legal change is considered unpredictable, in which case everyone—in-
cluding those with pending cases seeking the legal change—must be denied 
 
441. See Kuo, supra note 209, at 896 (“O�en, unconstitutional taxes are a substantial source of 
revenue for many states.”). 
442. L.S. Tellier, Annotation, What Constitutes Laches Barring Right to Relief in Taxpayers’ Action, 71 
A.L.R.2d 529 (1960). Laches and acquiescence typically do not, however, apply against the 
government, and so the doctrine may not provide protection to taxpayer defendants in cases 
such as South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018). See 30A C.J.S. Equity § 144 
(2020). 
443. See Beswick, supra note 356, at 150-54, 158-60 (critiquing how a rule to this effect has distorted 
doctrine and parties’ incentives to a dramatic extent in England); see also Gonzalez v. Crosby, 
545 U.S. 524, 536-37 (2005) (noting that a change in the law of limitation does not in and of 
itself constitute extraordinary circumstances to justify vacating order denying habeas corpus 
petition, and that the petitioner had shown a “lack of diligence in pursuing review of the stat-
ute-of-limitations issue” in his case); Cabarga-Cruz v. Fundacion Educativa Ana G. Mendez, 
Inc., 609 F. Supp. 1207, 1210 n.2 (D.P.R. 1985) (“The foresight on the development of the law 
required of litigants in the retroactivity analysis is equally applicable to those who would jus-
tify a late amendment to pleadings on the need to incorporate a recent legal development or 
change. They should at least be diligent in detecting the possibility of change in the law so as 
to minimize the hardship and prejudice on the other parties that a late amendment will 
cause.”), aff ’d, 822 F.2d 188 (1st Cir. 1987). 
444. Supra Section II.D. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3393077
the yale law journal 130:276  2020 
354 
retroactive relief, or the fact that there is novel litigation seeking legal change 
renders such change foreseeable and predicable, in which case (if successful) all 
claimants ought to be entitled to retroactive relief—regardless of how proactive 
they have been in pursuing their rights. The remedial framework produces a 
one-size-fits-all outcome. So even if this framework could coherently identify 
legal issues warranting a non-retroactive response (which, for the reasons dis-
cussed in Section II.D, is doubtful), it cannot differentiate between parties de-
serving of (non-)retroactive relief. The doctrines of laches and acquiescence, by 
contrast, do not depend on the predictability of legal change or the date an ap-
pellate court happens to hand down a novel judgment. They depend on the ex-
tent of claimants’ delays between the event(s) complained of and the date(s) of 
filing suit. Those who file suit promptly have a more compelling claim for retro-
active relief than do those who sit on their rights. 
While the right-of-action framework is attuned to the rights and interests of 
parties before adjudicating courts, that does not mean it is unreceptive to bright-
line interpretations of what amounts to laches or acquiescence in complex litiga-
tion. Where defendants face suit on multiple fronts in respect of similar events 
or complaints (as is the case, for example, in litigation concerning the compul-
sory deduction of union agency fees), it may well be appropriate, and indeed 
inevitable, that precedents emerge as to what is unreasonable delay in respect of 
the defendants’ conduct. Such precedents would not do so by reference to a spe-
cific date, as the non-retroactivity frameworks are wont to do. They would es-
tablish, instead, a time period within which delay in filing suit would be consid-
ered reasonable (e.g., within X months from when a plaintiff ’s right of action 
accrued or ripened), and beyond which claims would be treated as time-barred. 
This would enable successive claimants to identify the scope of their legally en-
forceable claims without having to litigate each afresh. 
b. Objections and Responses 
Some of the cases in which courts have employed non-retroactive adjudica-
tion likely fall beyond the traditional scope of the doctrines of laches and acqui-
escence. But that does not mean the doctrines are irrelevant. Even leaving their 
doctrinal bounds intact, laches and acquiescence could usefully be employed by 
analogy in appropriate cases. That is to say, the law could take the lead from eq-
uity.445 In cases where courts previously might have turned to non-retroactivity 
doctrine, they could instead turn to the principle that underlies these equitable 
doctrines, namely, that remedying promptly prosecuted harms should be prior-
itized over remedying those that are brought a�er significant delay. Claimants 
 
445. W.M.C. GUMMOW, CHANGE AND CONTINUITY: STATUTE, EQUITY, AND FEDERALISM 38 (1999). 
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ought to pursue their rights vigilantly. If (successive) claimants prefer to hold 
back and wait to see whether the law develops favorably in other (principal) par-
ties’ cases, they ought to bear the risk of delay—just as principal parties bear risk 
when litigating novel rights. Courts have not resiled from fashioning non-retro-
activity doctrine along largely amorphous “equitable considerations.” These con-
siderations might be more normatively persuasive were they aligned with estab-
lished equitable principles.446 
Alternatively, the formal doctrines of laches and acquiescence447 could be de-
veloped to meet this context.448 Admittedly, doing so would face a number of 
objections. But each, as the remainder of this Section shows, can be overcome. 
The first objection is that, if laches were more liberally employed, claimants 
would never know ex ante whether a court was going to deem them out of time. 
Claims might be rejected for delay though they are brought within the pre-
scribed limitations period. The answer, although cold comfort to claimants, is 
that courts will balance the respective prejudices to parties when weighing 
whether to invoke the equitable defense. Fortunately, courts have centuries of 
doctrine and principle to call upon to guide their discretion and moderate arbi-
trariness. That is more than what they have had to navigate the discretionary 
quagmire of non-retroactivity doctrine (a doctrine that is vulnerable to the same 
objection). 
The second objection targets the idea that a suit filed within a statutory lim-
itations period could nevertheless be dismissed for “unreasonable” delay. This 
issue has long divided courts. Some contend that laches can never bar relief for 
a claim filed within the limitations period.449 But the better view is that it can.450 
 
446. This is not to suggest that analogizing to the doctrines of laches and acquiescence to constrain 
rights of action would be without objection. Flexibility begets uncertainty. In particular, the 
first and fi�h objections that follow would also apply if courts reasoned by analogy to laches 
and acquiescence. 
447. The remainder of this Section discusses laches, but the discussion should be assumed to en-
compass acquiescence also. See supra note 423 (noting that acquiescence is o�en subsumed 
into laches). 
448. See Samuel L. Bray, The System of Equitable Remedies, 63 UCLA L. REV. 530, 587-89 (2016) 
(postulating that the system of equitable remedies could be reformed to make rules such as 
laches explicitly functional). 
449. Thomas G. Robinson, Laches in Federal Substantive Law: Relation to Statutes of Limitations, 56 
B.U. L. REV. 970, 973-74 (1976) (“[T]he federally developed laches doctrine applies only to 
those claims based upon federal equitable or maritime rights for which Congress has ne-
glected to establish a limitations period.”). 
450. STEPHEN A. SMITH, RIGHTS, WRONGS, AND INJUSTICES: THE STRUCTURE OF REMEDIAL LAW 
312-14 (2020) (suggesting that resort to laches may be justified, even within a limitations pe-
riod, in cases where the burden of complying with a court order increases over time); Bray, 
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Laches would be a toothless instrument for guarding against unreasonable prej-
udice if it could not bar relief within the limitations period. 
The Supreme Court considered the relationship between laches and limita-
tions in Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. and held that laches can be invoked 
notwithstanding a limitations statute.451 Admittedly, the majority opinion was 
circumspect on this point. Justice Ginsburg for the Court thought there was “lit-
tle place” for laches in a regime of statutory limitations periods,452 and she con-
fined her holding to claims for “equitable relief, in extraordinary circum-
stances.” 453  Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion, however, more expansively 
rejoined that Congress enacts limitations statutes against the background of 
common law and equity,454 and that the place for laches remains “an important 
one”: “In those few and unusual cases where a plaintiff unreasonably delays in 
bringing suit and consequently causes inequitable harm to the defendant, the 
doctrine permits a court to bring about a fair result.”455 Prima facie, then, it is no 
sufficient retort that a limitations statute is extant. 
A third and formidable objection is that, according to the Supreme Court in 
Petrella and SCA Hygiene Products Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Products, LLC, 
laches, being “a defense developed by courts of equity,” “cannot be invoked to 
bar legal relief.”456 In other words, laches is only a defense “to claims of an equi-
table cast.”457 
 
supra note 424, at 17 (arguing that for equitable claims, “absent a clear statutory abrogation, 
laches should be allowed even where there is a statute of limitations since Congress is pre-
sumed to legislate against the backdrop of traditional equitable principles”). 
451. 572 U.S. 663, 667-68 (2014); see Samuel L. Bray, The Supreme Court and the New Equity, 68 
VAND. L. REV. 997, 1035 (2015); Bray, supra note 448, at 585. 
452. Petrella, 572 U.S. at 685. 
453. Id. at 667. 
454. Id. at 694 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
455. Id. at 700. 
456. Petrella, 572 U.S. at 678, applied in SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby 
Prods., LLC, 137 S. Ct. 954, 960 (2017) (noting that laches is not a defense against damages 
for patent infringement); see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICH-
MENT § 70 cmt. g (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (“[Laches] applies only to a suit for equitable relief.”); 
Bray, supra note 448, at 535, 548 (noting—without commenting on whether equitable con-
straints such as laches “would never be useful for legal remedies”—that “it is the blackletter 
law of the vast majority of jurisdictions that laches is an equitable defense good against equi-
table claims, but not against legal claims”). 
457. Petrella, 572 U.S. at 678. 
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Whether equitable defenses can bar legal claims has long been a matter of 
contest within courts.458 Equitable remedies (such as injunctions) are histori-
cally, formally, and functionally distinct from legal remedies (such as dam-
ages).459 The Court’s holding in Petrella presents a barrier for cases in which legal 
remedies (like damages) are sought in the wake of new law. There are, however, 
four ways courts might overcome this barrier to preserve the use of laches in such 
cases: 
(1) O�en the monetary remedies sought in this context are restitutionary 
rather than compensatory.460 Federal and state courts have long blurred 
the distinction between legal restitution and equitable restitution.461 
The Restatement (Third) largely dismisses the distinction as “ambigu-
ous.”462 Thus, while taxonomically inelegant, it is open to courts to cast 
restitutionary claims as equitable in nature and therefore subject to the 
equitable doctrine of laches. 
(2) Claims brought in the wake of new federal law are typically constitu-
tional in nature. They arise from statutes being struck down, new con-
stitutional rights being articulated, or old constitutional principles being 
reinterpreted. Constitutional remedies characteristically fall short of 
 
458. See T. Leigh Anenson, Equitable Defenses in the Age of Statutes, 36 REV. LITIG. 659, 698 (2018) 
(“A modern issue for equitable defenses, particularly those like laches and unclean hands that 
operated exclusively against equitable relief, is whether they may be extended to bar actions 
seeking damages.”); T. Leigh Anenson, Statutory Interpretation, Judicial Discretion, and Equita-
ble Defenses, 79 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 5 n.9 (2017) [hereina�er Anenson, Statutory Interpretation] 
(noting “the Federal Circuit divided over the scope of laches” in SCA Hygiene Products, 137 S. 
Ct. 954); Bray, supra note 448, at 546(noting some states “allow[] one or more of the equitable 
defenses to be applied to all claims for legal relief”). 
459. See IRIT SAMET, EQUITY: CONSCIENCE GOES TO MARKET 28-42 (2018); cf. SMITH, supra note 
450, at 31, 312 (arguing “that it is possible to describe and explain both (so-called) Legal rem-
edies and (so-called) Equitable remedies on the basis of the same principles,” and yet defend-
ing the distinction in the laches context on the basis that “delays in seeking specific relief [e.g., 
injunctions] typically prejudice defendants more significantly than delays in seeking non-spe-
cific relief [e.g., damages]”). 
460. See Burbank, supra note 90, at 351 (conceiving of illegal exaction cases as giving rise to “a 
restitution remedy . . . when the government unlawfully requires or demands money or prop-
erty, regardless of the basis for that illegality”). 
461. See Tracy A. Thomas, Justice Scalia Reinvents Restitution, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1063, 1063 (2003) 
(“Equitable restitution is unrecognizable in recent Supreme Court decisions.”); Note, The In-
tellectual History of Unjust Enrichment, 133 HARV. L. REV. 2077, 2094-95 (2020) (discussing 
American courts’ confusion about unjust enrichment’s place in equity and law). 
462. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 4 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 
2011); see also DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE 3-36, 82-84 
(1991) (approving courts’ willingness and tendency to skirt antiquated divisions between law 
and equity). 
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making victims of rights violations whole. This right-remedy gap is well 
acknowledged and is accepted by many scholars as a feature of courts’ 
inherent equitable discretion to grant, withhold, or tailor backward-
looking relief in constitutional cases.463 Recourse to equitable defenses, 
including laches, in such cases would therefore seem acceptable. 
(3) Even in cases where the monetary relief requested is clearly legal in na-
ture, the Supreme Court’s holdings in Petrella and SCA Hygiene—that 
equitable defenses cannot bar legal claims—need not necessarily apply 
across the board. Petrella was a copyright-infringement case, and SCA 
Hygiene a patent-infringement case. Copyright and patent infringement 
each typically concern ongoing harms. A case-specific court order may 
be the only way to prevent a defendant’s ongoing infringement. These 
cases could be distinguished from new-law cases, in which continuing 
unlawful conduct typically ends once an authoritative judgment deter-
mining the law is handed down. The primary concern in new-law cases 
is how to respond to past conduct, not to ongoing conduct. There re-
mains a useful role for laches to play in such cases. 
(4) More boldly, the Court could venture to revise its “new equity” jurispru-
dence464 and endorse the minority opinion in Petrella: that there is no 
“general rule” barring “laches in actions for legal relief,” and in 
 
463. Jeffries, supra note 320, at 91; see Anenson, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 458, at 38 (“[A]n 
equitable analysis subordinates private law to public right.”); Michael Coenen, Right-Remedy 
Equilibration and the Asymmetric Entrenchment of Legal Entitlements, 61 B.C. L. REV. 129, 132-38 
(2020) (cautioning that the right-remedy gap will tend to expand over time, since it is easier 
for judges to limit legal entitlements than it is to promote them, and identifying strategies for 
overcoming the asymmetry); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage Between Justiciability and 
Remedies—and Their Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. REV. 633, 683-89 (2006) (ar-
guing that courts equilibrate their doctrines of justiciability, substantive rights, and remedies 
so as to achieve overall desirable outcomes); John Choon Yoo, Who Measures the Chancellor’s 
Foot? The Inherent Remedial Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1121, 1166 (1996) 
(arguing that courts should determine claims of constitutional violation but defer the reme-
dial response to the states, the executive branch, and the Congress); see also Hanoch Dagan & 
Avihay Dorfman, Substantive Remedies, 96 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manu-
script at 36-39) (on file with author) (discussing a tort doctrine of “crushing liability” that 
can operate ex post to excuse defendants from the disproportionate burden of full remedial 
relief). 
464. See Bray, supra note 451; see also Anenson, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 458, at 4 (“Equi-
table defenses . . . have been resurrected. The Supreme Court is raising the dead in recent de-
cisions.”); James Fullmer, The Outer Limits of Equity: A Proposal for Cautious Expansion, 39 
HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 557, 568 (2016) (“A�er hundreds of years of judicial evolution, equi-
table remedies are hardly experimental or dangerous such that they should be tools of last 
resort.”). 
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appropriate cases—whether legal or equitable—it ought to be available 
as a defense.465 
Accordingly, the objection based on the law/equity distinction is not insur-
mountable. 
Fourth, there is authority for the proposition that delay may be excused until 
the state of the law clearly favors a claimant’s case. The Equity chapter of the 
Corpus Juris Secundum states that “[d]elay for the purpose of awaiting a change 
of previously unfavorable law is a reasonable delay for the purposes of laches, 
and does not constitute a lack of diligence.”466 Moreover, “[t]he pendency of le-
gal proceedings may excuse a delay in instituting a subsequent suit involving the 
same subject matter.”467 This is bad law and bad policy. As a matter of law, it is 
inconsistent with two principles also recorded in the Corpus Juris Secundum. 
First, that “[i]gnorance of one’s legal rights is not a reasonable excuse in a laches 
case.”468 Second, that delay is determined from when the right of action accrued, 
became ripe, or was discoverable. Delay is calculated from “the earliest time at 
which plaintiffs were able to bring their claims.”469 It is incontrovertible that 
claims may reasonably be brought despite an unfavorable state of the law. It is 
only through bringing novel claims that novel law can develop.470 As a matter of 
policy, excusing such delay encourages claimants to sit back on their rights in the 
hopes of benefitting from others who pursue theirs. It discourages claimants 
from pursuing their rights vigilantly.471 This contravenes the very essence of the 
equitable doctrine. The authority on this point thus warrants skeptical review. 
A fi�h objection is that in many cases the defendant’s complaint will stem 
not from delay as such, but from the mounting and seemingly disproportionate 
claims brought against it in light of new law. Is delay not being used as a proxy 
 
465. Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572 U.S 663, 697 (2014) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he Court has said more than once that a defendant could invoke laches in an action for 
damages . . . despite a fixed statute of limitations.”). 
466. 30A C.J.S. Equity § 150 (2020) (citing In re Beaty, 306 F.3d 914, 927 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
467. Id. § 166 (“[P]ending litigation excuses delay only where such litigation actually prevented 
assertion of the plaintiff ’s claim in a court of competent jurisdiction. . . . [D]elay pending the 
decision of a test case is not excusable in the absence of an agreement to abide by the event.”). 
468. Id. § 171. 
469. Id. § 151. 
470. Supra Section III.A. Where plaintiffs file suit in the shadow of some ongoing principal litiga-
tion, a court may find it appropriate to stay their proceedings pending the outcome of the 
principal case. This is, for example, what the Supreme Court did in the American Trucking 
litigation. See Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Gray, 483 U.S. 1014 (1987). In such circumstances, delay 
is in the court’s hands. It is not the plaintiffs who are responsible for delay. 
471. Cf. supra note 443 (collecting sources that criticize plaintiffs who waited for legal doctrine to 
develop before pursuing their claims). 
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for hardship in the same way reliance is used in non-retroactivity doctrine? The 
short answer is that it is. But that does not sweep away the value of this construct. 
Where prejudice to a defendant stems from mounting claims,472 vigilance/indo-
lence is the fairest metric for distinguishing meritorious and unmeritorious 
claims.473 Prima facie, the more prompt plaintiffs are to file suit, the more vigi-
lant they are in pursuing their rights, and—relative to indolent plaintiffs—the 
more deserving their claim for relief.474 
Sixth, what should be done in cases, such as American Trucking Ass’ns v. 
Smith, in which plaintiffs file suit without delay? Recall that in Smith, the im-
pugned HUE tax was enacted in March 1983, plaintiffs filed suit in May 1983, 
and the HUE Tax Act took effect from July 1983.475 While their appeal was pend-
ing, the Supreme Court in June 1987 delivered the favorable Scheiner judgment 
on which the Smith plaintiffs then sought to rely.476 In July 1990, the Smith 
plaintiffs’ substantive claim succeeded before the U.S. Supreme Court. Yet, the 
Supreme Court plurality denied the plaintiffs full retroactive relief on the basis 
that the HUE Tax Act’s enactors had acted in “good faith” and that “equitable 
considerations tilt[ed] the balance toward nonretroactive application” of 
Scheiner.477 It is not clear why Scheiner should bear upon the Smith plaintiffs’ 
case at all: the Smith plaintiffs had mounted their arguments in court against the 
HUE tax well before Scheiner was decided. Their right of action had accrued in 
 
472. See SMITH, supra note 450, at 312-14 (describing laches as an appropriate response when the 
burden of complying with a court order increases over time, although also assuming that the 
burden of complying with monetary orders remains relatively constant over time). 
473. One might object that this metric favors sophisticated and well-resourced claimants over 
those uninformed of their legal rights and those unable to pursue them. This objection is a 
more fundamental critique of the civil-litigation system generally. As a matter of doctrine and 
policy, impecuniosity does not normally excuse delay. See Leggett v. Standard Oil Co., 149 
U.S. 287, 294 (1893) (“[A] party’s poverty or pecuniary embarrassment [is] not a sufficient 
excuse for postponing the assertion of his rights.”); Danjaq LLC v. Sony Corp., 263 F.3d 942, 
954-55 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding, as part of laches determination, that a party’s delay was un-
reasonable despite his claims that he could not afford to bring suit); 30A C.J.S. Equity § 165 
(2020). This rule, however, operates less harshly in our era of class-action lawsuits and litiga-
tion funding. Plaintiffs in high-stakes litigation are o�en backed by well-resourced interested 
organizations. For example, the American Civil Liberties Union brought suit on behalf of the 
named claimants in Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S 644 (2015), and the National Right to Work 
Legal Defense Foundation and the Liberty Justice Center on behalf of the named claimants in 
Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018). 
474. The Court in Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572 U.S 663, 668 (2014), averred that a 
plaintiff ’s delay can “be brought to bear at the remedial stage.” 
475. Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 206-07 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
476. Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266 (1987); see Smith, 496 U.S. at 190 (plurality 
opinion). 
477. Smith, 496 U.S. at 181, 186 (plurality opinion). 
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1983 and was immediately pursued. (Indeed it is happenstance that the Supreme 
Court held their appeal, rather than deciding it at the same time as, or instead 
of, Scheiner.478) In any event, Smith is hardly an exemplar for invoking equitable 
defenses. The Smith plaintiffs, by immediately filing suit, did everything they 
could to protect themselves from what was ultimately held to be an unconstitu-
tionally discriminatory tax. The burden of delay was not caused by the plaintiffs, 
but by the drawn-out process of litigation. The defendants were on notice from 
the outset that the constitutionality of the HUE Tax Act was under challenge. In 
such circumstances, it hardly seems equitable that the plaintiffs should bear the 
burden of paying the unconstitutional tax. Thus, according to this Article’s right-
of-action framework, Smith was wrongly decided (the dissenting opinion was 
right),479 and it is not a case in which the equitable defense of laches could apply. 
Defendants in such a case could, however, still grasp for the other temporal and 
nontemporal limits on rights of action outlined in this Section. 
Finally, might Smith not stay the exception but become the norm under the 
right-of-action framework? A�er all, once plaintiffs are alerted to the risk that 
laches might bar their claims, they will have an incentive to challenge legal rules 
promptly to ensure that the opportunity to do so does not expire. This might 
perpetuate opportunistic litigation of rights. A threefold response can be given 
to this objection. First, parties are unlikely to challenge the validity of legal rules 
(and of actions taken under those rules) where they have no plausible grounds 
to believe that the rules are in some way legally invalid. Unsuccessful plaintiffs 
would bear the cost and, without an arguable case, would face dismissal for fail-
ure to state a claim. Second, since parties already have an incentive to challenge 
potentially invalid rules, making way for a laches defense would only marginally 
affect timing incentives. Third, it would be a good thing if the consequence is to 
encourage early litigation over potentially invalid legal rules. It is better for all 
parties, and particularly for states and governmental authorities, to know earlier 
rather than later whether their rules are good law. It is best that ultra vires laws 
are identified as soon as possible so that those responsible may redress and cor-
rect them. The drastic circumstances of the English tax-restitution cases, which 
 
478. See supra note 244 and accompanying text; see also Schaefer, supra note 254, at 645 (arguing 
that the application of “new” law should not hinge on what stage a case happens to have 
reached in the judicial system). 
479. Smith, 496 U.S. at 212 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Arkansas HUE tax also violated the 
Constitution before our decision in Scheiner and petitioners are entitled to a decision to that 
effect. . . . Petitioners would have prevailed if the Pennsylvania tax invalidated in the Scheiner 
case had never been enacted, or if that litigation had not reached our Court until a�er their 
litigation did. They should not lose simply because we decided Scheiner first.”). 
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exposed three decades of past-paid taxes to protracted litigation, should be 
avoided.480 
4. Stay of Judgment 
A final temporal limit that courts can impose is staying entry of judgment.481 
This defers a successful plaintiff ’s opportunity to obtain a remedy until a future 
date, which can provide time for a legislature to recalibrate relevant rights and 
obligations (within constitutional bounds) in the interim period in a way that 
may bear upon the plaintiff ’s ultimate position. Critique of the judiciousness and 
constitutionality of stays of judgment is beyond the scope of this Article. 
5. Nontemporal Defenses 
In addition to time-oriented limits, a number of “pre-existing, separate, in-
dependent rule[s]” may also limit rights of action.482 These include doctrines of 
sovereign immunity, 483  qualified immunity, 484  a good-faith defense to 
 
480. See supra Section II.E.2. 
481. E.g., Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 970 (Mass. 2003) (staying entry of 
a judgment recognizing a state constitutional right of same-sex marriage for 180 days); see 
Rhodes, supra note 4, at 415-16. 
482. Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 756 (1995); see South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 
138 S. Ct. 2080, 2099 (2018). 
483. See Vicki C. Jackson, Principle and Compromise in Constitutional Adjudication: The Eleventh 
Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 953, 983-84 (2000); Vicki 
C. Jackson, Suing the Federal Government: Sovereignty, Immunity, and Judicial Independence, 35 
GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 521, 569-72 (2003); Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Elev-
enth Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1, 83-84 (1988); Roosevelt, supra 
note 28, at 1136. 
484. See Reynoldsville Casket, 514 U.S. at 757-59. Although this doctrine, too, is highly problematic. 
Joanna C. Schwartz, The Case Against Qualified Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1797 
(2018); see Baxter v. Bracey, 140 S. Ct. 1862, 1862-65 (2020) (mem.) (Thomas, J., dissenting 
from denial of certiorari) (criticizing the Court’s denial of certiorari on the question of 
whether the doctrine of qualified immunity should be narrowed or abolished); Alan K. Chen, 
The Intractability of Qualified Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1937, 1941-51 (2018). 
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constitutional torts,485 forfeiture,486 estoppel,487 procedural default,488 change 
of position,489 and passing on,490 as well as the other justiciability doctrines such 
as standing.491 Again, analysis of these various limits is beyond this Article’s 
scope. 
C. Summary 
The right-of-action framework requires timely complaints to be resolved ac-
cording to the adjudicating court’s best understanding of the law. This encom-
passes relevant novel precedent. But whether a complaint remains timely must 
be understood in the context of established defenses and limits on rights of ac-
tion. The right-of-action framework maintains the burden on plaintiffs to inves-
tigate and pursue their rights vigilantly. It incentivizes prompt litigation of novel 
rights by empowering courts, in exceptional cases where equity demands, to 
protect defendants from the prejudicial consequences of undue delay. Unlike 
non-retroactivity doctrine, it does not excuse parties who are caught off guard 
by novel precedent. For instance, the right-of-action framework rejects Justice 
Stevens’s characterization of Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson as a “special” case in which 
“[i]t would have been most inequitable to have held that the plaintiff had ‘slept 
 
485. See supra note 336. Although, for the same reasons the Smith plurality judgment can be criti-
cized, invoking “good faith” to bar relief in pending suits is dubious. See Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari at i, Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty & Mun. Emps., No. 19-1104 (Mar. 10, 2020) 
(presenting the question of whether there is a “good faith defense” to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in cases 
of new law); William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 45, 55-62 
(2018); Schwartz, supra note 484, 1801-03, 1814. See also, in the context of criminal-procedure 
violations by government, Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 254 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissent-
ing), which states that “[a] new ‘good faith’ exception and this Court’s retroactivity decisions 
are incompatible.” Cf. Beske, supra note 20, at 679-81 (discussing the relevance of retroactivity 
doctrine to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule’s “good-faith” exception). 
486. See Beske, supra note 20, at 681-87. 
487. See Andrew Robertson, Reliance and Expectation in Estoppel Remedies, 18 LEGAL STUD. 360, 361-
62 (1998). 
488. See Kermit Roosevelt III, Light from Dead Stars: The Procedural Adequate and Independent State 
Ground Reconsidered, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1888, 1889 (2003). 
489. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 65 (AM. LAW INST. 
2011). 
490. See id. § 64. 
491. See Erin F. Delaney, Analyzing Avoidance: Judicial Strategy in Comparative Perspective, 66 DUKE 
L.J. 1, 16-28 (2016). 
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on his rights’ during a period in which neither he nor the defendant could have 
known the time limitation that applied to the case.”492 
It is not correct that the parties could not have known their respective rights 
and obligations under law prior to the day the Supreme Court handed down its 
novel decision in Rodrigue, or that “[t]he most [Huson] could do was to rely on 
the law as it then was.”493 Huson gained a right of action the day he was injured 
on Chevron Oil’s drilling rig. He had reason to seek legal advice from that date. 
That he did not anticipate that state limitations law governed his claim, and that 
Chevron Oil did not think to argue it, does not take away from the reality that 
had Huson filed his claim within one year of his injury, there would have been 
no question as to its timeliness. Rodrigue did not abolish Huson’s right of action. 
It may be that Huson’s claim could have been saved by some other independent 
doctrine.494 But that doctrine should not have been non-retroactivity. 
Invoking established equitable principles such as laches—either directly or 
by analogy—is a preferable response to new law than the amorphous “equitable 
considerations” that underlie judicial non-retroactivity doctrine. Even radical 
shi�s in precedent, as evinced in Obergefell and Janus, bear on past rights. The 
timing of such judgments does not determine which same-sex couples suffered 
rights violations when they were denied the benefits of marriage, or which pub-
lic-sector employees suffered rights violations when they were compulsorily 
charged agency fees. Rather, the timing of those rights violations determines 
whether such plaintiffs can still have their day in court. This is the key point that 
distinguishes the right-of-action framework from the alternatives. 
The right-of-action framework outlined in this Article eschews the non-ret-
roactivity paradigm. It distinguishes cases according to when rights of action ac-
crued and prioritizes remedying the most recent-in-time harms over those that 
are brought a�er delay. It does not divorce rights from remedies by reference to 
 
492. Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 220 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 108 (1971)); see also Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & 
Petrigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 370-74 (1991) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (endorsing 
the Court’s previous practice of applying new judicially determined limitations periods non-
retroactively as a matter of fairness, justified reliance, and due process); id. at 377 (Kennedy, 
J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for adopting an approach to limitations that the plain-
tiffs could not have anticipated and with which they could not have complied); David N. 
Mark, Retroactivity of Statute of Limitations Rulings Under the Influence of Jim Beam, 29 IDAHO 
L. REV. 361, 365 (1992) (arguing that “retroactivity of statute of limitations rulings should still 
be decided under the Chevron Oil three-factor equitable test”). 
493. Chevron Oil, 404 U.S. at 107; see supra Section II.B.2; cf. Beske, supra note 20, at 690-92. 
494. The Court could, for instance, have held Chevron Oil was estopped from introducing a late 
limitations defense. See Rhodes, supra note 4, at 420-23. 
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an arbitrary date that a significant novel precedent is handed down.495 It does 
not hinge on courts distinguishing between pending and subsequent cases. And 
it embodies an important value in our legal system: that equity aids the vigilant. 
conclusion 
Non-retroactive adjudication fails to construe rights and remedies in a man-
ner that does justice to parties. Its assumptions are flawed.496 Its foundations—
fairness, reliance, efficiency, and finality—are manipulable.497 And perhaps most 
concerningly, it risks collapsing into a crude policy tool, whereby from case to 
case either retroactivity or prospectivity is favored merely to achieve the deci-
sionmaker’s preferred outcome.498 Non-retroactivity doctrine does not satisfac-
torily rationalize the temporal scope of novel precedent. 
The Supreme Court’s current jurisprudence, which recognizes a strong pre-
sumption of adjudicative retroactivity, is but one step removed from the right-
of-action framework. The Court should take the final step by collapsing the pre-
sumption into acceptance. The right-of-action framework is coherent and com-
pelling because it recognizes that novel precedent, like all precedent, is inherently 
retroactive. Whether “new” law applies to a given case depends on the justicia-
bility of the plaintiff ’s right of action. Only if justice demands it should equitable 
doctrines, such as laches, interfere to curtail plaintiffs from vindicating their ju-
dicially recognized rights. By reconceptualizing the puzzle of novel precedent in 
these terms, we solve it. 
 
495. Cf. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 66, at 1794-97 (arguing that retroactive remedies can be with-
held when new rules would have been unpredictable). 
496. See supra Part II. 
497. See Chen, supra note 6, at 1435; Stephens, supra note 31, at 1560-61. 
498. See Chen, supra note 6, at 1450-51. Similar concerns permeate the temporality of new rules of 
criminal law and procedure. See supra note 61. They are also salient in so-called “judicial tak-
ings” cases. See Eduardo M. Peñalver & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Judicial Takings or Due Process?, 
97 CORNELL L. REV. 305, 331-33 (2012). 
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